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Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Arbeit beschreibt die Notwendigkeit der Nutzung von Open Source
Software für Verifikationsaufgaben in der nuklearen Rüstungskontrolle und stellt die
Entwicklung einer solchen offenen Software zur Simulation von Neutronenmultiplizi-
tätsmessungen vor. Verifikation dient der Sicherstellung der Einhaltung internationaler
Verträge. Technische Verfahren spielen dabei eine zentrale Rolle, sowohl zur Vermei-
dung von Proliferation als auch bei der Verifikation zukünftiger Abrüstung.
Auch 26 Jahre nach Ende des kalten Krieges stellen Kernwaffen noch immer eine welt-
weite, ernsthafte Bedrohung dar. Neun Staaten besitzen insgesamt rund 15350 Kern-
waffen, die Mehrheit davon mit höherer Sprengkraft als die in Nagasaki und Hiroshima
eingesetzten Waffen. Sowohl die beabsichtigte Nutzung, wie in den Militärdoktrinen
vieler Länder vorgesehen, als auch die unabsichtliche Explosion durch technische oder
menschliche Fehler hätten weitreichende Folgen. Um das Ziel einer atomwaffenfreien
Welt zu realisieren, können neue internationale Vereinbarungen getroffen werden oder
existierende Vereinbarungen ausgeweitet werden. In beiden Fällen wäre dies mit einer
Steigerung der Nutzung von Verifikationstechnologien verbunden.
Diese Arbeit identifiziert, bezogen auf diese Messverfahren und Technologien, ein neues
Problem, welches in anderen Untersuchungen typischerweise nicht berücksichtigt wird.
Die Ergebnisse technischer Verifikationsmaßnahmen spielen oft eine entscheidende Rol-
le in der Entscheidungsfindung von Staaten und internationalen Organisationen. Neben
der inhaltlichen Validität der gewonnenen Daten ist es daher ebenso wichtig, dass alle
beteiligten Akteure den Ergebnissen vertrauen können, die zugrunde liegenden Annah-
men transparent dargestellt werden und das alle Vertragspartner, möglicherweise auch
weitere gesellschaftliche Akteure, Zugang zu den verwendeten Technologien haben. Im
folgenden wird dabei ein Fokus auf Software als Teil von Verifikationstechnologien ge-
legt, für die die genannten Aspekte ebenso gelten. Existierende eingesetzte Software
unterliegt oft verschiedenen Einschränkungen mit Bezug auf die genannten Anforde-
rungen, Software ist häufig proprietär oder steht unter Exportkontrolle.
Dies kann auch an einem konkreten Beispiel deutlich gemacht werden. Für den For-
schungsreaktor in Arak hat der Iran ursprünglich die Nutzung von Uran mit natürli-
chem Anreicherungsgrad geplant, ein solcher Reaktor weist jedoch eine besonders hohe
Proliferationsgefahr auf. Im Rahmen des Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
hat der Iran mit anderen Staaten unter anderem vereinbart, den Reaktor auf andere
Brennstoffe umzurüsten. Typischerweise werden für Simulationsrechnungen von neu-
en Reaktorkonfigurationen Monte Carlo Neutronentransportprogramme verwendet, das
mit Abstand gängiste Tool ist Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP), eine amerikanische Soft-
ware. Die proprietäre und exportkontrollierte Software steht Wissenschaftlern aus dem
i
Iran jedoch nicht zur Verfügung. Sollte den Diskussionen auf Basis von Resultaten die-
ses Programmes erfolgen, erschwert dies eine internationale, offene Diskussion über die
Umrüstung. Zwei weitere Beispiele werden ausführlich in der Arbeit behandelt.
Zur Lösung des beschriebenen Problems wird vorgeschlagen, dass Software, die im Kon-
text von nuklear Rüstungskontrolle verwendet wird, folgende drei Kriterien erfüllen
sollte:
1. Freier Zugang zum Programm, ohne Einschränkungen jeglicher Art
2. Weitergabe des Programms muss vollständigen Quellcode einschließen
3. Veränderungen am Programm (und deren Weitergabe) sind erlaubt
Die genannten Kriterien sind abgeleitet von den Definitionen für Freie Software [Sta10]
und Open Source Software [OSI], wie sie in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten im Bereich all-
gemeiner Softwareenwicklung diskutiert wurden. Software, die in nuklearer Rüstungs-
kontrolle eingesetzt wird, erfüllt häufig diese Kriterien nicht. Um dies zu ändern, ist es
entweder notwendig, den Zugang zu Software und Quellcode zu öffnen, oder alternati-
ve Möglichkeiten zu entwickeln, sofern die erste Option nicht möglich ist.
Die Nutzung der genannten Kriterien bietet eine Reihe von Vorteilen für in der nu-
klearen Rüstungskontrolle eingesetzte Software. Durch die Offenlegung des Quelltex-
tes haben alle Akteure die Möglichkeit, Software sowohl auf etwaige Betrugsroutinen,
als auch auf unintendierte Fehlfunktionen zu überprüfen. Dadurch wird das Vertrauen
in die Verifikationsergebnisse erhöht. Verifikation wird durch offenen Quellcode auch
transparenter - alle einer Software und den damit produzierten Resultaten zugrunde-
liegenden Annahmen können eingesehen und geprüft werden. Außerdem gibt es durch
die genannten Kriterien für alle beteiligten Staaten und internationalen Organisatio-
nen, sowie für weitere Interessierte die Möglichkeit, Zugang zu verwendeter Software
zu bekommen. Dies dient erhöhter Partizipation in wichtigen Prozessen, vereinfachter
Ausbildung von neuen Expertinnen und Experten sowie einer Demokratisierung des
Rüstungskontrollprozesses.
Um die Umsetzbarkeit dieses Vorhabens darzulegen, und gleichzeitig einen technischen
Beitrag zu leisten, wurde die Software “Open Neutron Multiplicity Simulation” (ONMS)
entwickelt, welche die Simulation von Neutronenmultiplizitätsmessungen ermöglicht.
Solche Messungen erlauben es, in nicht-destruktiven Verfahren die in Proben enthal-
tene Menge an Plutonium zu bestimmen. Dazu wird über Koinzidenzmessungen die
Rate an Spontanspaltungen in der Probe ermittelt. Die geradzahligen Plutoniumisoto-
pe haben deutlich höhere Wahrscheinlichkeiten für einen Zerfall über Spontanspaltung.
Bei bekannter Isotopenzusammensetzung kann daher aus der Spontanspaltungsrate die
Plutoniummasse ermittelt werden.
Für eine Simulation solcher Messungen sind eine Reihe von Schritten notwendig. Zu-
nächst müssen die Quelldefinitionen für Proben adäquat modelliert werden. Dies bein-
haltet korrekte Zerfallsraten sowie korrekte Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung der Zahl bei
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einzelnen Spaltungen freigesetzten Neutronen. Ebenso notwendig ist eine korrekte Be-
handlung von (α, n) Reaktionen, die bei oxidischen Proben eine signifikante Rolle als
Neutronenquelle spielen. Zur Simulation des Teilchentransports durch komplexe De-
tektorgeometrien ist es notwendig, eine gute Repräsentation von Neutronenwechsel-
wirkungen mit verschiedenen Materialien zur Verfügung zu haben. Abschließend muss
die Pulsfolge detektierter Neutronen durch entsprechende Methoden analysiert werden,
um daraus auf die Masse rückschließen zu können.
Alle diese Funktionen wurden in der vorgestellten Software ONMS abgebildet. ONMS
arbeitet auf der Basis von Geant4, einem Software Framework für Monte Carlo Teil-
chentransportsimulationen in unterschiedlichsten Anwendungsbereichen, insbesondere
auch in der Hochenergiephysik. Es bietet aber auch die notwendigen Routinen für den
Neutronentransport im Energiebereich bis zu 20MeV, sowie speziell Neutronenstreu-
ung in thermischen Regionen (bis rund 4 eV). ONMS ist die erste Anwendung, die die
Monte Carlo Routinen von Geant4 nutzt. Fast alle anderen, existierenden Simulations-
programme nutzen entsprechende Funktionen basierend auf der Software MCNP. Daher
haben sie die schon zuvor genannten Einschränkungen mit Bezug auf Verfügbarkeit von
Software und Quellcode.
Speziell für ONMS entwickelt wurde eine neue Routine für Teilchenquellen. Sie nutzt
aktuelle Datensätze für Spontanspaltung, und ermöglicht die automatische Berechnung
der durch (α, n) Reaktionen emittierten Neutronen basierend auf durch den Nutzer
vorgegebenen Probenmaterialien. Weiterhin wurde die Analysefunktion für Neutronen-
pulsfolgen von Grund auf neu konzipiert, basierend auf der Methodik elektronischer
Schieberegister. Die Funktion erlaubt die Berechnung der Masse sowie die Bestimmung
der drei zentralen Größen Singles, Doubles und Triples, die Momente der emittier-
ten und detektierten Multiplizitätsverteilung. Über den kompletten Entwicklungspro-
zess hinweg wurde darauf geachtet, dass die Software den oben genannten Kriterien
entspricht. Sie ist als Open Source Software verfügbar, ebenso sind alle erforderlichen
Datenquellen frei zugänglich.
Die Software wurde anhand von verschiedenen Datensätzen validiert. Zunächst wur-
den dafür experimentelle Messungen herangezogen, die von Malte Göttsche im Früh-
jahr 2012 durchgeführt wurden. Diese Messungen beinhalten drei metallische und fünf
oxidische Proben. Simulationen der Messungen mit ONMS zeigen in fast allen Fällen
sehr gute Übereinstimmung mit gemessenen Werten, sowohl für die Momente Singles,
Doubles und Triples, als auch bei detektierten Plutoniummassen.
Weiterhin wurden Daten aus einem umfassenden Satz von speziellen Vergleichsrech-
nungen verwendet, die als sog. “ESARDA Neutron Multiplicity Benchmark” zusammen-
gestellt wurden. Die Daten umfassen einerseits theoretische, idealisierte Probendefi-
nitionen mit dazugehörigen, simulierten Neutronenpulsfolgen, sowie Spezifikationen
von realen Proben und gemessene Neutronenpulsfolgen. Diese Daten wurden von einer
Reihe von Arbeitsgruppen analysiert, und deren Ergebnisse verglichen. Die Analysen
umfassten zwei Teile, zum einen die Analyse der zur Verfügung gestellten Neutro-
nenpulsfolgen, zum anderen die vollständige Simulation der Messung inklusive Mon-
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te Carlo Teilchentransport. Beide Teile des Benchmarks wurden ebenfalls mit ONMS
durchgeführt. Die Ergebnisse der Analyse der Neutronenpulsefolgen sind sehr gut, Ab-
weichungen für einzelne Proben vom Mittelwert der Benchmarkergebnisse liegen im
Bereich von wenigen Prozent. Für die vollständigen Monte Carlo Simulationen werden
auch gute Ergebnisse erzielt. Insgesamt sind die Abweichungen größer, insbesondere
bei Proben mit großer Plutoniummasse, jedoch im Rahmen typischer Unsicherheiten
der Messmethode.
Die Validierungsrechnungen lassen den Schluss zu, dass die Software grundsätzlich
funktioniert und eine mögliche Alternative zu existierenden Routinen bietet. Weitere
Schritte zur kontinuierlichen Verbesserung der Software können die Nutzung anderer
Wechselwirkungsdaten sowie die Implementierung von verbesserten Routinen zur Neu-
tronenpulsfolgenanalyse, wie sie von einigen Autoren vorgeschlagen wurden, umfassen.
Mit Bezug auf die anfangs genannten grundlegenderen Probleme der Softwarenutzung
in nuklearer Rüstungskontrolle ist in Zukunft eine vermehrte Anwendung der Open
Source Kriterien sinnvoll.
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1 Introduction
The central issue addressed in this thesis is the role of trust, transparency and partici-
pation in technical verification of nuclear arms control. This involves a general analysis
of these topics, and the development of an open source software application to be used
for verification tasks in nuclear disarmament verification and safeguarding of fissile
materials.
Nearly all existing arms control regulations rely on verification mechanisms as ways
to proof states’ compliant behavior with international agreements. Future regulations
might include the same and new verification mechanisms. Often, the task of developing
and improving arms control verification is seen as a political issue to be solved primarily
by diplomats, politicians and experts in international relations, but it is also a technical
problem. From early on, technical aspects have been seen as central parts of approaches
to control or eliminate the danger of nuclear weapons. In the Franck Report, written
by members of the Manhattan project before the first nuclear weapon was dropped, the
authors stated that “any international agreement on prevention of nuclear armaments
must be backed by actual and efficient controls” [Fra+45].
Until today, no international treaty or codified multilateral effort is in place which would
set the stage for complete, global elimination of nuclear weapons. Nine countries1 still
own an estimated number of 15350 nuclear weapons [KN16], each one of them capable
of destroying a medium sized city, many of them orders of magnitude more powerful.
So-called strategic nuclear weapons sit on intercontinental ballistic missiles, are ready
to be loaded onto long-range bomber aircraft and cruise the oceans on submarines.
Additionally, tactical nuclear weapons are stored in military bases around the world,
even on foreign soil2. There seems to be an imminent threat of usage and resulting
disaster, caused either by intentional explosions as proposed in several current military
doctrines, or by accidental detonations due to technical or human failures. At the same
time, the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries remains a risk. Nuclear
proliferation in the past resulted in constant additions of countries to the pool of nuclear
weapon states. More than 26 years after the end of the cold war, the often promised
“peace dividend” has not payed off. And as time goes by, the group of women and men
that remember living in a world without nuclear weapons dwindles, eventually all will
die.
At the same time, some positive developments are underway. The “Humanitarian Ini-
tiative” can be seen as a refreshing new step forward towards prohibition of nuclear
1 United States, Russia, France, United Kingdom, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea.
2 US tactical nuclear weapons are held in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey under
NATO’s nuclear sharing policy [NK11].
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weapons. In 2013 and 2014, three international meetings were held in Norway, Mexico
and Austria, organized by the respective foreign ministries. Countries met to discuss
effects of nuclear weapons and possible catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any
use, intentional or accidental, of nuclear weapons. The discussions led to the draft of
the “Humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons”. It
was tabled as a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly in 2015 and has re-
ceived 139 votes in favor [UNG15]. The pledge includes the proposition to negotiate a
treaty which would ban possession of nuclear weapons. In the May 2016 meeting of the
Open Ended Working Group of the United Nations General Assembly, tasked with “Tak-
ing Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations”, a proposal to start such
negotiations by the year 2017 was tabled by nine countries, all members of Nuclear
Weapon Free Zones3 [Arg+16].
The goal of a world free of nuclear weapons will not be possible without comprehensive
verification. Very likely the importance and necessary capabilities of verification for
existing and future nuclear arms control, understood here as both the attempt to prevent
proliferation and to limit and finally remove existing nuclear weapons, will continue to
grow. Such an increased need for verification technologies also increases the demand
for new technological developments. Three particular aspects of verification are often
neglected or overlooked by researchers working on verification technologies: First the
role of trust in relation to the used technology, second the question of transparency of
the used tools and lastly the question of accessibility of technology to all parties involved
and a broader audience.
These issues are addressed in this thesis, with a general focus on software that can
underpin verification instruments and methods and allows for simulations of physical
effects. Used as part of verification technologies for international treaties, it is clear that
software results often form an important basis for decision making. Increased software
use also goes along with the continuous increase in information technologies. Software
plays important roles in different phases of the life of verification technologies. It is
used in the beginning as part of the design and testing process of measurement devices.
After measurements are taken, software is used for data analysis and distribution. In-
dependent from actual measurements, software can play a role in simulating future
developments or events that should be covered by verification but where actual real
tests are undesirable, as for example a nuclear weapons test explosion.
To increase trust, transparency and participation in nuclear arms control, employed
software should fulfill criteria similar to those definitions proposed by the movements
for Open Source Software and Free Software. Software should be distributed includ-
ing source code, to allow other users to verify its functionality. There should be no
restrictions on access to software used for arms control verification. Many applications
currently used in nuclear arms control do not fulfill the listed criteria, in contrast they
3 Nuclear Weapon Free Zones are formed by groups of countries and ban nuclear weapons in certain
areas. The proposal was tabled by Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Mexico and Zambia.
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are often characterized by strict access controls (e.g. export limitations) and are mostly
of proprietary nature. Changing these characteristics would contribute to removing
secrecy, mistrust, lack of transparency and exclusive arrangements. The open source
community, which developed alongside the above mentioned movements, is an exam-
ple for the successful integration of knowledge sharing in a different area. Transferring
some of the achievements and benefits from the open source community to nuclear
arms control would be beneficial.
Looking at recent literature, this work is neither the first to publish open source software
that is or could be used for arms control applications (for example OpenMC, [RF13]),
nor the first to emphasize the benefits (for example [Whi01]). However, to my knowl-
edge, it is the first broader study based on both discussions of the open source issue,
as well as providing a piece of software which has been developed from the ground up
using an open source philosophy.
The software developed is a new application to carry out simulations of neutron multi-
plicity measurements, “Open Neutron Multiplicity Simulation” (ONMS). It is the first of
its kind to be available as open source software and the first to use Geant4 as a back-
end for the required Monte Carlo particle transport. Most, probably all, of the existing
tools rely on the export-controlled and proprietary tool Monte Carlo N-Particle Code
(MCNP) for the Monte Carlo particle transport. During the development of ONMS is
was ensured that necessary components, including the required nuclear data sets, were
chosen from openly available sources. Beyond obvious benefits of the open source stan-
dard, the software also implements several additional features, especially with regard
to the particle source for simulations.
Using neutron multiplicity measurements can reveal the mass of plutonium in a given
sample. Such methods could be used during several arms control verification tasks.
Safeguards preventing nuclear non-proliferation can use the measurements to provide
material accountability for fissile materials. During future disarmament efforts, the
same method could be utilized to help authenticating an object to be a nuclear warhead.
A commonly discussed method to do this is the “Attribute Approach”, where several
different attributes of a warhead would be defined, one of which very likely would
be an items’ plutonium mass. Simulations of neutron multiplicity measurements help
developing new detectors and allow to simplify checks for possible ways of cheating
measurements. As stated above, no open source software for such a task is currently
available. In addition, availability for existing tools is limited. In one of the descriptions
of the benchmark calculations used to validate ONMS, the authors writes that “few
codes are available today [...] and they are not available to everybody” [PS06, p. 2].
The dissertation is organized in two parts. The first part addresses the issue from a
policy perspective, and is split in chapter 2 and 3. Chapter 2, “Arms Control and the Use
of Software” describes the use of software as part of arms control verification in detail,
categorizes applications and illustrates possible issues and limitations based on three
examples. In chapter 3, “The Case for Open Source Software”, the open source approach
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is presented. It is explained how it could be employed for arms control verification and
what the benefits and challenges would be.
The second part covers all details related to the development and testing of Open Neu-
tron Multiplicity Simulation. It starts with chapter 4, “Neutron Multiplicity Measure-
ments,” which describes the physics of neutron multiplicity measurements. The chapter
includes the steps of the calculation required to retrieve the plutonium mass from a
measurement and detailed discussions on the role of (α, n) reactions for neutron mul-
tiplicity measurements. Chapter 5, “Description of the Simulation Software”, focuses
on the software itself and the implementation of physical processes and models. The
last chapter of the second part, chapter 6, “Validation of Open Neutron Multiplicity
Simulation”, discusses testing and validation of the code. It is based both on experi-
mental results and a large benchmark exercise for neutron multiplicity simulations. The
dissertation ends with concluding remarks, which also give an outlook about possible
subsequent research.
From a broader, historical perspective, the thoughts of this thesis go in line with ideas
that have been raised seven decades ago. It is important to strengthen international
agreements through technical verification, as first outlined in the Franck report men-
tioned above. Sharing of knowledge is a fundamental idea of the open source approach,
a similar idea can be traced back in the early history of nuclear weapons, too. The “Re-
port on the International Control of Atomic Energy”, known as the Acheson-Lilienthal
Plan, concludes with the following sentences: “When the plan is in full operation, there
will no longer be secrets about atomic energy. We believe that this is the firmest basis
of security; for in the long term there can be no international control and no interna-
tional cooperation which does not presuppose an international community of knowl-
edge” [Lil+46, p. 60]. Applying open source criteria to software (and possibly other
means of verification) would be a step towards supporting an international community
of knowledge on nuclear arms control.
The motivation to contribute as a scientist to a field of public interest has been motivated
by Bertrand Russels ideas of the responsibility of scientists and their moral obligations
as citizens [Rus60], and the relationship between science, society and atomic energy
as voiced by Albert Einstein: “We scientists recognize our inescapable responsibility to
carry to our fellow citizens an understanding of the simple facts of atomic energy and
its implications for society. In this lies our only security and our only hope – we believe
that an informed citizenry will act for life and not for death” [Ein46]. The work for this
dissertation has been carried out mostly as part of the Interdisciplinary Research Group
on Science, Technology and Security (IANUS) at the Technische Universität Darmstadt
and partly in the Program for Science and Global Security at Princeton University. Both
groups have a longstanding tradition of contributing to public policy issues by doing
scientific research, not only limited to the field of nuclear arms control. The idea of
helping with scientific and technical work to eliminate nuclear weapons was part of the
overall motivation for the research project described in this thesis. Besides scientific
challenges, there was an ongoing struggle to please scientists and policy experts alike,
fulfilling different requirements of the different peer groups and scientific communities.
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I hope that this work is able to meet these standards. At the same time, I hope that some
of the findings and results can contribute to nuclear disarmament and a safer world in
the future.
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Part I.
Open Source meets
Nuclear Arms Control
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2 Arms Control and the Use of
Software
The goal of this chapter is to outline the role of software in nuclear arms control, and to
characterize problems and challenges. At first, a short, general history of arms control
is presented, which could be skipped by readers familiar with the topic. The section is
followed by a broad overview of actual use cases of software in arms control, sorted
by different classes and categories. Then, three more detailed examples shed additional
light on the previously defined categories. Beginning with these examples, several issues
and limitations related to the use of software in arms control are identified. The list of
issues and limitations will be expanded in a general way at the end of this chapter.
2.1 History of Nuclear Arms Control
Ideas on how to limit the use of nuclear weapons and their spread have been raised
for a long time. Already during the Manhattan Project, several scientists realized what
radically changing effects nuclear weapons would have on warfare and the interna-
tional community. It is very remarkable that important points, which are valid until
today, were raised at a time before the first nuclear weapon was tested and before
they were actually used in war. The scientists discussed among their fellows, and ad-
dressed high level politicians to possibly stop the use on the Japanese cities of Nagasaki
and Hiroshima. Leo Szilard wrote internally on this issue and made attempts to con-
tact presidents Roosevelt and Truman. Niels Bohr proposed the idea of negotiating
an agreement to share control of nuclear weapons among the United States, United
Kingdom and Russia to Churchill and Roosevelt. In June 1945, James Franck chaired
a committee on social and political implications of atomic energy which produced the
so-called Franck report. The report predicted a nuclear arms race, and also argued
against the use of weapons on Japanese cities [Fra+45; Wit09]. It also discussed the
possibility of international arms control, including the necessity of technical verification
methods.
After the war, the ideas on international control were followed up. Based on the
Acheson-Lilienthal report [Lil+46], the United States introduced the Baruch Plan in
1946 at the newly founded United Nations, which proposed international coopera-
tion for nuclear energy and the elimination of nuclear weapons from arsenals [FGL02,
p. 504]. The first resolution ever passed by the United Nations General Assembly called
for the elimination of nuclear weapons of national arsenals [UNG46]. Contrary to
these and other attempts, no agreement was reached, nuclear weapons remained in
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US arsenals, and in the seven decades since, eight additional states acquired their own
weapons.
In parallel to proliferation, efforts to regulate nuclear weapons were continued, some of
them successful. Until today, a complex international regime for nuclear arms control
has developed. Often considered “the cornerstone” of this regime, the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970 [UNO12; UNO15]. It defines
two categories of treaty members: States who tested a nuclear weapon before January
1st, 1967 are “Nuclear Weapon States”, other member states are “Non-Nuclear Weapon
States”. The latter are not allowed to acquire nuclear weapons, while the first have an
obligation to disarm their arsenals over time. States of both categories should cooperate
on the civilian use of nuclear energy. Testing of nuclear weapons has been regulated
since 1963 on the surface, in the atmosphere and underwater by the Limited Test-Ban
Treaty. In 1995 the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty was concluded, banning under-
ground tests as well. Lacking some states’ ratification, however, it has not yet entered
into force. The nuclear arms control regime further includes bilateral measures by the
Soviet Union and the United States to limit their arsenals, most importantly the “New
START” treaty which regulates strategic arsenals and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty (“INF”) which bans missiles. Many states also formed Nuclear Weapon
Free-Zone’ based on multilateral treaties. Today, such zones cover the whole southern
hemisphere.
Nevertheless, the most important component of the regime is missing: A clear way for-
ward towards a world free of nuclear weapons. A first step would be the regulation of
fissile materials used in weapons. The so-called Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, which
would ban the production of such materials, has been on the agenda for international
negotiations for more than two decades. Substantive negotiations have not started due
to a stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, the assigned negotiating arena. In a
more comprehensive version, such a treaty might also ban possession of fissile materials
in general [Fei+14, 143ff.]. Regarding the weapons itself, no international agreement
has been reached, or even put forward for negotiations. The NPT includes a general
provision for disarmament, but does not prohibit possession. Such a prohibition includ-
ing provisions for phases towards that goal would be included in a “Nuclear Weapons
Convention”, which has been proposed by several NGOs as a model treaty text similar
to the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention [III07].
In recent years, many states met to discuss the humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear
weapons in conferences in Norway, Mexico and Austria. These meetings resulted in the
“Humanitarian Pledge”, calling for a rather simple treaty banning all weapons [UNG15].
This would be a different approach compared to a comprehensive convention, as con-
crete steps to disarm would be negotiated only after such a “ban treaty” entered into
force. The treaty itself would focus on setting the normative goal. A proposal to start
such negotiations by the year 2017 was tabled by nine countries of different Nuclear
Weapon Free Zones in an international meeting in 2016 [Arg+16]. Even given that
proposal, numerous calls for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and endorsements of the
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Humanitarian Pledge - there is much more work to be done to achieve the goal of a
world free of nuclear weapons.
Looking back in history, while ideas on arms control started among scientists, the issue
quickly shifted, probably exclusively, to the field of international relations and foreign
policy, dominated and carried out by state leaders, diplomats and other political person-
nel. The general public has had some influence on the developments, especially during
times of strong peace movement activities. Scientists, science, engineers and technol-
ogy today mainly enter the picture with relation to verification and monitoring of treaty
obligations. Most successful international treaties rely on such verification mechanisms.
The most obvious reason for verification is to detect if states are failing their obligations
or trying to cheat. But there are other functions: Verification and monitoring can create
and preserve trust and confidence that every member is complying. Showing ways to
ensure compliance, verification also can help building support for treaties and motivate
states to join a treaty. It is also important for the scope of treaties - in most cases they
include only provisions that are deemed verifiable (cf. for example [Gay86]). Serious
negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty only started after viable verification
means had been demonstrated. Experts and scientists played an important role in devel-
oping these tools, and also formed the “Group of Scientific Experts” to help negotiations
with technical advice [Dah13].
Early ways to carry out verification originated in the military. It often consisted of
so-called “National Technical Means”, where states would use their own military and
civilian intelligence assets to observe other countries actions. On-site inspections, in-
vestigations on other countries soil were added over time [Gay86]. In parallel, interna-
tional organizations were founded that would be tasked with verification, for example
the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Preparatory Committee for the Com-
prehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization.
2.2 Software Applications in Nuclear Arms Control?
The importance of software use in arms control applications goes beyond common re-
liance on software in a computerized world. Of cause, there are many applications
that use general purpose software, standard software that an organization inevitably
will be using, such as word processing tools, web browser, means for email and other
communication or simply operating systems. More relevant, though, are applications
that are more closely involved with treaty verification. Technical verification consists
of complex measurement systems and networks, and is carried out by groups of spe-
cially trained scientists. Similar to many other fields, the use and reliance on software
constantly increases with new emerging information technologies. A significant part of
the work is carried out using software, sets of instructions and algorithms to be exe-
cuted by computing hardware like personal computers or signal processing units. For
many tasks, there is no way to avoid using software. Software programs are also often
designed specifically for a particular task and implement representations of particular
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Table 2.1.: Existing and possible tasks fulfilled by software in current and future arms
control regimes, ordered by treaty regime and main use of software.
Non-Proliferation /
Safeguards
Comprehensive Test-Ban Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty
Nuclear Disarmament
Agreement
Particle Transport Development of
non-destructive assay
methods for fresh/spent
fuel analysis
Development of
non-destructive assay
methods for material
analysis
Development of
non-destructive assay
methods for warhead
authentication
Criticality Calculation Generate neutron
flux-spectra for depletion
calculation
Generate neutron
flux-spectra for depletion
calculation, nuclear
archaeology
Depletion Calculations Proliferation potential of
reactors
Estimate fission product
release
Estimate past/current
fissile material production
capabilities
Fission product tagging
for warhead identification
Spectrum Analysis Identify items
(spent/fresh fuel),
determine material
compositions
Detection of radionuclides Identify items
(spent/fresh fuel),
determine material
compositions
Identify items (warheads)
and respective material
compositions
Correlation Analysis Neutron correlation /
multiplicity
measurements for
plutonium mass estimates
Neutron correlation /
multiplicity
measurements for
plutonium mass estimates
Neutron correlation /
multiplicity
measurements for
plutonium mass estimates
Atmospheric Transport
Modeling
Kr-85 detection
(clandestine and declared
reprocessing)
Radionuclide detection Kr-85 detection
(clandestine and declared
reprocessing)
Fuel Cycle Simulation Material balancing &
accounting
Material balancing &
accounting, past fissile
material production
Fluid dynamics Isotope separation
modeling
Enrichment cascade
analysis
Nuclear archaeology
Waveform Analysis Discriminate explosion /
earthquake
Image Identification Find clandestine facilities
using satellite imagery
Find clandestine facilities
using satellite imagery
Image Change Detection Find clandestine facilities,
track operational status of
existing ones
Detect crater / sinkings
after explosions
Check operational status
of facilities
Chain-of-custody for
nuclear warheads
Geographic Information
System
Combine data from
different sources
Reconstruct possible
locations of explosions
Virtual Reality Inspector training, data
visualization
Training for on-site
inspections
“Virtual” archaeology Improvement of
verification process
Encryption Data transmission and
authentication
Data transmission and
authentication
Data transmission and
authentication
Data transmission and
authentication
Other Cryptographic
Methods
Hashed declarations Hashed declarations
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physical or technical contexts. As states rely on arms control verification, and therefore
the software involved, the role of software should be carefully analyzed.
To emphasize the importance of software in arms control, this section provides a com-
prehensive overview over the different use cases. There are different ways to group and
categorize such applications. Table 2.1 lists many of the common tasks dealt with by
software in nuclear arms control. The tasks are sorted according to the possible treaties
they would support and the physical or technical function they fulfill. The first column
considers the existing methods to control nuclear proliferation, including the NPT and
the related safeguards regime. The next column lists applications used to verify the
absence of nuclear tests. The last two columns go beyond existing agreements and obli-
gations. While they give an overview over proposed technologies, they are also partly
speculative. As long as no international agreement is reached, the future selection of
related verification technologies remains an open question. Similarly, new technolog-
ical developments in the future might extend the potential for new software, making
agreements more likely to be negotiated.
Beyond the ordering scheme selected for the table, software packages can be sorted into
categories based on the purpose they have related to verification. It is useful to define
five different classes, which partly overlap. In the first three of them, applications are
included that deal with data from real, physically existing, measurements. The last two
classes involve various ways of simulations.
Data Processing: Software is used to process data either in real time (during measure-
ments), or some later time after the data have been acquired. Such processing
happens in close relation to the physical quantity measured, e.g. discriminating
measured signals from background, reducing noise in signals.
Data Transmission and Display: After measurements, data acquired by technical equip-
ment and human inspectors have to be distributed to international organizations
and member states. The second category of software includes applications that
can be used for this task. Such software is responsible of ensuring completeness
and authenticity of the data transmitted, and appropriate ways to display data.
Data Analysis: Depending on the question asked, measured and processed data have
to undergo subsequent data analysis, combining the measurements with data sets
from other sources.
Simulation of Measurement Systems: It is often cheaper to run several simulations in-
stead of testing hardware during the development of verification technologies.
Simulations make it possible to run training exercises and analyze events that are
very undesirable in reality, for example a test of a nuclear weapon. Lastly, simula-
tions also provide for more comprehensive tests of resilience against cheating.
Technology Assessment: This category covers a wider range of tools than the other four.
Beyond explicit verification tasks, software is used to analyze risk and possibilities
of current and future technological developments. It can be used to understand
how an emerging reactor system performs with regard to possible proliferation
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risks, or how technological developments could allow for completely new verifi-
cation approaches. Such an analysis is often an important input for a state’s or
an international organization’s policy. It enables and helps diplomacy and treaty
negotiations, and probably shows new ways for peaceful developments.
2.3 Three Detailed Examples of Software Use
2.3.1 Information Barriers
In many practical cases, verification technologies will measure or produce information
that can not be revealed due to treaty reasons or due to an inspected states’ national
security concerns. To overcome such problems, the development and construction of
so-called information barriers has been proposed. They will be mostly used for war-
head verification applications, but other uses are also possible. The information to be
protected could be of numerous types, among them gamma spectra, x-ray images or
the spatial distribution of neutron count rates. To protect the information, information
barriers turn complex data input into binary outputs, e.g. a green and a red light. Both
actors involved in a verification, the inspected party and the inspecting party, have to
trust the information barrier. On the one hand, it is important that the information
barrier only shows a green light if the object under inspection really is what it is sup-
posed to be. This includes the necessity of high confidence that no cheating could be
done by the inspected party. On the other hand, the inspected party wants to have high
confidence that no additional information beyond red or green light is released to the
inspectors.
Important developments with regard to information barriers were carried out during the
Trilateral Initiative, in which the Soviet Union, the United States and the International
Atomic Energy Agency tried to develop ways to verify classified forms of fissile material
[Int97]. During this initiative, different groups worked on information barriers, mak-
ing a list of general requirements [Ful99] as well as discussing issues related to the
authentication of software used [Wol+01]. Further research on information barriers
was made as part of an initiative between the United Kingdom and Norway [Cha+10;
All+13]. This project recently published some of the source code of the developed
software [UKN15].
An information barrier has a high reliance on software, mainly in the areas of data pro-
cessing, data transmission and analysis. Software typically is developed for particular
cases, since off the shelf applications rarely exist. All past projects struggled to create
trusted devices, even if they incorporated joint software development among inspected
and inspecting party. Mistrust among an inspected state and an inspecting state is also
influenced by the hardware used, and it is necessary to avoid any manipulation in this
area. Cheating bears high cost for at least one and possibly both sides involved. If for
example a nuclear weapon state would manipulate an information barrier, the verifi-
cation could reveal higher numbers of weapons than actually dismantled. The weapon
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state would be able to keep some weapons beyond their declaration and gain a strategic
advantage, because the other side would believe that they are dismantled.
Some of the issues of information barriers were explored in a course taught in 2015 at
Technische Universität Darmstadt, where students were tasked to cheat a given infor-
mation barrier system. The course has been summarized together with a course taught
in parallel in Princeton, New Jersey, where groups of students built information barriers
[KPG15]. The experiences of both courses led to the attempt to build a new, partly open
source, information barrier, results of which will be published in [KGG16].
2.3.2 Neutron Multiplicity Counting
Neutron Multiplicity Counting is a measurement technique for non-destructive assay of
a material. In a verification exercise, it is a way to estimate the mass of plutonium in a
complex sample. Such measurements could be applied for warhead verification, and to
ensure non-proliferation of states using peaceful nuclear power by inspecting plutonium
in fresh or spent fuel, or separated plutonium stockpiles. While such a system would
use software for data processing, the main application of software here is the simulation
of the measurement system. This has to be done during the development of respective
detector systems, and for the evaluation of possible ways of physically cheating such
systems. It is faster and cheaper to simulate different kinds of cheating attempts and
assess a verification system’s outcome than to build a physical system and investigate
all its vulnerabilities.
To simulate neutron multiplicity counting systems, Monte Carlo particle transport rou-
tines are used to track neutrons from a simulated source through a detector. In a next
step, the simulated detector signals are analyzed with specific post-processing codes. A
commonly used tool that includes functionality for both steps is MCNPX-PoliMi [PPM03;
Poz+12]. This software package is a special version of the more general Monte Carlo
particle transport code Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) [Goo+13]4. Development of
both codes mainly took place in the United States and is subject to export controls
which limit distribution. These codes are proprietary tools, although under certain cir-
cumstances it is possible to request access to source code. While it is more important
that states trust the actual hardware than the software used to build it, limited access
might create a lack of transparency among actors during the design phase of a detector.
Transparent, detailed simulations would allow open discussions among all parties to
prevent possible cheating and prevent misuse. Also, limited access to simulation tools
limits the number of experts involved to a small community - thus possibly constrain-
ing good ideas for detector improvements, too, and reducing opportunities for capacity
building.
4 Until recently, two different codes existed, MCNP and MCNPX. With version 6 of MCNP, they have
been merged to form a single application.
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2.3.3 Plutonium Production Potential of Nuclear Reactors
This example shows how software is used to assess a future technology. For about a
decade, Iran has been building the IR-40, an indigenous research reactor in Arak, the IR-
40. Its stated purpose is a research reactor and the production of medical isotopes. The
reactor’s original design was also well suited for weapon grade plutonium production. It
featured the use of natural uranium as fuel and heavy water as moderator and coolant.
Similar designs have been used by several other countries for weapon programs (e.g.
the Dimona reactor in Israel, the CIRUS reactor in India or the Khushab reactors in
Pakistan). Therefore, the Iranian plans raised suspicions in the international community.
Several proposals to modify the reactor making it less proliferation-prone were made in
the past. They typically involved some of the following options: Increasing the uranium
enrichment, changing the moderator material and / or reducing the core size (among
others [WFK12], [AG15]).
Modification of the reactor towards a design less prone to proliferation was agreed upon
as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as “Iran
Deal”, which was concluded in 2015, Several initial design parameters are included in
the JCPOA, but further design work has to be carried out to make it a working reactor.
Final designs have to be approved by all states involved in the JCPOA[Cou16].
To evaluate possible changes to the design prior to construction, simulation software has
to be used to calculate reactor parameters (e.g. criticality, various safety coefficients)
and the change in inventory (e.g. plutonium production). Reactor parameters can be
calculated using Monte Carlo particle transport routines. However, the most common
used software is MCNP, whose issues and limitations have been described in the previ-
ous subsection. For the change in inventory, results of the Monte Carlo particle transport
are coupled with reactor burnup models. There is a large variety of software for bur-
nup calculations, typically export controlled in the country of origin. None of them is
publicly available, as all major codes are available via code distribution centers5, which
ensure that export control procedures are followed. While it is possible to gain access to
the source code of some programs, most are proprietary developments. Depending on
the states involved, tools to be used for the Arak reactor conversion might not be shared
with Iranian scientists. Therefore, even if results derived of software inaccessible to the
other actor might be shared, the question arises on how to effectively collaborate on a
design among several states.
Many of past works carried out in the IANUS group have been using this type of soft-
ware, and the issue of plutonium production in nuclear reactors. With MCMATH, a
locally developed depletion code exists[Pis06; Küt11]. It was used for many differ-
ent applications, among them the calculation of the plutonium production potential
of fusion reactors and spallation neutron sources [Eng09] or the role of fast reactors
5 Radiation Safety Information Computational Center (RSICC) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory dis-
tributes software on the American continent, while the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/NEA) distributes software in Europe.
16 2. Arms Control and the Use of Software
for the US-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement [KGE14]. MC-
MATH has been developed since more than ten years, using the proprietary software
Mathematica and MCNP, hence it suffers similar limitations as previously described.
2.4 Issues and Limitations using Software for Arms Control
In nuclear arms control, different use cases for software exist. Several of them are very
particular and custom tailored for specific tasks. The use of technology influences how
treaties are negotiated and verified, how states might shape their nuclear ambitions in
the future, and even how states decide on sanctions and other measures, possibly war.
However, as already the three detailed examples showed in part, there are several issues
that affect to the use of software in arms control. These issues, and also limitations on
existing software and software use in general will be outlined in the following. With an
increased use and reliance on software, the impact of issues and limitations will become
stronger.
Independent of the use in arms control verification, software has to deliver valid and
correct results. The physical models that are implemented in data processing tools or
simulations have to be accurate and optimized for the particular questions they answer.
This requirement is most likely not an issue for the specially made software examples
listed above, nevertheless important.
Particularly for the use in arms control verification, software results have to be trusted.
This issue is probably the most important. All actors involved in a verification exercise
or the assessment of a new technology have to be convinced that the results revealed
actually represent a given or future physical reality. Without trust of states and other
actors in the correctness of software, there is basically no value in the verification results
or the findings of technology assessment at all. There has to be confidence that software
was not manipulated intentionally to achieve a certain outcome and that no one tried to
cheat. Unintentional malfunctions of code or simple software bugs can also undermine
trust.
For software used in arms control, it is important that the ways and means to come to
results are as transparent as possible. This ensure the ability to reproduce the results
in the future by interested parties. If the software used has been proprietary or has
limited access, a future reproduction of results could become impossible if the vendor
or provider of the software is not around anymore. One can draw a parallel between
scientific experiments and verification challenges. Scientific results are considered valid
only if they can be reproduced independently by a third party. The same is required for
results of arms control verification - if they can not be independently examined, they
might not be accepted. In the example of the Arak Reactor conversion, the importance
of such transparency becomes very clear. Both the Iranians and the other parties in
the agreement have an interest in reproducible models of reactor conversion proposals,
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before they will agree on a particular design and build it. With export-controlled or pro-
prietary tools, it is very difficult to achieve transparency levels that would be acceptable
to both parties.
Software tools have to be available to all parties involved in an agreement. Clearly it is
important that every state party to a treaty should be able to participate in verification,
and have access to all the required tools including software. In a broader context, also
participation of other actors might be preferential, including international organizations
but also society at large. Large participation could significantly reduce errors made, be
a way to employ societal verification for many tasks and introduce democratic means to
nuclear arms control in general.
Regarding these issues, the majority of the currently used software has at least some,
if not all, of the following three limitations. First, most software tools available for
the applications mentioned in table 2.1 are proprietary. This results in distribution of
only the binary form of an application, even if that is done sometimes free of cost.
Binary software is executable on a computer and can yield results, but it is not easily
possible for a human to understand the underlying algorithm. While there has been no
proven case of this occurring, this method of distribution could be a way to cheat on
states and actors using clandestine methods, which would for example hide a specific
measurement result. Without the so-called source code – the human readable “recipe”
of a binary application – it is difficult to detect such modifications, and also harder to
remove bugs and improve software.
Second, some applications are under strict export controls in several countries, often
due to possible dual-use capabilities. While it is claimed that the control is beneficial
to prevent proliferation, it could have negative implications for verification. Whenever
software is used in a verification setting, such a limitation can have negative effects as
not all parties involved might be able to access the same software. Sometimes, access
is limited not only due to export controls, but because of other reasons to a small group
of people, like the members of an organization. Reasons for such a limitation might be
patent or copyright issues, or just a reluctance to make a tool publicly available.
As a last limitation, the cost of software might be an issue. In several cases, especially
for software that also has commercial application outside of nuclear arms control, the
software comes at relatively high costs. These can range from several $100 up to prices
in the order of $10000. Although these are not unusually high numbers compared to
other necessary items in the context of nuclear arms control, they still could prevent
certain actors from getting involved, e.g. developing countries or non-governmental
actors.
All the listed issues and limitations have typically not been addressed, but definitely
have an impact on current agreements and might limit future verification efforts. The
proprietary and export control aspects of many used tools limit the access to software
and can reduce trust among partners. It is difficult to imagine how a “global commu-
nity of knowledge”, as proposed in the Acheson-Lilienthal report [Lil+46], could be
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achieved without changing that situation. The next chapter proposes how this commu-
nity could be formed using open source approaches.
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3 The Case for Open Source Software
Software used in arms control would benefit greatly if the main paradigm of devel-
opment and distribution of software would change more towards an approach often
referred to as “Open Source Software”. For software with arms control purpose that
would require software to fulfill the following three criteria:
1. No restrictions for access to the program.
2. Distribution of the program must include the full source code.
3. Modifications of the program are allowed to anybody.
The criteria are derived from standard definitions of Free Software [SLG02] and Open
Source Software [OSI]. To argue for a broader application of the approach, this chapter
will discuss these criteria in detail, starting with a first section on general history of open
source software, explaining the criteria’s origin. The idea of such criteria seems to be
contrary to many current approaches in the world of nuclear weapons, which are often
characterized by secrecy, compartmentalization and the urge to keep things as private as
possible. Open source software in contrast supports traditions of sharing, collaboration
and open exchange. In a second section, benefits based on these differences will be
discussed with regard to the issues listed in the previous chapter. After that, a section
tackles aspects often raised as a critique of open source approaches. In a fourth section,
a brief overview of the current situation of open source software in nuclear arms control
will be given.
3.1 Background on Open Source Software
Codified definitions of open source software similar to the three criteria defined above
are relatively new. However, many of the ideas behind open source software have
been prevalent throughout the history of computing. With early mainframe comput-
ers, software often was provided for free bundled with hardware, the latter being very
expensive. New tools and improvements of existing ones were often shared among
users and developers, saving time and money. Sharing programs was a defining norm
for the forming culture of “hackers”, for example at the Artificial Intelligence Labora-
tory / Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The researchers (or hackers) had a set of
shared values, which later Stephen Levy phrased as “Hacker Ethics” [Lev75]. An ear-
lier example of sharing is the “Project for Advancement of Coding Techniques” (PACT),
established in 1953 by the competing companies Lockheed, Douglas, RAND and other
defense contractors. The companies realized that they could improve their work faster if
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they shared common routines and tools used in computing, instead of having to develop
everything from scratch [Web04, p. 22].
While the community of computer users and the number of machines was small, shar-
ing was common practice. In the 1980’s, Personal Computers (PC) became common,
and allowed for a significant increase in computing infrastructure and usage. They also
made it possible to have computers in private homes. Together with the further spread
of the hardware, serious commodification of many software tools began. Companies
started selling software, and hence saw unlimited sharing as a threat to their business
model. A very famous example is a letter by young Bill Gates when he realized that
many people were copying his program without paying. The program of concern was
an interpreter for the programming language BASIC, which Gates offered for sale. In
a letter from 1976, entitled “Open Letter to the Hobbyists”, he complained about the
loss in income due to copying. According to the letter, such a lack in income would
prevent quality software from being written. A couple of years later, in 1983, AT&T
decided to commercialize its operating system, Unix, developed by the Bell Laborato-
ries of AT&T. Previous versions had been shared relatively widely, and often for free6.
Generally, in the 1990’s most commonly used software was sold as proprietary product
and not shared freely. Many members of the industry agreed with Gates’ letter, seeing
the tradition of sharing as a threat to the motivation to produce good programs. Many
of the companies whose main business is software were founded at that time. Out of
the top ten companies listed in the 2015 Forbes “The World’s Biggest Public Companies”
ranking under the category “Software / Programming”, seven were founded between
1970 and 1985 [For15].
Around the same time, activities working into the opposite direction started as well.
Beyond the original behavior of sharing, attempts were made to codify rules to protect
and promote free and open source software. A key actor was Richard Stallman, a hacker
at the MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. In 1983, he proposed the “GNU’s Not Unix”
(GNU) project, a free unix-like operating system, and a year after he left MIT to focus
on writing free software. In 1985, he founded the “Free Software Foundation” (FSF) as
an organization to promote his ideas of free software. He published the GNU Manifesto
based on the statement: “If I like a program I must share it with other people who like
it” [Sta10, p. 27]. The manifesto also defines “Free Software”, based on the following
four freedoms to the user of a program:
Freedom 0: The freedom to run the program, for any purpose.
Freedom 1: The freedom to study how the program works, and adapt it to your
needs. [...]
Freedom 2: The freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your neighbor.
Freedom 3: The freedom to improve the program, and release your improve-
ments to the public, so that the whole community benefits. [...]
[Sta10, p. 3]
6 AT&T’s main reason to share earlier versions without charge was to stay in compliance with court
rulings regarding its monopoly on the US phone market [Web04].
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The criteria defined at the beginning of this chapter are partly based on theses freedoms.
To ensure freedom 1 and 3, access to source code of software is required. If those
would be directly transferred to software for arms control purposes, mainly freedom 1
is crucial. Studying the function of a program is what parties involved in a verification
would need to do to figure out if they could trust the software. Freedom 2 and 3
ensure the inclusiveness and participation of many in verification activities. Freedom
0, however, needs to be treated with care. It is not included specifically in the above
listed criteria for open source arms control software. Sometimes, the tools used for
verification purposes have so-called dual-use properties, making them also usable for
weapons development. Clearly, such use would be in contradiction with the goal of a
nuclear weapon free world.
The FSF developed the GNU Public License (GPL), a general copyright license which
can be used by any software developer to ensure these four freedoms. While the GNU
project did release many useful tools, it did not provide the central part of an operating
system - a kernel. In 1991, Linus Torvalds created the first version of Linux, a Unix-like
operating system kernel, which filled this gap. Torvalds shared the source code with
others and asked for contributions. Licensing for the Linux kernel was soon changed
to use the GPL. In a sense it replaced the missing operating system part of the GNU
project. Today, Linux is the basic operating system for numerous applications, running
everything from large servers down to cell phones and small devices as internet routers
or TV set-top boxes. The way the Linux kernel was developed is also a major example
for the process of open source development. Beyond sharing of software as in earlier
days, it is structured in a way to allow many developers to collaboratively work on a
very complex tool, often on a voluntary basis. Another example for successful open
source software is the Apache web server, which today is one of the most important
programs to deliver websites to users.
While many shared basic ideas promoted by the Free Software Foundation, major cri-
tique addressed the “viral” property of the GPL. The license requires that the program is
only used together with other programs using similarly free licenses, possibly “freeing”
other programs with more restrictive copyright requirements by requiring their users
to switch the license. According to the GPL, it is not possible to use an application or
even parts of it in a new developed proprietary tool. This has been seen as a problem.
In 1998, several important actors of the free software movement met and wrote a new
definition for free software, and created a new brand: “Open Source Software”7. To
support the brand and the definition, the Open Source Initiative was founded [OSI;
FF01]. The definition of open source software specified ten criteria for software to be
considered open source and was based on Bruce Perens’ “Debian Free Software Guide-
lines”. The criteria include free access to software, guaranteed access to source code
and the right to modifications. It explicitly states that the licenses for open source
7 Throughout this work, free software and open source software are used interchangeably. While there
is a personal preference of the author for the first term, neither side of the debate related to moral
issues of both terms seems to be better or worse suited for the application of related criteria to arms
control applications.
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software should not discriminate persons or groups and also put no restrictions on the
fields of endeavor. The open source definition was seen by many to be more attractive
for businesses compared to the more political ideas of the FSF [FF01].
Beyond the historical development, some particular aspects of the process of developing
and maintaining open source software are relevant for the following analysis. Often,
references to open source software actually go beyond properties of applications and
programs and include procedural aspects in the description, talking about an “open
source process” or even an “open source movement”. Very often people unfamiliar with
the open source process ask: How can it happen that open source software is created?
As there are no direct economic benefits, because you can not exclusively sell open
source software as a product, what gives incentives to produce such software?
Typical motivations listed include mainly four points (cf. for example [BR03; FF01;
HK03; Fel+05]): First, developers engage into software development because of the in-
trinsic utility of a program for themselves, because they need something that could solve
a specific problem. Second, there can be an intrinsic motivation of people. They develop
software knowing that it might be shared later and benefit other people. The third point
can help increase this intrinsic motivation - as part of sometimes very large, typically
international projects, developers have the sense of being a member of a community.
Lastly, open source development can also have economic motivations. Although there is
no immediate return, there are often delayed benefits. Many developers have received
future job opportunities through publicly posted work. Publishing code as open source
software shows the skills and talent of a programmer to possible employers. Clearly, not
all of these motivations apply to everyone. Sometimes, it is also just part of a persons
job to develop open source software, depending on the policy of the employer.
The open source characteristic is not only a constant status, but also has procedural
aspects, addressing a very common problem of software development. Because of the
complexity of programs and the inherent need to keep an overall design structure, the
software development process can not be accelerated by just adding more developers.
This has been described already in 1975 by Frederick Brooks in his book “Mythical man
month” [Bro75]. One of the big challenges of developing software, especially with a
number of developers, is the conflict between global concepts and the necessity to split
the work into smaller tasks. Eric Raymond characterizes two ways of software develop-
ment, cathedral or bazaar style [Ray00]. A cathedral is build by a master, who makes
all important design decisions – for Raymond this has been the traditional process of
proprietary software development. In contrast, he sees open source software as being
developed “bazaar-style” - many people can work on the same piece and discussing
issues without any hierarchical structure. While this is not true for all open source
projects, as some only consist of single developers or have a hierarchical structure,
Raymond’s description gives a good characterization of the process of volunteer collab-
oration in general. Steven Weber writes that the 90’s actually revealed and proved that
there are two possibilities for production models of software, the open source model
and the proprietary model [Web04, p. 94]. Other authors go even further, discussing
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the removal of a direct wage relation between product and producer under the title
“Hacking Capitalism” [Söd08].
Included in the work by Eric Raymond is the famous quote “given enough eyeballs, all
bugs are shallow” [Ray00, p. 8]. It describes the expectation that open source software
projects can produce software of better quality, because they have the possibility to
tap into the resources of large numbers of developers. Open source software thus has
the potential to create a community of developers possibly larger than any company
or closed organization could achieve. Although this is not guaranteed to happen, it is
clearly visible for many successful projects.
Consisting of many voluntary members, open source projects naturally suffer sometimes
from internal conflicts and have to overcome specific challenges. Good projects not only
have a stable developer base, but also a clearly defined decision making structure. Such
a structure can have different forms - sometimes projects are organized in hierarchies
surrounding leading developers. For example, Linus Torvalds until today has the final
say over changes to the Linux kernel. Alternatively, they are more spread out to groups
of core developers. Independent of the structure, basically all projects make use of
different technological helpers (e.g. version control systems) to foster the efficiency of
the process. Typically, the decision making structure also prevents decline of software
quality and the addition of intentional changes that would undermine functionality or
open up security loopholes. While it is often assumed that changing the source code
of an open source project would be as easy as modifying entries in the Wikipedia, this
is mostly not true. Projects implement numerous cross-checking mechanisms to make
sure that changes to the source code only can be published after they have been checked
by other developers.
Due to the voluntary nature of open source projects there can be no strong enforcement
mechanisms, groups are hold together by one important characteristic of the possibility
to share changes: In case of insurmountable differences, projects can undergo a process
called “forking”, where some developers take an existing, freely available code base
and create a new separate project. The fork and the original software then compete for
users and developers, reducing resources available for both. However, this only occurs
very rarely. Mostly, it is tried to overcome conflicts among developers and to achieve
compromises before are fork could happen.
Concluding this background one can state that today, open source or free software is
used very widely. It is common not only for individuals, but also for companies to get
involved in the development of open source software. This can take the form of paying
developers or releasing formerly proprietary software under open source Licenses. Even
one of the most outspoken critics of open source model in the past, Microsoft [Web04,
p. 126], recently joined the movement by publishing several of its products as open
source software, for example with the release of the .NET framework [Lan14]. The
idea of open source software and the characteristic of the development process has not
reached the field of nuclear arms control yet – in the following, several of the benefits
and advantages of open source approaches to that field will be discussed.
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3.2 Benefits of the approach
Using open source software for nuclear arms control can directly address the issues
raised in the previous chapter. It can increase trust, transparency and participation,
enable societal verification and lead to broader capacity building.
Trust among all actors involved is increased if the source code of software is accessible
together with the software itself. This allows for inspection of a software’s functionality,
carrying out a “verification of the verification”. Instead of trusting proprietary software
applications like black boxes, states and international organizations could thoroughly
study how the software works. This inspection could even be carried out by a greater
audience; basically everyone interested would be able to access open source verification
software and check its functions for possible backdoors. A perfect example for the need
to open, intensive scrutiny are information barriers, as described in the previous chapter.
Both the inspected and inspecting party need to know what the machine is doing, and
most likely see its source code. This already can be achieved by jointly developing the
software and using only open source software whenever external tools are required.
But there does not seem to be a convincing reason why that should not be opened up to
a larger audience. If many experts would confirm the functionality of such a tool, trust
could be even greater.
Interrelated to the issue of trust is the issue of transparency. Access to source code not
only allows one to verify that there has not been an attempt to cheating, but also to
show the underlying principles used to obtain a certain result. Such principles could
be basic assumptions about physics, as well as the physical model used in a simulation.
With regard to the examples from the previous chapter, this might be beneficial in cases
like the Arak reactor conversion. Transparency would allow different parties not only to
discuss “this is how we think the reactor should be modified”, but also “this is why we
think it is the case”, by showing model and method for the simulation of a converted
reactor model. Transparency is also a fundamental requirement for correct scientific
behavior ensuring reproducibility of results. Using open source software simplifies re-
peating measurements or simulations because it provides all the main assumptions and
models that are part of the software.
Open source criteria applied to arms control have the benefit of increasing participa-
tion. Instead of a policy of compartmentalization, openness in sharing developments
enables connection between communities. Proprietary tools always have the risk that
due to access restrictions and proprietary licenses, development of new products could
be made risky and difficult. For similar issues in bio-medical research, [HE98] called
this the “tragedy of the anticommons”. In contrast to this risk, open source licenses
would guarantee re-usability of changes in the future.
Increased sharing is a benefit for the arms control community itself. By reusing software
and being able to adapt it to new tasks, developers can possibly save time and achieve
better results. In addition, the open source aspect of software also has implications
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beyond the arms control community. It is possible to attract more developers, engineers
and people with a multitude of backgrounds. Under the right circumstances, why not
even have disarmament hackers? Most likely, such an increase in the number of people
involved will create more ideas on how to solve specific verification problems. This
could be done in an organized fashion, for example using crowd sourcing approaches
([Sur05], [Bra13]). Clearly, this is only viable if the software has been available to the
“crowd”, and if everyone is allowed to modify the code.
In successful open source projects, a trend of an increase in numbers is sometimes trig-
gered just by releasing software as open source software. Figure 3.1 shows the number
of authors over time in some software projects related to arms control applications. The
figure is based on the number of author contributing per year to projects that are hosted
by the development platform GitHub. While it not possible to generalize from such a
small number of cases, there is at least an indication that open source projects might
create participation options for larger numbers of developers.
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Figure 3.1.: Number of authors that contributed to selected open source projects.
Besides increasing the developer base through openness, a move in this direction also
could enhance capacity building through an increased user base. To give arms con-
trol experts easy access to software tools by releasing them as open source software
might broaden their interest, and also draw previously not involved people to the field.
Even further, beyond the group of experts, software developers and specialists, open
source software makes it possible to involve the society at large in arms control veri-
fication. Giving access to the general public allows everyone to participate in certain
steps of arms control verification (“Societal Verification” [Rot+93; HH12]), but also to
learn and gain knowledge on an important issue. An example closely related to nu-
clear arms control is the project “Safecast”, which developed a world-wide radiation
monitoring network based on voluntary participants. They constructed relatively cheap
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radiation detectors using open source hardware designs, and set up an open database
for the collected data. This helped especially the Japanese population to get a better
understanding of the radiation exposure after the Fukushima nuclear accident. Future
developments might allow for similar projects of citizens helping nuclear arms control.
Giving access to tools allows everyone interested to know what is going on. Gener-
ally, releasing verification tools using open source criteria would be an important step
towards more democratic arms control regimes.
3.3 Challenges and Criticism
Of course, applying open source criteria to arms control does not come without cost
and there are challenges that should be considered. A point often raised is that sharing
source code would give an adversary the chance to cheat because she or he can know
how the software works. It is true that if there exist a way to cheat, it is detected more
easily if the source code is open. For example, if an inspected state would know that
an information barrier shows a green light for a specific combination of fissile materials
that are not a weapon, it might use such a combination during an inspection. More
complicated cheats are possible, too. However, having no access to software source
code as in proprietary tools is by no means a guarantee that no ways to cheat can be
found. In both cases, there is a competition between an attacker and a defender to find
loopholes, and either exploit them or close them in time. But only open source software
is open for scrutiny by everyone, and does not rely on “security through obscurity” by
not allowing an adversary to understand the workings of a program. Especially for
critical applications such as arms control, there is well-grounded reason to believe that
the broader group of analysts will give advantages to those working for a trusted piece
of software over those trying to cheat (cf. [Sch99; Sch14]).
Cryptography has a similar problem - weaknesses of encryption could be exploited by
an unwanted listener. To overcome this problem, it is a widely accepted principle that
security of an encryption algorithm should only require the key to be secret, not the
cryptographic algorithm used. Already in 1883, this has been stated as the Kerckhoffs’
principle, named for a Dutch military cryptography specialist [Ker83]. The best algo-
rithms indeed are public ones, where the algorithms have undergone numerous checks
by independent experts. Of course, this could only be done if the algorithm (or source
code) is published along with the software itself.
Kerckhoffs’ principle also addresses another challenge. As stated previously, not all of
the information and data generated during an arms control inspection or prepared for
negotiations might be shared among inspecting and inspected party as well as the gen-
eral public, because it would be considered sensitive or sharing would be prohibited by
international treaties. As an example, sharing weapon design information with a non-
nuclear weapon state is prohibited under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty. That
point has been often raised as an argument against the use of free software for arms
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control purposes. Doing so often mixes two different things - data and the data process-
ing software, or in terms of encryption message and cryptographic algorithm. If there
is a necessity to protect sensitive information, the information should be separate from
the algorithm. But such a separation should rely on an algorithm that can be published -
following Kerckhoffs, it should be possible to design an algorithm that can be shared.
While openness can help increase participation, it is also possible to reduce participa-
tion, mainly because of the voluntary nature and free-riding effects. This can lead to
crucial malfunctions or even to the death of a project because of limited and decreasing
numbers of developers and maintainers. One of the more recent examples for such a
development is the bug called “Heartbleed”, which was found 2014 in the OpenSSL
library [Cox14]. The SSL protocol is used for encryption between websites and web
servers, e.g. to protect personal data from eyes of third-parties. The bug allowed at-
tackers to steal data from affected web servers, and has been part of the software for
many years. Discussions on the causes of the bug clearly point out that the voluntary
participation for a security critical tool failed to gather adequate support [Pag16]. At
the time of the bug, the project had only a small number of developers contributing
actively to the code. Large companies, while relying on the functions of the software,
did not contribute resources. They chose to do so after the bug was discovered [Lin14].
The same effect could be an issue for open source projects that are employed for nuclear
arms control. However, releasing a program as an open source code does not necessary
imply reliance on a completely random community. Of course, institutional contribu-
tions can continue or be added. Verification tools are almost always sponsored by states
and international organizations. There is no reason to believe that their motivation will
decrease when software is open.
Possible usage areas of software pose another challenge. Software tools can have dual-
use characteristics, they could be employed for arms control purposes, and at the same
time might be useful for development of the weapons itself, or optimization of related
processes. Clearly, open source software that has such dual-use characteristics would
raise concerns as the easy access could eventually contribute to further weapons prolif-
eration. These characteristics are the main reasons why software access is regulated by
states and the international community, using export controls. Export controls typically
are based on international agreements, as the Wassenaar Arrangement or the Export
Control Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in case of nuclear weapons. To be
effective, these have to be transferred into domestic export laws by member states, re-
sulting in a variety of characteristics, but still limiting access. This issue is relatively
difficult to resolve, especially if cooperation and openness should be favored over se-
crecy. One the one hand, it should be prevented that software is used for malicious
purposes or help weapons development. On the other hand, such a limitation of shar-
ing could create mistrust, and probably also prevent or slow down successful progress
on disarmament and arms control. If possible, software to be used in verification should
be developed in ways to prevent other use cases, even if openly shared.
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3.4 Current Situation of Open Source Software in Nuclear Arms Control
As shown before, the issues related to the use of software with regard to trust, trans-
parency and participation play an important role for arms control applications, probably
more important than for software applications in other fields. However, the possible use
of open source software to address these issues has been discussed only in very few cases
in the past8. Probably the first to discuss the issue, Greg White presented a paper that
lists open source software and hardware as the preferred option for the development of
information barriers as part of the Trilateral Initiative [Whi01]. 10 years later, [MBH11]
promotes the use of open source software for geospatial information systems (GIS) for
use in nuclear safeguards. Further publications that explicitly discuss open source can
be found in the field of civilian nuclear energy production - [VW07] and [WVV07]
discuss the use of open source software for reactor safety applications.
Beyond the scholarly debate, the idea of open source software is exemplified by the
development of software. Several examples of open source software related to arms
control issues are listed in table 3.1. Some of the listed examples have been particularly
developed as open source software. However, none of the authors claim that a main
reason of publishing their software as open source was primary benefits for arms control
as described in this work.
Table 3.1.: Open source software examples that could be used for nuclear arms control
purposes.
Code Purpose Citation
OpenMC Neutron transport Monte Carlo code [RF13]
Cyclus Nuclear fuel cycle simulation [HWG11]
PyNE General purpose tool for nuclear engineering [Sco+12]
Geant4 General purpose Monte Carlo framework [Ago+03]
There are not only individual examples of open source applications, but signs of orga-
nizations engaging more broadly in this field. Several US national laboratories have
specific organization pages on GitHub, the largest platform for publishing and develop-
ing open source software:
• Sandia National Labs: https://github.com/sandialabs
• Los Alamos National Lab: https://losalamos.github.io/
• Pacific Northwest National Lab: http://pnnl.github.io/
8 Independent of the above mentioned reference, a substantive set of articles can be found that has
open source in the title. However, these works typically deal with open source information, infor-
mation available in the open, e.g. satellite images from Google Earth, newspaper articles or Twitter
messages. Those articles are not related to the issue of this work (software), and hence not discussed
here.
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• Lawrence Livermore National Lab: http://software.llnl.gov/
On these pages, the labs list some of the software packages they developed, and make
them available for download and modifications.
The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization
seems to have realized some of the benefits of open source software, which it states
publicly: “It was therefore decided to migrate the IDC applications software (i.e. data
acquisition, forwarding, automatic processing and interactive analysis) to open source
systems.” [Com10]. At the same time, while source code and software sharing is preva-
lent inside the CTBTO and among the national data centers of member states, there is
no real engagement with the broader public (for example, the CTBTO has no public
GitHub page or similar open source repository).
While the listed references and examples show that there are some activities in the area
of arms control with regard to open source software, it also shows a lack of broader
application of the open source idea. With the development of an open source application
for simulations of neutron multiplicity measurements, the feasibility for the approach
will be shown. The software will also give users and experts an option that is different
from the commonly used proprietary simulation tools. Further expansion of open source
software use should be possible, and this chapter should have shown its necessity, too.
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Part II.
Simulation of Neutron
Multiplicity Measurements
33

4 Neutron Multiplicity Measurements
This chapter describes the physical background needed to carry out adequate simula-
tions of passive neutron multiplicity measurements. Passive neutron multiplicity mea-
surements are used to estimate spontaneous fission rates of samples, in most cases to
determine their plutonium masses. While all important aspects will be mentioned, a
special focus will be put on the description of (α, n) reactions. For the treatment of
these reactions, special routines that were developed as part of ONMS. Because of this
reason, sections covering these aspects are discussed at the end of this chapter.
The chapter is in parts based on the good overviews over method, application and
theory which can be found in the literature, e.g. in chapter 6 of the addendum to
the comprehensive book “Passive Non-Destructive Assay of Nuclear Materials” [Rei07;
Ens+07a], also in the “Application Guide to Neutron Multiplicity Counting”, [Ens+98].
Among more recent sources, a detailed description can be found in [Göt15].
A neutron multiplicity measurement or neutron multiplicity counting is a non-
destructive assay (NDA) technique, based on neutron emission and detection. It extends
the functionality of total neutron counting and neutron coincidence counting methods.
Detecting neutrons has the advantage that they travel relatively far through matter, as
they do not interact via electromagnetic forces. Often it is possible to carry out pas-
sive measurements, where the initial source of neutrons is based on radioactive decays
in the sample. If the natural activity of a sample is not strong enough to acquire the
desired information, active interrogation can be applied by using external neutron or
gamma emitters to induce reactions in the sample [RE08]. All detection can be done
without changing the material itself, in contrast to destructive assay methods, which for
example include dissolving parts of the material for chemical analysis9. NDA methods
are beneficial when destructive assay is not possible, e.g. for measuring fabricated fresh
reactor fuel rods or nuclear warheads during warhead verification, where the fissile
material most likely would be inaccessible or destructive assay would be considered too
intrusive.
Measurement devices specifically designed for neutron multiplicity measurements have
been developed since the 1980’s (cf. [KS84; LKE90; Men+93; Gua93; Rei07]). It was
possible to use older coincidence counters by employing modified analyses. Some older
detector designs are today commonly used for passive neutron multiplicity analysis, as
9 Technically, active interrogation changes a sample by inducing fission reactions inside. However,
acceptable neutron count rates are already achieved with very small changes. For example while 1
g of 235U consists of about 2.6× 1021 atoms, fissioning only 1000 atoms/second could be enough to
carry out adequate measurements.
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for example the “Active Well Coincidence Counter” (used in passive mode), which will
be described later.
The most common property to be derived via passive neutron multiplicity measurements
is the mass of plutonium in a sample. The different plutonium isotopes have different
spontaneous fission rates, isotopes with the even atomic mass numbers A have rates sev-
eral orders of magnitude above those with odd A. To derive the total mass of the sample,
the sample composition needs to be known, in case of plutonium its isotopic vector. Iso-
topics can be measured using other technologies, for example gamma spectroscopy. It is
possible to measure plutonium masses in a variety of chemical compositions, e.g. metal,
oxide, fluoride, even in liquids. Especially for plutonium with impurities, multiplicity
counting methods are beneficial over coincidence or total counting approaches, because
of additional information generated in the process.
Samples can originate from every step of processing nuclear fuel, weapons produc-
tion or other research activities related to plutonium. According to [RE08, p. 46],
multiplicity measurements are used in several countries “for NDA of impure Pu met-
als, oxides, mixed oxides, residues, wastes”. Reasons for measurements range from
material accountability and safeguards verification in plutonium handling facilities like
reprocessing plants or weapon production facilities to the verification of excess weapons
plutonium. Warhead verification and authentication is possible, too. Some examples of
possible applications will be listed in the following.
The “Plutonium Scrap Multiplicity Counter” (PSMC), which is one of the detector mod-
eled in later chapters, was designed for IAEA verification during Japanese reprocessing
efforts. It is supposed to measure “plutonium scrap”, impure samples of plutonium
that result from various chemical processes during reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrica-
tion. The samples can contain plutonium metal or oxide, but also fluorine, beryllium
or other matrix materials [Men+93; Ens+98]. A similar approach, but more recent,
is described by [Nak+10]. The approach proposes to use neutron multiplicity mea-
surements to analyze process waste (“sludge”) of the conversion of plutonium-uranium
nitrate to MOX powder. Resulting MOX powder samples can be analyzed using neutron
multiplicity measurements, in Japan for example using the PSMC detector type, too. It
is also foreseen to measure full fabricated MOX fuel elements with neutron multiplicity
measurement methods [Nak+14].
As stated earlier, the method can not only be used to safeguard reactor materials. After
the end of the cold war, the United States and Russia declared some of their weapons
plutonium to be excess for its original purpose. In several inspections in the United
States, the IAEA used neutron multiplicity measurements for inventory verification of
excess weapons materials [LFL97].
Beyond material accountability, it has been proposed to use neutron multiplicity mea-
surements for verifying full warheads and fissile material in warhead components. In
one of the first publications on this idea, [Fet+90] describes the use of neutron radia-
tion for warhead verification. A comprehensive overview of measurement technologies
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for warhead verification is given in [GK14]. In this context, neutron multiplicity mea-
surements are employed for the so-called “Attribute Approach”. The approach identifies
nuclear weapons based on measurement results for a predefined set of physical prop-
erties, called attributes. One attribute usually is a mass range for the fissile material
inside a weapon.
Development of several systems using neutron multiplicity measurements for fissile ma-
terial mass estimates took place during and after the Trilateral Initiative (cf. chapter
3, page 30 of this work, also [Whi12]). One system was built in cooperation among
Russian and US scientists - the AVNG, spelled out as “attribute verification system, with
IBs for plutonium with classified characteristics, built on the neutron multiplicity count-
ing and high-resolution gamma-spectrometry” [Raz+10]. In US laboratories, over time
three different systems were build. A first version was the Fissile Material Transparency
Technology Demonstration (FMTTD, [Bou+01]), followed up later by the Next Gen-
eration Attribute Measurement System (NG-AMS, [She+05]) and the 3rd Generation
Attribute Measurement System (3G-AMS, [War+12]). Besides neutron multiplicity de-
tectors, all had various other components, e.g. for gamma spectroscopy and for the data
processing and analysis part to form information barriers.
Neutron multiplicity measurements can also be employed to detect the mass of Curium.
Curium is produced during irradiation of fuel in a reactor. For high reactor burnup
times, curium isotopes are the major source of neutron radiation in spent fuel, and
directly determining the plutonium content is not possible anymore. Such high burnups
are common for commercial nuclear power applications. Combined with the “curium
ratio technique”, this method can also determine the plutonium content in this spent
fuel. As part of this technique, the ratio between curium and plutonium of a stream
of spent fuel would be measured using different technologies, for example destructive
assay methods of small samples. From the ratio and the curium content determined
by neutron multiplicity measurements of larger samples, the related plutonium content
could be determined [Lee+08; MM94].
To measure uranium, typically active approaches are used, where additional neutron
sources create neutrons for fission inside of the sample material. Only if the detector
efficiency is high enough, uranium samples can be measured using just the passive
approach. At the Joint Research Centre in Ispra, Italy, the “High Efficiency Passive
Counter” has been developed and tested for large samples of low enriched uranium
[LPT09].
4.1 Overview of the physical effects to be considered
The spontaneous fission rate cannot be measured directly. It can be derived by counting
the number of emitted particles, neutrons or gammas. For the approach discussed here,
neutrons are preferred over gamma emissions. They have a much higher probability
of leaving the samples, and most gammas result from other decays than spontaneous
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Figure 4.1.: Example neutron pulsetrains, taking different effects into account. Each
rectangle stands for a neutron detection event. a) shows a pulsetrain as it
would be emitted by a spontaneous fission source, b) the same after moder-
ation, c) with detection efficiency < 1. d) includes also neutrons from other
reactions.
fission. Figure 4.1 shows examples of several detected neutron events, so-called “pulse-
trains”, depicting the effect of different physical processes involved in measurements.
The pulsetrains typically come from multiple individual detection units inside of a de-
tector, e.g. multiple 3He tubes. The simplest case (a) shows neutrons as they would be
emitted by a spontaneous fission source with a total fission rate F . Single fission events
have different numbers of neutrons that are emitted. The average number of neutrons
per fission is typically noted as ν, hence the total neutron rate from spontaneous fission
is
rn,SF = F · ν (4.1)
Most detectors rely on thermal neutron counting, so moderation is required, leading
to (b), where neutrons from single spontaneous fission events get stretched out over
time. Detectors have a limited detection efficiency, some neutrons get lost outside of the
detector or absorbed in detector materials other than the “sensor” (c). More neutrons
are added to the pulsetrain by additional effects (d): α-particles from decay can undergo
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(α, n) reactions and produce additional neutrons, with a rate rn,α. The relation between
spontaneous fission neutrons and the (α, n) reaction rate is defined as
α≡ rn,α
F · ν (4.2)
Any neutron in the sample can cause an induced fission, again producing more neu-
trons, as shown in (d), too. This increase is described by the multiplication M . All these
effects are discussed in this chapter, preparing for the explanation of the developed
simulation software in the following chapter.
With only the effects in part (b) of figure 4.1, total neutron counting could be an ade-
quate method to derive the spontaneous fission rate. To use it also for (c), it is necessary
to know the detector efficiency as a function of the positions of neutron emission, or
have a detector built in a way that its efficiency can be considered equal for all positions
in possible samples. If only one effect in (d) is unknown, neutron coincidence counting
can be applied. The method results in two measured quantities, often called “reals”
and “accidentals”, allowing to solve for one effect of (d) and the spontaneous fission
rate. This would be the case for example for pure metal samples, where only multipli-
cation but no (α, n) reactions occur, or generally for small samples, where nearly no
multiplication occurs.
Only the introduction of neutron multiplicity measurements allowed for the measure-
ment of a third variable. Mostly, this is used to solve for the multiplication, the second
effect depicted in figure 4.1. However, there are many more variables or functions that
could influence the results. The following list is reproduced as listed in [Ens+07b]:
• Energy spectrum of (α, n) reactions
• Spatial in-homogeneity of multiplication (induced fission rate varying by position)
• Spatial and energy differences in detection efficiency
• Neutron capture in the sample
• Detector die-away time
For all these unknowns, it is necessary to make assumptions and characterize detec-
tors with calibration samples. For example, as has been mentioned before, a flat
efficiency profile is a goal for detector development, and often samples are relatively
small compared to the overall detector geometry. It is possible to check detectors for
their efficiency profile using calibration samples. For the following calculations it is as-
sumed that there is no variation in detection efficiency depending on source position
or energy, which is reasonable for many detectors. Similarly, the other variables and
functions are typically small or reduced by careful detector and measurement design.
A comprehensive description of the assumptions and preparations made for the other
effects and variables is given in [Ens+07b]. Some of them will also be discussed later
in this chapter.
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4.2 Neutrons from Fission
For passive neutron measurements, spontaneous fission events are the most important
neutron source. Several isotopes can decay by spontaneous fission, most with very
low branching ratios compared to other forms of decay. However, as neutrons have low
interaction probabilities within typically measured samples, already spontaneous fission
rates of a few hundred to thousand fission reactions per second can lead to significant
neutron flux leaving a sample.
Probably the most important figure for neutron multiplicity counting is the rate of spon-
taneous fission reactions of 240Pu per gram and second, calculated via:
FPu240 = N · BR · ln2T1/2 (4.3)
where N is the number of 240Pu atoms in 1 g, BR the decay branching ratio for sponta-
neous fission and T1/2 the total half-life of
240Pu.
For simulations of mixed samples, it is also necessary to calculate fission rates for all
other isotopes undergoing spontaneous fission. Collecting data for total half-life and
spontaneous fission branching ratio was more complex than expected when starting this
work. Starting out with values taken from a textbook for nuclear engineering [SF02], it
became quickly clear that even among very recent references there is a relevant diver-
gence in data sets. This is especially true for data references often quoted in relation to
neutron multiplicity measurements, as in the “Application Guide to Neutron Multiplicity
Counting”, [Ens+98, p. 43], the “Passive Nondestructive Assay of Nuclear Materials”
(PANDA), [Rei07, pp. 11-15]10, and “A Good Practice Guide for the use of Modelling
Codes in Non Destructive Assay of Nuclear Materials”, [Cha+09].
Table 4.1 collects half-life data from different sources, table 4.2 for branching ratios for
a selected list of isotopes. Besides the mentioned references, data from the following
sources has been included:
• Current versions of the Evaluated Nuclear Structure Data File, which are compiled
by the International Network of Nuclear Structure and Decay Evaluators. The files
used were downloaded from a website of the IAEA (https://www-nds.iaea.org/
ensdf_base_files/) in the version from December 08, 2015.
• Two major evaluations of nuclear reaction data commonly used for Monte Carlo
simulations, ENDF-B in version VII.1 and JEFF in version 3.1.1. Although their
main content deals with induced reactions, they also have data files for decay
data. According to the textual information included in most files of ENDF-B VII.1
(data set with MF=1, MT=451 according to ENDF file format [HT09]), they are
compiled based on recent ENSDF data, JEFF 3.1.1 radioactive data comes from a
variety of sources (cf. [KBM09]).
10 These two sources actually list the same values.
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• A manual compilation of the most recent issues of Nuclear Data Sheets, covering
the listed isotopes
Nuclear Data Sheets is often considered a reference standard, and form the basis for
the ENSDF data set, which are updated accordingly with a short delay. Among most
other sources, several differences can be found. Even though the data evaluation ENDF-
VII.1 claims that it is based on ENSDF data, spontaneous fission branching ratios differ
(e.g. for 238Pu 1.9(1)× 10−9 from ENSDF compared to 1.86(6)× 10−9 from ENDF).
For 240Pu, there are also differences, which can lead to significant differences in neu-
tron source rates. Nuclear Data Sheets lists a half-life of 6561(6)yr. PANDA and the
ESARDA Good Practice Guide list values inside the uncertainty range of the previous
value, however the latter is at the lowermost end (6555yr). Outside of the error
margin are the values of [SF02], listing a half-life of 6569yr and a branching ratio
of 5× 10−8. The latter is more than 10% off all the other values. Many publications
related to neutron multiplicity measurements cite a spontaneous fission rate for 240Pu of
473 fissionsg−1 s−1 (e.g. [Ens+07b]). Given current evaluations, this is too low. Based
on values from Nuclear Data Sheets, the spontaneous fission rate can be calculated to
be
FPu240 = 479(17) fissionsg
−1 s−1 (4.4)
The relative uncertainty is about 3.5%, with the main contribution coming from the
uncertainty specified for the branching ratio of spontaneous fission. As will be dis-
cussed later, the measured effective mass of 240Pu is calculated by dividing the measured
spontaneous fission rate by this value. Hence, the relative uncertainties of the natural
spontaneous fission rate translate directly into relative uncertainties of the measured
plutonium mass.
For this work the data sets from the issues of Nuclear Data Sheets have been used11.
They are summarized again in table 4.3, together with the resulting fission rate per
gram per second. Additionally listed is the average neutrons produced per spontaneous
fission ν and the resulting neutron rate per gram and second of each isotope. Also for ν,
different sources list different values. Differences are not listed here. It has been more
difficult to find reference values, displayed are those that can be calculated from table
4 of [VHW10], or directly taken from table 5 of the same source. The software library
described in [VHW10] is later used for calculations of fission events.
It is sometimes discussed that for safeguards and verification purposes, using a set of
nuclear data that is consistent over time can be more important than using a physically
accurate data set [Cha+09, p. 41]. For example to verify that items have not been
11 Some exceptions relate to additional isotopes not listed in tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, which were in-
cluded in developing related functions for ONMS (232U and 233U). For both, spontaneous fission
branching ratio listed was not consistent with ENSDF files, nor the spontaneous fission half-life listed
in the respective journal article. The latter is very likely an editorial error. In both cases, the values
from ENSDF files were implemented in the code.
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Table 4.3.: Selected reference values for half-life, spontaneous fission branching ratio
and average neutrons per spontaneous fission. Fission and neutron rates
have been calculated based on the other listed values.
T1/2
* Branching Ratio* fission rate† ν‡ neutron rate
years fissionsg−1 s−1 neutronsg−1 s−1
235U 7.04(1)× 108 7.0(2)× 10−11 5.60(16)× 10−6 1.86 1.041(30)× 10−5
238U 4.468(6)× 109 5.45(7)× 10−7 0.006778(88) 1.99 0.01349(17)
237Np 2.144(7)× 106 2× 10−12 § 5.205(17)× 10−5 2.05 0.00010671(35)
238Pu 87.7(1) 1.9(1)× 10−9 1204(63) 2.187 2.63(14)× 103
239Pu 2.441(3)× 104 3.1(6)× 10−12 0.0070(14) 2.16 0.0152(29)
240Pu 6561(7) 5.7(2)× 10−8 479(17) 2.154 1031(36)
241Pu 14.329(29) 2× 10−16 § 0.0007659(16) 2.25 0.0017233(35)
242Pu 3.75(2)× 105 5.50(6)× 10−6 801.5(97) 2.149 1722(21)
241Am 432.6(6) 3.6(9)× 10−12 0.46(11) 3.22 1.47(37)
242Cm 0.44572(55) 6.2(3)× 10−8 7.60(37)× 106 2.54 1.931(93)× 107
244Cm 18.1(1) 1.37(3)× 10−6 4.102(93)× 106 2.72 1.116(25)× 107
252Cf 2.645(8) 0.03092(8) 6.134(24)× 1011 3.757 2.3046(92)× 1012
* Values from the most recent publications in Nuclear Data Sheets. In detail: 235U [BT14a],
238U, 238Pu [BT15], 239Pu [BT14b], 240Pu [SB08], 241Pu, 241Am [Nes15], 242Pu, 242Cm
[Ako02], 244Cm [Ako03], 252Cf [Nic05].
† Atomic masses required in the calculation where taken from the 2012 Atomic Mass Evalu-
ation [Aud+12; Wan+12].
‡ Calculated from [VHW10].
§ For calculations, the maximal possible value was used (the< from the source was dropped).
changed over time, it is more important to base measurements on the same assumptions
than on changing data sets. However, this is not taken into account in this thesis.
A higher emphasis here was given to more accurate data sets. If in the future the
developed software should be applied for tasks where other data sets were used in the
past, the respective data could be easily changed by knowledgeable users.
In most samples, the neutrons can undergo absorption processes. If they are captured
in a radiative capture (n,γ) process, this leads to a decrease in neutron population. In
samples of fissionable materials / actinides, absorption can cause induced fission, which
would increase the neutron population. Beyond radiative capture and induced fission,
there are (n, 2n) and (n, 3n) reactions. Because of high threshold energies, the latter
two only rarely occur for spontaneous fission neutrons and are typically not accounted
for in theoretical descriptions of the source for neutron multiplicity counting. These
effects are summarized as the sample multiplication M . A given sample will emit M · x
neutrons if x neutrons start in the sample by decay processes12.
12 These decay processes usually also include neutrons are produced by α-decay of materials and sub-
sequent (α, n) processes, as discussed in later sections.
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The energy distribution of neutrons produced in fission reactions is usually described
by a Watt spectrum, based on empirically derived parameters a and b:
W (a, b, E) =
√√pib
4a
· e
b
4a
a
· sinhpbE (4.5)
In this equation, E is the energy of the outgoing neutrons. The equation was taken from
[VHW10], where also parameters can be found in tabulated form.
Most simulations of neutron reactions only require knowledge of the average number
of neutrons produced per fission event ν. However, neutron multiplicity measurements
make use of the known distribution of produced neutrons. The latter is also called a
“Multiplicity Distribution”, or sometimes just “multiplicity”. To derive the spontaneous
fission rate after detection, knowledge of this multiplicity is employed. Good knowledge
of the multiplicity is not only important for the mathematical analysis after a measure-
ment, but also to define particle sources for Monte Carlo simulations. Again, in the
following the data of [VHW10] is used, which lists the same multiplicities as [SM08].
Figure 4.2 shows distributions for spontaneous fission of 240Pu and induced fission of
239Pu. These multiplicities are the most frequently used distributions in the analysis of
neutron multiplicity measurements.
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Figure 4.2.: Multiplicity distribution of neutrons resulting from induced fission of 239Pu
and spontaneous fission of 240Pu.
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Multiplicity distributions are often described by factorial moments. The first three facto-
rial moments m1, m2, and m3 can be calculated as follows for a probability distribution
P(n):
m1 =
∞∑
n=0
= nP(n) (4.6)
m2 =
∞∑
n=0
= n(n− 1)P(n) (4.7)
m3 =
∞∑
n=0
= n(n− 1)(n− 2)P(n) (4.8)
All sums only need to be evaluated up to the biggest n with P(n) > 0. Whenever
such moments are discussed in the following, the are based on normalized probability
distributions, where
1=
∞∑
n=0
P(n) (4.9)
4.3 Neutron Detection and Common Detectors
The majority of existing detectors for neutron multiplicity measurements are based on
3He tubes to register incoming neutrons. 3He neutron detection is most efficient for
thermal neutrons. Others detection materials for thermal neutrons are possible, as
well as detection in the epithermal (e.g.[Tam+10]) or fast neutron energy range (e.g.
[PVE07]). Detection in 3He is beneficial for several reasons. The incoming neutron gets
absorbed, avoiding cross talk with other detectors, and the tubes show nearly no signal
from gammas. However, recent increases in neutron detection applications lead to a
world-wide 3He shortage and drastically increased prices. [Uni11] discusses the issue
and also lists possible replacement technologies. Still, no large trend is visible to replace
existing 3He based neutron multiplicity detectors.
Inside of 3He tubes, an electrical field is established between a central wire and the tube
casing. Typical voltages applied are between 1500V to 1680V [Ens+98]. The typical
reaction of a neutron with gaseous He3 is a capture process that leads to the emission
of a proton and a triton:
3He+ n→ p+ 3H (4.10)
The reaction has a q-value of 763.7560(32) keV13, carried away as kinetic energy of the
proton and the triton. Both resulting particles ionize additional atoms of the 3He gas.
13 Calculated using atomic mass data and conversion factor to keV as in [Aud+12; Wan+12].
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Due to the electric field between central wire and casing, ions and electrons move into
opposite directions. They create a charge pulse, which can then be further amplified
and processed by the detector electronics to form a neutron pulse.
Figure 4.3 shows neutron interaction cross sections in 3He. The cross section for the
above described reaction is shown in green. It is increasing with falling energy, showing
proportionality to 1/v . In the MeV energy range, the elastic interaction cross sections
becomes more important. Not shown in the figure are the interaction cross sections
for the (n,γ) reaction and deuteron production. The latter has a very high threshold
value, the first is orders of magnitude smaller than the shown range. Because neutrons
released from fission are in the fast neutron energy range, detectors based on 3He tubes
require slowing down of neutrons by moderation to achieve high detection efficiency.
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Figure 4.3.: 3He neutron interaction cross
sections from JEFF 3.1.
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Figure 4.4.: 1H neutron interaction cross
sections from JEFF 3.1.
Moderation typically is done using polyethylene (C2H4)n, which can at the same time
form a structural component of a detector. Neutrons entering the polyethylene undergo
elastic scattering processes mostly with the hydrogen atoms of the polyethylene. It
takes multiple scattering events for the neutrons to be slowed down to thermal energies.
Some neutrons get absorbed, forming deuterated polyethylene, reducing the detector
efficiency. The number of neutrons absorbed varies with the detector, but can be as
large as around a fourth of all neutrons emitted from a sample. The overall process of
slowing down takes time, on the order of 10 µs to 100 µs before neutrons are absorbed or
have left the detector. The average life time is called die-away time τ, a characteristic
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of the detector. Smaller die-away times are beneficial, because it reduces the chance
of overlapping neutron detection of subsequent fission events, and allows for shorter
coincidence windows.
While most higher energy scattering can be described well on a nuclear level, for ther-
mal energies also interaction effects with molecules have to be taken into account. This
phenomenon is known from solid state physics, where neutrons are used to study atomic
structures, because thermal neutrons have a deBroglie wavelength of the order of the
dimensions of inter-atomic spacing dimensions and and a kinetic energy in the order
of collective vibrational modes of solids [FP13, p. 3]. Figure 4.4 shows the difference
between 1H cross-sections that only take nuclear interaction into account (“Standard
Elastic Scattering”) and those that are corrected for thermal scattering effects with the
structure of polyethylene.
Most detectors have a cylindrical geometry, and employ several rings of 3He tubes. A
model of the previously mentioned Active Well Coincidence Counter is shown in figure
4.5. This detector has two rings of 3He tubes. Compared to other detectors, it has
a rather low detection efficiency. Sometimes, detectors employ 4-pi geometries, sur-
rounding samples on all sides. This is especially the case if it is intended to measure
large and/or low emission samples (e.g. nuclear waste drums). Generally, while design-
ing detectors, it is important to maximize efficiency and minimize the die-away time of
neutrons inside the detector [RE08, p. 46]. As will be discussed later, high efficiency
plays a major role as some results include the cube of the efficiency.
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Figure 4.5.: Rendering of a Geant4 model of the Active Well Coincidence Counter, which
is also commonly used for passive measurements.
4.4 Reconstruction of the Plutonium Mass
After a sample has been measured, experimentalists or simulators are left with a neutron
pulsetrain, which is influenced by the effects described in the beginning of this chapter
(cf. figure 4.1). An analysis of this pulsetrain is carried out inside of detector electronics
using shift registers. If the pulsetrain has been recorded, the latter step can instead be
done with a computer program.
Central references for the discussion of the shift register approach in this and the follow-
ing sections are [Ens+98], [Ens+07b] and [Göt15]. This section deviates partly from
their notation when it seemed to improve readability. In the shift register approach, two
multiplicity distributions are defined, usually called “R+A” or “foreground” and “A” or
“background”. The goal is to apply a method which stores the correlated events in the
“foreground” distribution and uncorrelated events in the “background” distribution. In
electronics, every incoming pulse is stored for a time period in the shift register, which
acts as a coincidence window. A typical length is G = 64µs (“gate length”), hence a shift
register driven by a 2MHz clock has 128 positions to store events. The pulses are de-
layed from entering the shift register by a very short time (“predelay”), with PD =2 µs
to 5 µs.
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To construct the two distributions, each incoming neutron is considered a trigger. Im-
mediately when a neutron is detected, the number of neutrons in the shift register is
stored in the “R+A” distribution table. The number of neutrons detected in this detec-
tion window includes correlated and uncorrelated neutrons with regard to the trigger
neutron. A second detection window is opened by the trigger neutron and a very long
delay. The number of neutrons in that detection window is stored in the “A” distribution
table, and it is assumed that all these events are uncorrelated neutrons with regard to
the trigger neutron. The long delay L typically has a length in the order of ms, an often
used value is L = 4096µs.
Figure 4.6 shows this process in a simplified way for 5 trigger neutrons, based on the
pulsetrain already shown in this chapter14. From the resulting distributions, three val-
ues are calculated, called Singles (S), Doubles (D), and Triples (T):
S =
nmax∑
i=0
A(i) =
nmax∑
i=0
RA(i) (4.11a)
D =S · ( f1 − b1) (4.11b)
T =S · 1
2
· ( f2 − b2 − 2( f1 − b1)b1) (4.11c)
In these equations, fn and bn are the factorial moments of the “R+A” and “A” distribu-
tion respectively. Singles represent the sum of all trigger neutron events, or simply of
all detected neutron events, and relate to the total number of emitted neutrons simply
by the detector efficiency ". Doubles and Triples represent the detected subsequent fac-
torial moments of the combined multiplicity distribution of source neutrons (including
spontaneous fission, (α, n) reactions and multiplication). Similar to S, they differ from
the theoretical distributions due to detection effects, depending on efficiency to higher
powers and “gate fractions”, the latter will be discussed later in this section.
The theoretical values for S, D and T can be derived with a model that is a basic version
of the different processes happening in a multiplicity sample. It takes into account the
three properties that are the measurement goal, spontaneous fission rate F , multipli-
cation M , and relation between neutrons from spontaneous fission to neutrons from
(α, n) reactions α. Detailed derivations of the model can be found in [Boe85]. The
basic model requires several assumptions:
• “Point Model”, where the sample is thought to be concentrated in a single point.
This is equivalent to the assumption of spatially homogeneous detector efficiency
and multiplication
14 Coincidence counting methods also use such a shift register approach. In contrast to multiplicity
measurements, only the total sums of the number of neutrons in the immediate and delayed detection
windows are stored in two scalers.
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Figure 4.6.: Transformation of a neutron pulsetrain into R+A and A distributions. To
achieve better visualization, a short gate length (32 µs) and short long delay
(300 µs) was used. In real measurements, both length of the gate and space
between gates would be larger.
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• Superfission concept: Neutrons from a decay, (α, n) reactions and subsequent
multiplication are assumed to occur at the same time.
• Similar energy distributions for spontaneous fission and (α, n) reactions
• Neutron capture (without fission) in sample is negligible
• There is no correlation between neutron energy and neutron number for single
fission events
• Die-away time can be described by a single exponential function
Several extensions to the model have been developed over time, which relax require-
ments for some of the assumptions (e.g. [Cro+12], [GK15]). This section will focus on
the non-extended version. The spontaneous fission rate of a sample can be described
as
F = mpu240 · FPu240 (4.12)
where FPu240 is the spontaneous fission rate of
240Pu as described above and mpu240 is
the effective 240Pu mass in the sample.
Given the weight fractions of 238Pu as f238,
240Pu as f240,
242Pu as f242, the effective
mass relates to the total plutonium mass via
mpu240 = mpu
 
2.52 · f238 + f240 + 1.68 · f242

(4.13)
For the superfission concept, where neutrons from a spontaneous fission decay and
(α, n) reactions are assumed to occur at the same time, a “superfission rate” can be
defined, adding the rate of neutrons from (α, n) reactions to the spontaneous fission
rate:
RSuF = F + rn,α = F(1+ανs f ,1) (4.14)
These superfissions will itself have a multiplicity distribution. The derivation of this
distribution is shown in [Boe85]. The expressions for the factorial moments of the mul-
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tiplicity distribution, the number of neutrons emitted per superfission, are the following:
ν1 =
M
1+ανSF,1
νSF,1(1+α) (4.15a)
ν2 =
M
1+ανSF,1

νSF,2 +
M − 1
νI F,1 − 1νSF,1(1+α)νi,2

(4.15b)
ν3 =
M
1+ανSF,1

νSF,3 (4.15c)
+
M − 1
νI F,1 − 1
 
3νSF,2νI F,2 + νSF,1(1+α)νI F,3

+ 3

M − 1
νI F,1 − 1
2
νSF,1(1+α)ν
2
I F,2

In this equation, νSF,1/2/3 are the first three factorial moments of the multiplicity dis-
tribution of spontaneous fission of 240Pu, νI F,1/2/3 are the first three factorial moments
of the multiplicity distribution of induced fission of 239Pu. νSF,1 is equal to ν of the
spontaneous fission of 240Pu, similarly for νI F,1. Combining RSuF with the moments of
equation (4.15) gives equations for Singles, Doubles and Triples.
S =RSuF · " · ν1 (4.16a)
D =RSuF · "
2 fd
2
· ν2 (4.16b)
T =RSuF · "
3 ft
6
· ν3 (4.16c)
Now, the detector effects have to be taken into account. For Singles, the value is mul-
tiplied by the detector efficiency. For Doubles, the value is multiplied by the square of
the detector efficiency, and the Doubles gate fraction fd . Similarly, Triples include the
Triples gate fraction ft , and a cube of the efficiency. The gate fractions describe the fact
that only a fraction of correlated neutrons can be detected in a finite gate length, other
neutrons might not be measured because they are detected later. A simple approxima-
tion to calculate gate fractions, valid if the die-away of neutrons in the detector can be
described as a single exponential function, is the following:
fd = e
− tpredela yτ (1− e−Gτ ) (4.17)
In the equation, tpredela y is the time for the predelay before the shift register gate is
opened, and t gate the gate length. τ is the die-away time in the detector. The Triples
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gate fraction in this approach would be ft = f 2d . Often, the assumption of single expo-
nential die away is not true. Taking D∞ as the Doubles and T∞ as the Triples of such
an infinite gate length, the gate fraction rather would be:
fd =
D
D∞
(4.18a)
ft =
T
T∞
(4.18b)
While infinite gates are impractical, one can however compare relatively long gate times
to the standard time used for the measurement. Using such long gates, the gate fractions
can be estimated using known samples.
After equations (4.14) and (4.15) are inserted in equations (4.16), and the system of
equations is solved for F , M , and α, it is possible to use values of S, D and T that result
from measurement and pulsetrain analysis, equations (4.11), to eventually calculate
the plutonium mass. Eliminating F and α leads to a cubic equation for M .
0=a+ bM + cM2 +M3 (4.19a)
a =
−6Tνs f ,2(νi f ,1 − 1)
"2 ftS(νs f ,2νi f ,3 − νs f ,3νi f ,2) (4.19b)
b =
2D(νs f ,3(νi f ,1 − 1)− 3νs f ,2νi f ,2)
" fdS(νs f ,2νi f ,3 − νs f ,3νi f ,2) (4.19c)
c =
6Dνs f ,2νi f ,2
" fdS(νs f ,2νi,3 − νs f ,3νi,2) − 1 (4.19d)
M can be calculated by solving the cubic equation (4.19a). This value can be used to
solve the system for F and α:
F =
2D
" fd
− M(M−1)νi f ,2Sνi f ,1−1
"M2νs f ,2
(4.20)
α=
S
F"νs f ,1M
− 1 (4.21)
From this, the effective 240Pu mass and the total plutonium mass can be calculated
according to equations (4.12) and (4.13).
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4.5 Role of α Decays
Most materials that undergo spontaneous fission mainly decay via α-decay, some via
β-decay. Probabilities for the latter two decay modes usually are many orders of
magnitude higher than for the spontaneous fission event. The largest branching ra-
tio for spontaneous fission among commonly measured isotopes is that of 252Cf, where
3.092(8)% of the decays are fission events. Table 4.4 shows typical α-decay energies.
Table 4.4.: Important kinetic energy levels of α-particles emitted by decay of various iso-
topes. Intensities are normalized to all α-reactions of the respective isotopes.
Isotope Energy / MeV Intensity / %
238Pu 5.4563(3) 28.98(10)
[BT07, p. 746]238Pu 5.49903(20) 70.91(10)
239Pu 5.1055(8) 11.94(7)
[BT14a, p. 241]239Pu 5.1443(8) 17.11(14)
239Pu 5.15659(14) 70.77(14)
240Pu 5.12368(23) 27.10(10)
[BT06, p. 2676]240Pu 5.16817(15) 72.80(10)
242Pu 4.8582(10) 23.4(6)
[BT15, p. 227]242Pu 4.9023(10) 76.5(6)
241Am 5.44280(13) 13.1(3)
[Bas06, p. 2381]241Am 5.48556(12) 84.8(5)
As ionizing particles, the range of α-particles with energies as those mentioned in table
4.4 in matter is very short. The particles would never reach a He-3 tube in a neu-
tron multiplicity counter. However, neutrons produced through α-particles in (α, n)-
reactions can contribute significantly to the neutron source term in cases where low-Z
materials are present. Examples for low-Z materials in close range to fissile materials
could be oxygen, fluorine or beryllium in different applications. The actual reaction
rate is relatively small, about one in a million α-particles will undergo an inelastic in-
teraction that releases a neutron. But as discussed above, typical branching ratios for
α-decay and spontaneous fission show inverse properties - spontaneous fission occurs
only in the order of one in a million decays and hence the neutron rates from (α, n)
reactions and spontaneous fission have approximately the same order of magnitude.
Thus, adequate treatment of (α, n) reactions has to be included in any simulation of
neutron multiplicity counting. This includes an estimate of the neutron yield, the num-
ber of neutrons produced per α-particle, for an energy range up to several MeV. Also
the energy distribution of the resulting neutrons should be adequately reproduced in
simulations. These two effects will be discussed in the following.
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4.6 Neutron Yield from (α, n) Reactions
There are mainly two ways to provide neutron yield data, which will be described in this
section. First, one can rely on experimental data of experiments that directly measured
the neutron yield. Second, it is possible to calculate yield as a function of energy during
slowing down from measured inelastic cross sections and α particle stopping powers of
materials.
Two comprehensive measurements of several sample materials were carried out by
[BC79] and [WS82], mainly aiming for thick target yields. Thick targets do not have
to be large, only bigger than the typical range of α-particles. Then, nearly all α parti-
cle of an external particle beam will be stopped inside, only very few will leave the
sample again because of being scattered backwards. [BC79] used a Van-de-Graaff
generator to produce α-particles of different energies, and bombarded targets inside
a graphite sphere. Neutrons were detected using eight BF3 neutron detectors placed
in the sphere, and several low-Z samples were measured. In [WS82], measurements
based on a slightly more complex setup have been carried out. They also include a
thorough evaluation and description of uncertainties. The measurement has been done
with selected α-particle energies. Afterwards, a cubic function has been fit to the re-
sults, from which the complete range from 3.0MeV to 10MeV has been interpolated
in 0.1MeV steps. Beyond these comprehensive works, [BB73] measured a very pure
sample of 238Pu oxide, one of the few references that can be found for measurements
of fissile material oxides.
Besides direct experiments, neutron yields can also be calculated if cross section data for
the interaction are available (cf. [FOK68], [LP77], [Hea+89]). While such data might
be a result of measurements similar to those mentioned above, they could also come
from other sources. Typically, many different cross sections are used by these references
to calculate yield.
In the following, the relevant steps for such a calculation will be discussed. Notation
and derivation for neutron yield is similar to those given in [LP77; Wes79; CM13]. For a
single isotope i undergoing (α, n) reactions, the chance of creating dY neutrons during
every small step dx that the particle travels can be described as:
dYi = niσi(E(x))dx (4.22)
ni describes the number density, σi the reaction cross section for (α, n) reactions of the
isotope. To get the actual yield, one has to integrate the reaction cross section over the
distance traveled by the α particle in matter, R.
Yi =
R∫
0
niσi(E(x))dx (4.23)
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The total distance depends on the initial energy and the energy loss due to electromag-
netic interactions on the way. The effect of such interactions is typically summarized as
the stopping power of an element. It is possible to describe infinitesimal energy loss by
stopping power using the following relation:
dE = −Se(E)dx (4.24)
As an effect mostly dominated by atomic interaction, stopping powers are equal for
different isotopes of the same element. Hence in the equation, Se is the elemental
stopping power of the element e. Combining both equations, the neutron yield per
single α particle for a given isotope can be calculated:
Yi(Eα) = ni
0∫
Eα-decay
−σ(E′)
Se(E′)
dE′ (4.25)
Here, the index e is chosen with respect to the isotope i. Equation (4.25) gives the yield
only for a single α-decay energy Eα-decay, and a single isotopic cross section and elemen-
tal stopping power. To calculate the yield of a material mixtures, several summations
have to be carried out. First, one has to calculate the total stopping power S of the
mixture using the Bragg additivity rule, which simply sums elemental stopping power
over all elements e in the mixture (denoted as set Mix)15.
S(E) =
∑
e∈Mix
weSe(E) (4.26)
Second, isotopic yields have to be summed over all isotopes undergoing α-decay (de-
noted as set AD), all α-decay energies of each such isotope a (denoted as Elevel,a) and
finally over all isotopes i in the mixture that have a non-zero chance to undergo (α, n)
reactions (denoted as set AN). All yield integrals need to take into account the total
stopping power for the mix as previously defined.
Y =
∑
a∈AD
na
ln(2)
T1/2,a
 ∑
Eα-decay∈Elevel,a
fEα-decay
∑
i∈AN
ni
0∫
Eα-decay
−σi(E
′)
S(E′) · dE
′

 (4.27)
15 The Bragg additivity rule is a simplification and can introduce small errors in the order of several
percent depending on the compound. These errors are neglected here. It is possible to correct for
these errors by additional correction factors for compound materials. However, the common sets of
stopping power data do not provide factors for the most relevant compound PuO2 [ICR93].
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Here, wa is the weight fraction of the decaying isotopes, T1/2,a its half-life, and fEα the
branching ratio for a decay with α particle energy Eα.
Commonly, the stopping power part related to electronic interaction is described by the
Bethe (or Bethe-Bloch) formula. However, at the relevant energies, the low MeV range,
the formula is not precise enough, even when various correction terms are applied. For
these energy ranges, there exist various tabulated data sets, for example in [Zie77],
in the ASTAR database [Ber+05], mainly in form of instructions and data collection
in [ICR93] or directly calculated with the SRIM software [ZBZ08]. The tabulations
are typically based on parameterized fits of experimental data, often combined with a
smooth transition towards the Bethe formula. The transition usually takes place at an
energy of about 10MeV. The second part of stopping power, nuclear stopping, plays
only a minor role in the energy range of the radioactive decays as described above, it is
not included in the calculation of stopping power for ONMS.
The calculation of yield in the software described in the following chapter is based
on a relatively large, current evaluation of cross sections, the JENDL/AN-2005 data set,
which has been but together by Murata et al. [MMS06]. It is available in the ENDF-6 file
format [HT09]. Generally, the authors used available data and software called mEXIFON
to produce their cross sections. For every cross section, the authors have calculated thick
target neutron yields using the formula described above, and stopping powers based on
[Zie77]. The authors of [MMS06] claim that they have adjusted the cross sections using
these yields to closely match yield data from [BC79] and [WS82]. It has been decided
to use these cross sections for this work, as they are the most recent comprehensive
evaluation, and freely available online. A detailed description of included isotopes and
the necessary steps to make the evaluation usable for ONMS is given in appendix A.
4.7 Energy Spectrum of Produced Neutrons
The (α, n) reaction can be described using a classical kinematic description of a scatter-
ing process where incoming particles differ from outgoing particles, as given for exam-
ple in [Fod71]. Incoming particles are the α-particle and the target nucleus t, outgoing
a neutron and the residual nucleus r. The difference in mass of incoming and outgoing
particles is described as the Q-value of the reaction.
Q = (mα +mt − (mn +mr)) · c2 (4.28)
where mα and mn describe masses of α-particle and neutron, and mt and mr describe
masses of target and residual respectively. In addition to energy generated or lost due
to the change in mass, the residual nucleus can be left in an exited state with energy
Eex . Both can be summarized to
Qex =Q− Eex (4.29)
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The reaction details are calculated in the center of mass frame. All x ′ (or ~x ′) values
denote center of mass frame values. If the target is at rest in the laboratory frame, the
velocity of the center of mass in the lab frame is:
~u=
mα
mα +mt
~vα (4.30)
Using this and the relations ~v ′α = ~vα − ~u and ~v ′t = ~u, the kinetic energies for α-particle
and target in the center of mass frame can be formulated:
E′α =
1
2
mα ~v ′α
2
=
1
2
mα( ~vα − ~u)2 = 12mα

mt
mα +mt
2
~vα
2 =

mt
mα +mt
2
Eα (4.31)
E′t =
mαmt
(mα +mt)2
Eα (4.32)
The resulting kinetic energy of the neutron in the center of mass frame can be described
as
E′n =
mr
mn +mr
(E′α + E′t +QEx) (4.33)
It should be noted that this equation is independent of angle θ between outgoing neu-
tron and incoming α-particle. Scattering in the center of mass frame is isotropic. To get
back the energy in the laboratory frame, the following relation for the velocities has to
be used:
~vn
2 = ~v ′n
2
+ ~u2 + 2 ~v ′n · ~u= v ′n2 + u2 + v ′nu cosθ ′n (4.34)
Maximal and minimal velocity (now only considering the magnitude) are those where
the angle between the reaction products in the center of mass frame is minimal / maxi-
mal, or cosθ ′n = ±1. Inserted in the previous equation:
vn,min/max =
q
v ′2n + u2 ± 2v ′nu (4.35)
En,min/max =
1
2
mnv
2
n,min/max =
1
2
mn
 
v ′2n + u2 ± 2v ′nu

=
1
2
mn(v
′
n ± u)2 (4.36)
En,min/max =
1
2
mn
√√ 2
mn
mr
mn +mr
(E′α + E′t +Qex)± mαmα +mt ·
√√2Eα
mα
2
(4.37)
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or with E′α from equation (4.31) and E′t from equation (4.32) inserted
En,min/max =
1
2
mn
√√√ 2
mn
mr
mn +mr

mt
mα +mt
2
Eα +
mαmt
(mα +mt)2
Eα +Qex

± mα
mα +mt
·
√√2Eα
mα
2
This describes the minimal and maximal energy of a neutron produced by an α-particle
with energy Eα for a single reaction with Qex , the combination of Q-value and particular
residual excitation energy as defined in equation (4.29). The neutron energy in the
laboratory frame is evenly distributed between En,min and En,max, because the scattering
in the center of mass frame is isotropic, and can be shown as follows. First, equation
(4.34) is used to write a function of the neutron energy of the scattering angle in the
center of mass:
En =
1
2
mn

v ′n
2 + u2 + v ′nu cosθ ′n

(4.38)
Building the derivative with regard to (cosθ ′n) yields:
dEn =
1
2
mnv
′
nud(cosθ
′
n) (4.39)
As due to isotropic scattering, every value d(cosθ ′n) is equally probable, all dEn are
equally probable, too.
In the following, the neutron energy distribution will be called f (Eα, En,Qex), a func-
tion that is 0 below En,min and above En,max. Between these limits, it has the value
1
En,max−En,min , so its integral is 1.
Typically, different excitation energies are possible for the residual nucleus. Although
the ground state is the most likely level, higher levels are reached with non-negligible
branching ratios. The reactions of a residual nucleus with Nex excitation levels (includ-
ing the ground state) can be described by the partial reaction cross section σn(Eα) for
each excitation level n ∈ Nex , where Qn is equal to Qex for that particular excitation
level (cf. equation (4.29)) the combination of Q-value and the excitation energy Eex ,n
of this level. Such partial reaction cross sections are for example in the JENDL/AN-2005
cross section data set.
Summing the products of the partial reaction cross sections with the corresponding
distributions f (Eα, En,Qex) over the different levels allows for the definition of a general
cross section:
σ(Eα, En) =
Nex∑
n=1
σn(Eα) f (Eα, En,Qn) (4.40)
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Using this general cross section, the probability of producing a neutron with energy En
during a small step dx along the trajectory of an α-particle can be calculated similar to
equation (4.22):
dP(Eα, En) = nσ(Eα, En)dx (4.41)
with n the number density of the target atoms and Eα the momentary energy of the
particle during the step.
The energy is reduced along the path due to the stopping power S(E), allowing to
express the previous equation in terms of infinitesimal energy changes:
dP(Eα, En) = −nσ(Eα, En) 1S(E)dE (4.42)
To get the distribution for neutron energies of a single α-decay with energy Eα-decay, one
has to integrate from Eα-decay until the particle is stopped (E = 0)16.
P(Eα-decay, En) =
0∫
Eα-decay
−nσ(Eα-decay,En)S(E) dE (4.43)
(4.44)
The total neutron energy distribution of a material can be calculated by summing P
over all possible target materials and source α-energies.
16 Often, integrals are expressed with 0 as lower and Eα-decay as upper bound, implicitly changing the
sign of the integrand.
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5 Description of the Simulation
Software
The main part of this doctoral research project consisted of the development of an ap-
plication for simulating neutron multiplicity measurements, “Open Nuclear Multiplicity
Simulation” (ONMS). Simulations of neutron multiplicity measurements can be divided
generally into two steps: A Monte Carlo based neutron transport step, which simulates
neutron sources as well as the physical processes and particle transport in a detector
geometry, and a second step to analyze the pulsetrain of detected neutron events pro-
duced by the first step. The implementation of all parts of the first step and the second
step will be described now.
There are several reasons why such simulations are useful. Simulations are very often
the first step of any new hardware development. In 1991, [Rei+91] wrote that “Com-
puter calculations employing Monte Carlo codes for neutron transport have been used
to optimize the design of 3He neutron coincidence detector systems” (p. 493). Be-
yond optimization and development, simulations can also be used to detect weaknesses
in detectors, e.g. regarding possible cheating in arms control verification. With vali-
dated physical simulation tools, it is often cheaper and easier to simulate many differ-
ent configurations, instead of taking measurements (cf. for example [GC13], [LPT09],
[Nak+14]).
While other tools to do these types of simulations exist, the development of ONMS
is worth pursuing for several reasons. In the description of the neutron multiplicity
benchmark exercises, the authors mention that “few codes are available today to per-
form the first step and they are not available to everybody” [PS06, p. 2], indicating a
need for more codes and especially for higher availability. The first step mentioned in
the preceding quote is the same first step as described above.
ONMS is open source software, and fulfills the three criteria listed in chapter 3. As
such, it is an example open source software with an arms control purpose, available to
everyone. Future uses include not only simulations, but also its use as a case study for
further developing the concept of open source software for arms control applications.
Beyond being open source, it also fills some technical gaps that existing codes have,
which will be shown in this chapter. Beneficial for the development of ONMS was the
fact that from the outset of the project, experimental data were available for validating
the code from the doctoral research project of Malte Göttsche, ZNF Hamburg [Göt15].
This was especially interesting, because the experimental data were gathered in the
context of an arms control application of the technology, nuclear warhead verification.
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ONMS was developed as a Geant4 application mainly in C++ [Str13]. Figure 5 shows
a conceptual overview of the C++ components of ONMS. Many parts were developed
from scratch, as there were no existing functions available, or existing functions were
not of the required quality. Apart from implementing required physical capabilities,
the software was also designed in a way that should allow for easy further extension
or replacement of individual parts and models. It was also carefully checked that all
required tools, libraries and data sets are openly available.
Besides components developed in C++, the source folder of ONMS also includes auxil-
iary files. There is a folder that holds geometry files for the two detectors and all samples
that were calculated as part of this thesis. These files are not required for the code, but
could serve as examples for future usage. Another folder contains Geant4 macro files to
carry out simple calculations of all samples, and also macro files for visualization.
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Figure 5.1.: Basic library structure of ONMS. Grey boxes are own developments, white
boxes show external tools.
Currently, ONMS consists of 93 different source files and more than 8000 lines of
code, excluding the fission library. The software is available at https://github.com/
nuclearfreesoftware/onms, allowing internet users to download and use it, access its
source code and give them the option to add modifications.
The content of this chapter is split in four sections. First, the Geant4 framework will be
described in more detail, together with a summary of the Monte Carlo neutron transport
capabilities and cross sections used in ONMS. In a second section, the global structure
and main functions of ONMS will be described. This is followed by sections three and
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four, which are specific descriptions of two sublibraries of ONMS, one for adequately
simulating the particle source related to a sample, the other to carry out the analysis of
the detected pulsetrain.
5.1 Geant4 and Neutron Particle Transport
Geant4 is a software framework for Monte Carlo simulations of particle interactions in
different geometries [Ago+03; All+06]. Compared to common tools used in the arms
control realm for Monte Carlo simulations (e.g. MCNP), the approach of Geant4 could
be described as less “engineering-centered”. It is itself not an application that can be run
individually, but a set of libraries which can be used to build specific applications. Also,
it does not have a common standard for “input files” to define simulation problems. In-
stead, the approach is more driven by basic science and experiments. The framework is
developed by the Geant4 collaboration, which consists of more than hundred scientists
and developers in different institutions around the world17. The software is capable
of simulating many different particles and can employ numerous physical processes.
Often, it is even possible to select one of several concurrent implementations of a pro-
cess to focus on particular problems and theoretical assumptions. For every use case,
a new application has to be developed. The development language of Geant4 is C++
[Str13], a simple Python API exists as well. A detailed description of the development
process for Geant4 applications can be found in the User’s Guide for Application Devel-
opers [Gea15a]. Background on the physics of Geant4 is given in the Physics Reference
Manual [Gea15b].
The main focus of Geant4 applications is on problems in the field of high energy physics.
It has been used for example for simulations of ALICE [Hrˇi+11] and ATLAS [Rim+04],
detectors at the Large Hadron Collider at CERN. Some past examples of usage of Geant4
for arms control and nuclear safeguards applications exist, too:
• Simulation of nuclear resonance fluorescence as a non-destructive assay method
for nuclear safeguards [Hay+10]
• Simulation of fast neutron detection for non-destructive assay methods [NCP13]
• Simulation of muon tomography of spent fuel containers [Jon+13]
A common theme of these (and other) examples is the use of Geant4 for more “exotic”
fields of physics, which consider particles other than neutrons.
The Geant4 framework has been selected as a basis for ONMS as it fulfills the open
source criteria defined in chapter 3. The copyright license used by the collaboration has
been drafted specially for Geant4 (http://geant4.web.cern.ch/geant4/license/LICENSE.html).
It is is very similar to some common open source licenses, and should fulfill the standard
of the Open Source Initiative for open source licenses.
17 http://geant4.cern.ch/collaboration/members.shtml
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The main feature directly provided by Geant4 is the transport of neutrons at relevant
energies. No modifications have been made to this functionality. Relevant for the prob-
lem is the neutron energy range between 0MeV to 20MeV. In nuclear engineering,
neutrons with energies of the order of MeV would be considered to be in a high en-
ergy range, however for Geant4 this is a very low energy18. Geant4 implements special
classes for the treatment of low energy neutrons. While originally being developed for
neutron interaction as NeutronHP classes, the most recent version of Geant4 (10.2) has
a unified version for multiple particles called ParticleHP. HP stands for High Precision.
If used, these classes load tabulated point-wise nuclear cross section data from a special
library and use these to simulate interactions. The Geant4 consortium publishes a neu-
tron cross section library for ParticleHP called G4NDL, currently in version 4.5. The
data in this library is cited as data from the ENDF/B-VII evaluation from NNDC (“comes
largely from ENDF/B-VII”19).
However, the library only includes isotopes of elements that naturally occur on earth
(Z ≤ 92), hence it does not contain any transuranic actinides, including plutonium20.
A different library has been compiled by scientists of the Centro de Investigaciones En-
ergéticas, Medioambientales y Tecnológicas (CIEMAT) in Spain [Men+12; Men+14].
They converted many of the major evaluations (ENDF-B/VII.0 from the United States,
JEFF-3.1/Europe, BROND-2.2/Russia, JENDL-4.0/Japan, CENDL-31/China) to files
compatible with ParticleHP, and included also isotopes of elements with Z > 92.
The libraries are freely available from the website of the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (https://www-nds.iaea.org/geant4/). No specific copyright or usage
license is given, but the public availability on the website of an international organi-
zation should suffice to fulfill at least the first open source criteria of access without
limitations. They are provided and as text files, which are human readable.
Unless otherwise stated, the JEFF-3.1-based cross section library was used for all calcu-
lations of this work. Nevertheless, it is easily possible to use other cross section libraries.
ONMS will output a warning when there is an indication that another library is used.
As discussed in the physics section, at very low neutron energies, interaction processes
between neutrons and molecules also need to be taken into account. The G4NDL library
includes elastic thermal scattering cross sections, which are available in their base eval-
uation. Four are primarily relevant for neutron multiplicity simulations: Hydrogen in
polyethylene, graphite, and depending on the problem beryllium oxide and beryllium
metal. The respective files had to be copied to the CIEMAT libraries according to the
instructions on the website. To use thermal scattering cross sections, a special Physics
List has to be written (cf. section 5.2).
18 Low energy neutrons in the Geant4 context are all neutrons with energy below 20MeV.
19 From Readme file of the library.
20 Additionally, using materials with Z > 92 leads to a program exception for standard Geant4
applications. To avoid this limitation, it is necessary to set the environment variable
AllowForHeavyElements to 1, which is automatically done by the ONMS main application.
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Comparison tests of these thermal cross sections with MCNPX have been carried out by
[Men+14]. They show very good agreement for resulting energy spectra of neutrons
interacting with a block of polyethylene, which is the main moderating and structural
material of most 3He based neutron multiplicity counters.
5.2 Global Functions of Open Neutron Multiplicity Simulation
The central process is governed by the main source file onms.cc and several classes de-
fined in the main folder. The main function of onms.cc instantiates all C++ classes that
are required for a Geant4 application. Mostly, the classes were specifically developed
for ONMS. The classes are listed in table 5.1 in the order of loading. Details will be
discussed in this section.
Table 5.1.: Central ONMS classes and short descriptions.
Class Name Man- Specifically Main function
datory* Developed
ONMSRunManager x x start / end run
ONMSDetectorConstruction x x material and geometry definition
PhysicsList† x x / - simulated particles, physics models
and processes
ONMSAnalysisManager - x store detected events in pulsetrain
ONMSTrackingAction - x keep statistics on particle source
ONMSSteppingAction - x store neutron capture events
ONMSEventAction - x run-time information display
ONMSRunAction - x output results at end of each run
ONMSPrimaryGeneratorAction x - sample and create source particles
G4VisManager - - visualization routines
G4UImanager x - user interface
G4UIExecutive - - helper class for user interface
* An instance of each of these mandatory classes listed is necessary for every Geant4 applica-
tion to be executable.
† Not a single class name, several different classes are possible, refer to text for more informa-
tion.
The ONMSRunManager class is derived from G4RunManager. It initializes the main func-
tions and controls event loops, which carry out Monte Carlo particle tracking. During
program execution, a set of events, typically equivalent to a measurement is summa-
rized as a “run”. In common Monte Carlo codes, users define number of particles to be
simulated for every run. The ONMS extensions gives users an additional option: They
can define a specific measurement time in the beginning, called “runtime”21. From this
time, the software calculates the required particles based on the source activity. The
21 In the following, this is not the actual time the program takes to run on a computer, but the length of
the simulated measurement.
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simulation can be started with the messenger command /ONMS/run/beamOnRuntime22.
The approach removes the necessity for the user to carefully calculate source activities
using tables of nuclear decay data and the source material composition before using
it as an input for the simulation. This automation makes the process easier and less
error-prone.
ONMSDetectorConstruction is the class responsible for defining used materials and
setting up the geometry of the problem. Although it bears detector in its name, it loads
both the description of the actual neutron multiplicity detector and the samples to be
measured. It is derived from G4VUserDetectorConstruction, which is an abstract
base class provided with the Geant4 source. Instead of defining materials and geometry
by C++ directives, ONMSDetectorConstruction makes use of G4GDMLParser, a set of
routines that allow to store this information in external XML files. The parser is part
of Geant4, and GDML is an open description standard defined by a group at CERN
[Chy+06; GDML]. The use of GDML allows users to make changes to material or
geometry without knowledge of C++ and without recompilation of the program. The
ONMSDetectorConstruction class was written in a way that allows the specification of
two different GDML files, a global detector description and a sample description, which
can be exchanged individually. This reflects typical usage of simulating several different
samples using the same detector. The separation of detector and sample files allows
users to keep one file for many calculations, while changing only the second, again
reducing possible errors and making development easier. One example GDML file of a
simple plutonium container is listed in Annex B.
Every Geant4 application needs to have a Physics List, which defines all particles that
could be tracked. It also defines processes and models that govern particle interaction
with materials in the problem geometry. In Geant4, a process is a method for figuring
out when an interaction takes place. For example, it could be a set of interaction cross
sections. When a specific interaction has been sampled, the particular model of this in-
teraction is called. The model then simulates the actual interaction, and the production
of secondary particles and / or excited states of targets [Gea15b, p. 3]. Three different
options for loading a Physics List are provided by ONMS, but only the first should be
used for substantive calculations. The others are provided mainly for debugging and
testing.
• ONMS_QGSP_BIC_HP_Thermal is the default option, including all required physics
processes for ONMS, high precision neutron cross section and thermal scattering.
• QGSP_BIC_HP is the QGSP_BIC version with high precision neutron models, but
without thermal scattering.
• QGSP_BIC does not include any high-precision neutron models. It is offered as a
third option mainly to compare results with the first.
22 Messenger commands are the typical Geant4 user interface. Geant4 provides ways to define new
commands. These can be used at runtime to change settings or control program flow.
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All are based on the QGSP_BIC Physics List that is one of the pre-defined Geant4 Physics
Lists. It defines all particles in the standard model23. For very high energy hadronic
interactions (> 10GeV) a so-called quark-gluon string model is used, for intermediate
energies the Geant4 Binary Cascade. Models and process for low energies, those rel-
evant for ONMS, depend on the specific selection. To use other other Physics Lists, it
would be necessary to change the source code and load respective Physics List classes.
The ONMS_QGSP_BIC_HP_Thermal Physics List has a small addition relative to the
QGSP_BIC_HP list, as the latter does not yet include thermal neutron scattering. The
following lines of code have been added at the function that loads elastic scattering
data for neutrons:
1 G4NeutronHPThermalScattering* theThermalModel = new
G4NeutronHPThermalScattering () ;
2 theThermalModel−>SetMaxEnergy (4 .0* eV ) ;
3 hel−>RegisterMe ( theThermalModel ) ;
4 hel−>AddDataSet (new G4NeutronHPThermalScatteringData () ) ;
This code makes sure that thermal scattering data are used for energies below 4 eV. It
is not used for all isotopes, but only for those for which cross sections exist and which
are named TS_<element>_of_<material>, e.g. TS_H_of_Polyethylene.
The next class loaded, ONMSAnalysisManager, is not based on any Geant4 base class,
but was developed completely from scratch. It is a singleton class that manages the
global analysis of the simulated problem. It stores information about the emitted source
particles and holds an instance of the pulsetrain analysis class which is part of the
pulsetrain sublibrary discussed separately in section 5.4. Besides collecting and storing
data, methods have been implemented to output results on the screen or in specifically
formatted files for further analysis and plotting with other tools.
The loading process is continued by five different “actions”, all classes derived from
abstract base classes. The ONMSPrimaryGeneratorAction is the class which generates
the source particles for all events. It is based on G4VUserPrimaryGeneratorAction,
and mainly serves as an interface between the main program and ONMSMaterialDecay-
Source. The latter does all calculations for sampling source particles, and is described
separately in section 5.3.
The other four classes provide ways to control, monitor and analyze the simulation
process of the application at different steps in time. ONMSEventAction is based on
G4UserEventAction. It contains a method that is called at the start of each source
event to give some informational output during calculations, but does not influence
results. ONMSRunAction is based on G4UserRunAction. It has methods that are called at
the beginning and end of every run to reset the analysis manager or output its results.
23 While this might seem to be more than needed for a problem of basically transporting neutrons, it
does not affect computation time significantly, as all other secondary particles are “killed” imme-
diately after creation by ONMSTrackingAction and not transported further. This should not affect
neutron count rates, as it is very unlikely that a neutron with the common energies in the described
problems produces a secondary particle, which in turn would again produce a new neutron.
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ONMSTrackingAction is based on G4UserTrackingAction. It has methods called at the
beginning and end of each track. A track in Geant4 is the history of the movement of a
single individual particle, either from the initial source or secondary particles produced
in reactions. The class is mainly used to store statistics about produced neutrons, both
from the user defined source and due to other reactions. ONMSSteppingAction, based
on G4UserSteppingAction, is the most important class for producing results. It is called
at every step of a track. If a neutron has “died” in a step (has been absorbed or decayed),
the class evaluates where this took place. If it took place in a geometry volume with a
name specified by the user (e.g. HE-3-Tube), a detection event is added to the neutron
pulsetrain24.
Three more objects instantiated are G4VisualisationManager, G4UIManager and G4UI-
Executive, which are all Geant4 default classes that control visualization output and
handling of textual input and output for the program.
There are several parameters of ONMS that can be controlled by command line op-
tions, e.g. turning thermal neutron scattering cross sections on or off, selecting detector
model, selecting sample model and output file names. A full list of command line
options can be found in table C.1 in appendix C.
Further settings are given via user interface commands defined in different messenger
classes, a common way for Geant4 applications to add interactive elements. A full list
of commands is given in appendix C. It is also possible to combine several of these
commands in macro files, which can be loaded in different ways. Such macro files can
be loaded using the “-b” command line option, which runs them files in “batch”-mode.
In this mode, the program terminates after execution of the calculations defined in the
macro file. This can be used to script the execution of many different calculations with
low user effort. A sample macro file that would be used for the calculations discussed
in the following chapters is shown in appendix C.3.
5.3 Material Decay Source
ONMSMaterialDecaySource is a sublibrary used for calculation of source particles in-
volved in neutron multiplicity simulations. Early in the development process, the deci-
sion to put this in a sublibrary was made as it is a relatively complex part of the total
program. The separate library was also designed in a way that allows for using it as a
particle source method for programs other than ONMS.
The library development has four main goals. First, the library should allow for an ade-
quate representation of particles coming from spontaneous fission. Second, the library
has to take care of the calculation of the (α, n) yield of a source material and produce
source neutrons with respective intensities and energy distributions. Third, it should re-
duce the necessary user input with regard to the construction of the source. Instead of
24 A second volume can be defined as a “lost volume,” for example, the polyethylene block of the
detector. Doing so gives information on where neutrons are lost in the geometry.
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forcing the user to do precalculations using atomic fractions of materials and tabulated
data to specify a source, this is all done during the execution of the program. The user
only specifies a material, from which ONMS calculates the quantities and intensities of
sources based on existing decay data. And lastly, the source should similarly allow for
flexibility to change specific source settings for specific problems in an easy way.
The physical background is described in sections 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7. In terms of program-
ming, ONMSMaterialDecaySource consists of a number of classes, and has a structure
that is similar to the G4GeneralParticleSource (part of Geant4). Implementation of
functions for all four goals has been mostly done from scratch, as often no Geant4
functions existed or were inadequate.
Before a simulation is started and source particles can be sampled, the user must provide
ONMSMaterialDecaySource with three parameters. The user has to specify a material
to be used as source material, the material has to be defined in the sample GDML
file. As a naming scheme for the rest of this section, the selected material M consists
of itot isotopes indexed with i, where i ∈ itot . The next selection has to be made
regarding geometry and volume of the source. Here, users can either provide a name of
a volume defined in the GDML file or select among several different geometrical shapes
(point, sphere, cylinder). If the first option is chosen, ONMS automatically extracts
related parameters (e.g. radius) from the GDML file and calculates the volume of the
source. If the second option is chosen, parameters of the shape and the volume have
to be specified manually via messenger commands. ONMSMaterialDecaySource stores
the source volume only once, so that all individual sources have the same shape and
volume. The last main selection to be made is to turn on or off particular decay or
reaction types from the list in table 5.2.
Table 5.2.: Source events implemented in ONMSMaterialDecaySource.
Reaction Equation notation Class name
Neutrons from (α, n) reactions αn NMSANSource
Neutrons from spontaneous fission events SFn NMSSFSingleIsoDecaySource
γ-particles from spontaneous fission events SFg NMSSFSingleIsoDecaySource
α-particles from α-decay αd NMSAlphaSingleIsoDecaySource
In the notation of the following equations, all these decay modes should be summarized
as the set of source types
ST = {αn,SFn,SFg,αd} (5.1)
For simulations of neutron multiplicity measurements, only the first two sources are
needed, hence they are activated by default. The other two were added for additional
calculations, but are typically turned off. Besides these three major choices, several
minor adjustments can be made. All selections are done via messenger commands. A
full list of commands and options is given in appendix C.
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Depending on the settings, the full source representation can consist of up to 4 · Niso
individual sources for a source material consisting of Niso isotopes. During an initial-
ization stage, the intensities of all individual sources are calculated, as well as the total
activity of the source.
For a given isotope i, the activity per unit volume of spontaneous fission leading to
neutron emission25 is calculated by
aSFn,i = ni · BRSF,i · ln2T1/2,i (5.2)
where ni is the atomic density of isotope i as specified in the source material definition.
BRSF,i is the branching ratio for spontaneous fission of isotope i and T1/2,i the total
half-life of the isotope. T1/2 was taken from the data included with Geant4 in the
G4ENSDFSTATE data set in version 1.2.1. This data set is used by Geant4 to define
nuclear properties, such as atomic mass and also half-life. The values for half-life are
extracted by the Geant4 developers from the most recent ENSDF data set [NNDC].
Except for one isotope, these values match the data collected in table 4.326. Activities
of the reactions SFg and αd are calculated in the same way, using respective branching
ratios.
Geant4 provides a second data set which includes half-life - G4RadioactiveDecay. How-
ever, several cases could be found where the data for half-life in the most recent version
(4.3.1) does not match the data in G4ENDFSTATE, version 1.2.127. It is not clear why this
is the case, as both data sets claim to be based on recent ENSDF evaluations. Hence the
latter data set was not used for the calculations described above.
Although Geant4 generally allows for automatic decay of isotopes as source definitions,
spontaneous fission processes are not yet implemented. Recently, starting with version
4.3 (November 2015) of the G4RadioactiveDecay data set, decay branching ratios were
included in the data files. However, there is no Geant4 defined class that executes such
a decay, and method to load decay data in the file G4RadioactiveDecay.cc reads:
1 case SpFission :
2 // Not yet implemented
For this reason, ONMS implements its own class for source particles coming from spon-
taneous fission reactions. The SF branching ratios are hard coded in the source file
ONMSMaterialDecaySource.cc, based on the data collected from Nuclear Data Sheets
and listed in the previous chapter (table 4.3).
25 For this source, it is not the intensity of neutrons but of fission events. The number of neutrons is
sampled every time a fission takes place.
26 Of the isotopes listed in table 4.3, only 241Pu has a half-life that apparently has not yet been updated
to the most recent value from Nuclear Data Sheets.
27 Discrepancies were found for 238U, 241Pu, 241Am and 252Cf from the list of important isotopes. Only
those isotopes listed in table 4.3 were checked, however.
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To retain a consistent class structure, also the class for α-decay source particles was
newly developed, instead of relying on the Geant4 decay. In this case, branching ratios
for α-decays were taken from the G4RadioactiveDecay data set.
The activity of the αn reaction is the neutron yield according to the derivation described
in section 4.6. The total activity per unit volume of the source is calculated by summing
over all isotopes and active source types STactive:
a =
itot∑
i=1
 ∑
s∈STactive
as,i
!
(5.3)
For a given source volume, the total activity can be easily calculated to
A= V · a (5.4)
where V is the source volume calculated from shape and size information. When the
source has no defined volume (e.g. a 252Cf point source), it is necessary that a total
activity is specified manually. Calling that activity A′, individual (total) source activities
are then calculated by
Ad,i = A
′ · ad,i
itot∑
i=1
 ∑
s∈STactive
as,i
 (5.5)
Clearly, turning on or off specific source types does not influence the activity of the
others, but only changes the total activity. The total activity is used by the main code to
derive the number of events to be started during a given runtime.
During a simulation run, every time a new source event should take place, the method
GeneratePrimaryVertex of ONMSMaterialDecaySource is called. First, a single inter-
nal source is sampled depending on a table that holds activities of all separate sources.
Next, the respective GeneratePrimaryVertex method of this selected source is called.
The latter function samples one or more particles and energies from the specific source.
For SF events, multiple particles are created for a single source event, α-decay and
(α, n) reaction produce single particles. Without a material defined as source material,
ONMSMaterialDecaySource will fail to run and raise an error, as it would be unclear
which material should be decayed.
Every source event is attributed an absolute event time te by sampling uniformly from
the specified runtime t r:
te = t r · urng (5.6)
where urng is a random number, uniformly selected of the interval between 0 and 1.
This sampling method neglects changes in material activity due to radioactive decay
during the measurement time. However, the measurement time is very short compared
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to typical half-lifes of isotopes measured, for example the shortest half-life of common
plutonium isotopes is that of 241Pu with 14.329(29) years.
The position of the beginning of the track of an individual source particle depends
on the defined source geometry. For point sources, this is the point of the source.
For volumetric sources taken from the GDML definitions or specified by the user (e.g.
Cylinder, Sphere), starting points are sampled homogeneously inside this volume. The
direction of particles is sampled from an isotropic distribution.
After a single source is selected, the respective classes use different approaches to
sample particle energies. If activated, the α-decay source, as specified by the class
ONMSAlphaSingleIsoDecaySource, has separate instances of the class for each isotope
that decays via α-decay. If called, an instance simply selects an energy from possible
levels according to data stored in G4RadioactiveDecay and starts an α-particle with
that energy.
The spontaneous fission source is specified by the class ONMSSFSingleIsoDecaySource.
Similar to α-decay, several instances can be part of the total source, in case that there
are multiple isotopes decaying by spontaneous fission. It does not require additional
initialization before the run starts. The class makes use of the Fission library, which has
been developed by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The library is available
as open source software under a permissive license [LLNLFIS]. This library is employed
mainly because it contains a comprehensive collection of the necessary data, mostly
from recent other references. The library is described in detail in [VHW10]. The code
allows to sample the number of neutrons or γ-particles from a spontaneous fission event.
In doing so, it includes tabulated multiplicity distributions of most isotopes decaying by
spontaneous fission.
Every time a spontaneous fission takes place, the number of neutrons is sampled from
this distribution. For each neutron emitted, the energy is calculated by the library using
stored parameters for the Watt spectrum. Similarly, the library can emit γ-particles
from a fission reaction, this is used for the SFg decay type. The emitted particles are
not correlated - no mechanism is implemented to check that the sums of energy would
match the energy released in a fission event, and that the sum of momentum of outgoing
particles would be zero. This should not influence the outcome of the program, as it
does not rely on such correlation, mainly due to the strong moderation that takes places
before neutron detection.
The properties of particles from the αn decay type are computed in the ONMSANSource
class. It was first envisioned to split the full simulation into two different runs. One
would simulate the transport of α-particles and store location and parameters of oc-
curring (α, n) reactions. The second run would transport neutrons, coming both from
these stored data-points and additional sources as spontaneous fission. While it was
clear that the first run would be computationally expensive, it would be beneficial to
accurately simulate (α, n) reactions completely problem independent, even in complex
geometries. During development, several problems arose. It turned out that most exist-
ing implementation α-particle Monte Carlo transport are not well suited for a treatment
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of (α, n) reactions. The originally implemented inelastic interaction in Geant4 is not
suitable for such low energies. Although some neutrons are produced by inelastic in-
teraction, the numbers do not match measured data. Even after implementing special
(α, n) cross section data sets for inelastic interactions, based on JENDL/AN-2005 data,
no reliable values for neutron yield could be achieved. Further investigation showed
that this might be due to the combination of multiple elastic interaction steps into the
model of a continuous slowing down process. It should be possible to improve this fur-
ther by simulating every single coulomb scattering step for elastic scattering, however
this would increase computation time by another factor of 1000, and as such would not
be practical with current computing power.
Instead, a routine was implemented that samples source neutrons based on a fixed
activity and from a given energy distribution. Per default, source activity and neutron
energy spectrum are calculated by ONMSANSource based on external (α, n) cross section
data and stopping power data, according to the descriptions in the previous chapter,
sections 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7. All the calculations are carried out during the initialization
process of ONMSMaterialDecaySource and stored for a single run, or even multiple runs,
if no parameters are changed in the meantime. Besides the method of precalculated
neutron spectra, ONMSANSource has two additional methods implemented. One creates
source neutrons of fixed energy. The second takes a text file with an energy spectrum
as input, which could for example be calculated with external tools such as Sources4C
[Wil+02].
Unlike other source particle classes, only one instance of the ONMSANSource is created
in the program, which calculates source particles for all isotopes. The (α, n) activity is
calculated according to equation (4.27), multiplied by the source volume. To deal with
the two sets of necessary physical data - stopping power of the source material and the
(α, n) reaction cross sections for relevant isotopes, an additional library was developed,
ONMSAlphaNData.
With regard to stopping power, the additional library accesses a list of stopping pow-
ers based on the parameterization [Zie77], data for plutonium was added based on
[PW81]. The necessary calculations for stopping powers of materials composed of sev-
eral elements using the Bragg addition method are implemented in the ONMSAlphaNData
library. The total interaction cross section for (α, n) reactions is read from JENDL/AN-
2005 cross section files. They have been converted into a data format similar to G4NDL.
This conversion was done for two main reasons: On the one hand, it allows for easy
future use of the cross sections with the Geant4 ParticleHP class. On the other hand,
it was easier to implement simple routines to read G4NDL style files in ONMS, instead of
implementing a routine that would read ENDF formatted files.
The conversion was carried out with a Python script, based on PyNE, a Python tool
set for nuclear engineering with routines for reading ENDF files. In the process of the
conversion, several bug fixes for the ENDF routine of PyNE were contributed to the open
source project, also some minor errors in the actual ENDF files of JENDL/AN-2005 had
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to be corrected to comply fully with the ENDF file format [HT09]. A description of the
Python script and the changes made to the cross sections is given in appendix A.
For the pre-generated neutron energy spectrum, ONMSANSource in combination with
the ONMSAlphaNData library also needs partial cross sections for the different excited
states of the residual nuclei of (α, n) reactions. These cross sections are also part of
JENDL/AN-2005, and were also part of the above mentioned file preparation process.
Overall, the neutron energy spectrum pre-calculation uses an energy group structure
with 1000 bins from 0MeV to 10MeV.
Besides generating neutrons as source particles, the ONMSANSource class provides two
methods to check the correctness of the pre-calculated data, which can be executed
using messenger commands. With the first method, it is possible to extract the neutron
yield for the given source material as a function of α-particle energy.
The second method allows for extraction of the resulting (α, n) neutron energy spec-
trum and for storing it in a file. Based on this, the resulting neutron energy spectrum of
the “PuO2-10” sample is shown in figure 5.2. The “PuO2-10” sample is one of the sam-
ples that were measured by Malte Göttsche and used to validate ONMS. Another energy
distribution was calculated using Sources4C [Wil+02]. The small differences visible in
the figure are a result of different data sets used in both cases. The data sets used in
ONMS are slightly newer, hence it can be assumed that they might contain improved
values.
With all the components described above, the ONMSMaterialDecaySource class should
be a very versatile library for calculating source particles in simulations of neutron mul-
tiplicity measurements. It makes use of very recent data sets, and offers a variety of
settings to adjust the source. It also has the ability to output most of the initial data as
a neutron energy spectrum or isotope specific source intensities.
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Figure 5.2.: Energy spectrum of neutrons from (α, n) reactions in the sample “PuO2-10”,
calculated both with Sources4c (green line) and ONMS (blue) line.
5.4 Pulsetrain Analysis
The functions to carry out pulsetrain analysis reside in the subfolder ONMSPulseTrainAnalysis
and are used as a software library by the main program. Although the library and source
files are part of ONMS, it was developed with the possibility to compile it separately. It
does not rely on any Geant4 component. A special helper routine is provided, allowing
the pulsetrain analysis to be run as a discrete program, without the requirement for a
Geant4 installation.
During a simulation, the class ONMSPulsetrainManager simultaneously stores a set of
detection events. A single detection event is defined in the class ONMSDetectedEvent
and consists of the following information:
1 long long eventtime ;
2 long long lifetime ;
3 i n t eventid ;
eventtime is the detection time in terms of global time of the problem, lifetime is
the time since the neutron has been generated. eventid stores the id of the event that
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led to the neutron detected. This information is useful for example for deriving gate
fractions from pulsetrains.
Detection events can be the result of the continuous creation during a simula-
tion in ONMS, or can be read from external files with special methods defined in
ONMSPulsetrainManager. As input files both those using a structure reflecting the
detection event structure, but also files listing detection event times using the unit
shakes (10−8s) are possible. The latter are required to analyze files provided as part
of the ESARDA benchmark, used to validate the code. The pulsetrain analysis bench-
mark and calculation results is discussed in chapter 6. ONMSPulsetrainManager also
provides ways to change, store or output settings used for the analysis. Possible settings
are listed in table 5.3.
Table 5.3.: Parameters for pulsetrain analysis. Respective messenger commands start
with /ONMS/analysis/.
Variable Messenger Command Name Default Value
Predelay setpredelay 4.5 µs
Gate Length setgate 64 µs
Long delay setlongdelay 4096 µs
Register length * registerlength 128
Dieaway dieaway 50 µs
Dead time (before quantization) predeadtime 0
Dead time (after quantization) postdeadtime 0
* This is the length of a virtual shift register. It is only used to calculate the operating
frequency (or length of a single register period), based on the gate length. The
register period is used if the user selects quantization for the register.
Deriving the R+A and A distribution from the recorded or loaded pulsetrain is done
by a function that implements typical shift register logic in software. This way should
allow for direct comparison to experimental results from shift register electronics. Many
steps of the process can be configured by settings.
First of all, it is checked whether the pulsetrain events are sorted in time. Coming from
Monte Carlo simulations, they are typically not sorted, because the timing is sampled
over the full simulated measurement length. If they appear not to be in order, they are
sorted.
In a real shift register, several quantization processes take place which move events
to specific time slots. Pulses can only be measured at times when the register shifts
all positions. For example in a register driven by a 2MHz clock, there can be a pulse
only every 0.5 µs. If a neutron pulse is slightly off that timing, it is registered as it
would be on the closest clock pulse. If more pulses (e.g. from different He-3 tubes)
arrive in the same shifting cycle, only one can be registered, the others would be lost.
Many multiplicity counters add a “Derandomizer Circuit”, which reduces the number of
lost neutrons due to overlap in event time. The circuit stores parallel events, usually
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with a faster driving clock then the shift register, in parallel buffers, and outputs them
sequentially to the shift register. Figure 5.3 shows a simplified quantization process.
Quantization in general has two main effects on data: Events are counted later than
they were detected, and some events might get lost.
a)
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t / µs
0 5 10 15 20 25
t / µs
b)
Figure 5.3.: Arbitrary pulsetrain (a) and pulsetrain after quantization (b) to 2MHz clock.
At 1.5 µs and 12 µs, events are lost due to quantization effects. The light
green squares in (b) show the positions of events in (a) to help visualization.
ONMS implements a quantization method that can be used if required. It takes quan-
tization frequency and a possible buffer length for storing of overlapping events as an
argument. If the buffer length is zero, overlapping events will be discarded immediately,
otherwise only if the buffer for such events is full. The method can be applied multiple
times to a data set.
Simulations using computers add another quantization effect due to finite precision
commonly used for binary representation of numbers. In early versions of ONMS, event
times of the pulsetrain were stored as C++ double values. Using double values leads to
different quantization effects depending on compiler and processor used, which might
change the total outcome. Also, quantization effects are bigger towards the end of
simulated measurement times, as the absolute value becomes higher and as such the
double precision decreases. To avoid this dependency, the current version works with
the long long data type for the event time. The time values are stored as values in ps.
As such, this leads to a quantization similar to an imaginary shift register with a 1THz
clock28.
Besides quantization, physical detectors also show dead time effects due to several rea-
sons. After a neutron is absorbed in a He-3 tube, it takes some time until the avalanche
of ionized particles has been removed and the tube can detect another signal [Ens+98,
p. 29]. After amplification, signals are typically transformed to relatively short pulses.
Still, when multiple He-3 tubes are used, overlapping signals could shadow each other,
thus leading to dead time effects. Often, detector dead time is characterized summariz-
ing several effects to give a single dead time value. Dead times also can be distinguished
between non-updating (non-accumulating) and updating (accumulating) circuits. In
the latter case, events that happen shortly after a first event “reset” the dead time, so
28 It would be possible to use arbitrary precision to avoid such quantization, however the listed solution
should be sufficient for good results, and is significantly faster.
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Figure 5.4.: Algorithm for simulating dead time effects on pulsetrain.
Input:
PulsetrainEvents: An array holding pulsetrain event times
dt: Variable for dead time
dtu: Boolean variable, true for updating dead time
Result:
ProcessedEvents: An array holding remaining events
LostEvents: An array holding events lost due to dead time effects
begin
deadtimewindow← 0
for i← 0 to Length(PulsetrainEvents) do
if PulsetrainEvents[i] > deadtimewindow then
Append PulsetrainEvents[i] to ProcessedEvents
deadtimewindow← PulsetrainEvents[i] + dt
else
Append PulsetrainEvents[i] to LostEvents
if dtu = True then
deadtimewindow← PulsetrainEvents[i] + dt
it is extended. When high count rates are measured, long updating dead times might
make measurements difficult to impossible.
ONMSPulsetrainManager has implemented a function for simulating dead time behav-
ior. The function can be called twice, once before any quantization effects are taken into
account, and once after the quantization functions. Mostly, there is no physical need to
do this twice for a single calculation, however this feature gives flexibility to carry out
different simulations where the analysis reflects different actual physical measurement
systems. An overview of the algorithm to apply dead time is shown in figure 5.4.
After selected effects are applied to the original pulsetrain, the algorithm loops through
all events to derive the “R+A” and “A” distribution. The commonly used algorithm is
shown in figure 5.5. For each event (“trigger”), it checks the number of events in a time
window starting after predelay and of the length of gate and increases the respective
entry of the “R+A” distribution by one. Similarly it checks for the number of events in
a time window of same length, but starting “longdelay” after the trigger. Depending on
the latter number, the respective entry in the “A” distribution is increased by one.
Besides the algorithm in figure 5.5, a similar method has been implemented to carry
out the analysis with a simulated shift register “backwards”. Backwards means that
instead of searching for all events that fall into the time period of “gate length” af-
ter the triggering event (and the predelay), the algorithm searches for all events that
fall into a time period of “gate length” before the triggering event. The latter algo-
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Figure 5.5.: Standard algorithm for pulsetrain analysis.
Input:
PulsetrainEvents: An array holding pulsetrain event times
pd: Predelay time
g: Gate Length (time)
ld: Long delay time
Result:
R+A-distribution: Array for calculated foreground multiplicity distribution
A-distribution: Array for calculated background multiplicity distribution
begin
Initialize all values of R+A-distribution and A-distribution with 0
for i← 0 to Length(PulsetrainEvents) do
j← i + 1
while PulsetrainEvents[j] < PulsetrainEvents[i] + pd do
j← j + 1
counter← 0
while PulsetrainEvents[j] < PulsetrainEvents[i] + pd + g do
j← j + 1
counter← counter + 1
R+A-distribution[counter]← R+A-distribution[counter] + 1
j← i + 1
while PulsetrainEvents[j] < PulsetrainEvents[i] + ld do
j← j + 1
counter← 0
while PulsetrainEvents[j] < PulsetrainEvents[i] + ld + g do
j← j + 1
counter← counter + 1
A-distribution[counter]← A-distribution[counter] + 1
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rithm is not used by default, but was used for testing purposes, and can be used to
compare results to other tools that work with such a method. In contrast to ONMS,
which simulates events using a global event time, many other codes only simulate time
on a per-event basis. That means that in such codes every spontaneous fission event
would occur at t = 029. To carry out pulsetrain analysis in this case, two options are
commonly used: As a first method, the “R” distribution is determined on a per-event
basis, and no A distribution needs to be calculated. As a second option, the resulting
events can be randomly distributed over a given measurement time. The latter ap-
proach is similar to the default approach used in ONMS. To allow for comparison with
the first approach, another way to analyze the pulsetrain is included in ONMS. If this
approach (ResultsEventNoForward) is selected, the pulsetrain is first split into sub-
groups based on eventid, the id of a source event that led to a specific detected event.
For each of these subgroups, an analysis similar to figure 5.5 is carried out separately,
the multiplicity results are later combined.
After the algorithm has calculated the distributions, the ONMSPulsetrainManager can
return an ONMSMultiplicityResult object, which holds foreground and background
multiplicity distributions. The ONMSMultiplicityResult object also includes functions
to calculate Singles, Doubles and Triples from theses distributions, as well as multipli-
cation M , (α, n) neutron fraction α, spontaneous fission rate F , and effective 240Pu
mass.
By default, the gate fractions fd and ft needed to solve for M , α and F are calculated
based on single exponential dieaways from the specified dieaway time, according to
equation (4.17). Besides the default, ONMSPulsetrainManager offers two other op-
tions. They are based on the application of gates that can be considered infinite (cf.
equation 4.18a). For one of the options, the assumption of an infinite gate is achieved
by calculating the “R” distribution with the above described ResultsEventNoForward
method twice, one time for the user defined gate length, a second time counting all
neutrons detected after a single event - equivalent to an infinite gate. The latter is pos-
sible because for every given eventid only a finite number of events can be detected.
Doubles and Triples gate fractions are then just the quotients of D or T calculated with
defined gate length and D or T calculated with no gate length. As a third option to cal-
culate gate fractions, the standard pulsetrain analysis method is called twice, one time
for the user defined gate length and once for a gate length of twice that time30. Again,
Doubles and Triples gate fractions can be calculated as the quotients of the results of
both calls.
As a first estimate of uncertainties of calculations, ONMSPulsetrainManager automati-
cally creates “R+A” and “A” distributions for fractions of a tenth of the total pulsetrain.
From this set of distributions, average Singles, Doubles and Triples and the related stan-
29 For example MCNPX uses such an approach. Every spontaneous fission event (or ’history’) starts at
t = 0, and detection times recorded are relative to that.
30 Doubling the gate length has been done by other codes, as it is for example described in [PS06].
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dard deviations can be calculated. These values are included in the output of ONMS,
and can be used as a quick uncertainty estimate.
For any output, ONMSPulsetrainManager either writes results to the screen using the
messenger command /NMS/analysis/showresults or to a file with the command
/NMS/analysis/writeresults <filename>. It is possible to store pulsetrains for fur-
ther analysis in files.
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6 Validation of Open Neutron
Multiplicity Simulation
Every simulation software needs validation, especially relatively complex applications
as ONMS, which consist of a number of different components and make use of a large
variety of nuclear data sets.
For neutron multiplicity measurements, there are mainly three different ways to gen-
erate data which can serve as a standard of comparison for the validation of a given
simulation code. All methods have benefits and disadvantages, and overlapping utility.
Probably the most obvious is the comparison of results of actual physical measurements
of different samples using neutron multiplicity counters to those derived by simulations.
Based on simulations that accurately predict detector results, use cases for safeguarding
or disarmament verification can be evaluated. It should be noted, however, that mea-
surement results vary depending on the detector and are influenced by detector design
and efficiency profile. They also depend on dead time of electronics and neutron die
away time, as well as the different pulsetrain analysis methods and shift register elec-
tronics employed in detectors. It is important for simulations to either account for all of
these effects, or otherwise compare results having the possible differences in mind.
A second way to generate data for validation is to provide theoretical characteristics of a
sample using the point model approach. Based on a sample mass, Singles, Doubles and
Triples rates can be calculated. The mass can be an assumed mass for a hypothetical
sample or measured by different means, e.g. measure a samples using a scale if possible.
To calculate Singles, Doubles and Triples via the point model, it is necessary to have
good knowledge of characteristics of the detector that is simulated (e.g. efficiency).
Third, results of a given code can be compared to results simulated using similar appli-
cations. Clearly, these results are not actual experimental results, but are checks for the
implementation of physical models that are the basis of simulation codes. The method
is beneficial to characterize the overall quality of simulation codes. Given similar physi-
cal models, results should be similar for equal initial parameters and models. Using this
way of validation, it is also possible to define entirely virtual samples and initial param-
eters. This is an easier step, as exact detector and sample geometries are sometimes
hard to be obtained. Simulation based on such virtual samples will give indications of
code quality, even if they do not resemble exact physical models of detectors or samples.
They are also helpful to find differences among different methods used in simulations.
This chapter presents simulations carried out with ONMS comparing to data derived
from all three methods. First, there will be a section describing measurements by Malte
Göttsche [Göt15], followed by the related ONMS results and a short discussion. After
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that, a comprehensive benchmark exercise for neutron multiplicity simulations will be
presented, again with results of ONMS and discussion.
The large number of calculations for this chapter were mostly carried out using the high
performance computing cluster “Della” of Princeton University31. While it is possible to
run simulations for neutron multiplicity measurements on common desktop computers,
the use of these resources allowed for a much higher number of simulated events, as
such improving statistical uncertainty of Monte Carlo simulations. ONMS is not (yet)
capable of using multithreading or cluster architectures as e.g. applications based on
the Message Passing Interface. Nevertheless, several provisions where made in the code
to achieve better parallelization. Simulations can be started with shorter measurement
times, and than accumulated for the final result. As such, a single task can be split in
smaller pieces, that can be distributed over different machines. This method only works
if different random number generator seeds are specified for each run. Otherwise,
ONMS uses the same seed each time, which is a deliberate function to make results
reproducible - but not practical for the given task. The generation of lists of random
seeds can be directly done with ONMS itself, using a specific command line argument. The
seeds can be used in macro files for calculations using the /random/setSeeds messenger
command.
After all calculation parts are finished, they need to be combined to form a consistent
result. The pulsetrains that have been written to files by each part can just be concate-
nated. So generated pulsetrain files can be reread with ONMS to carry out pulsetrain
analysis on the full pulsetrain. Apart from pulsetrain analysis, other results generated
by ONMS (e.g. the number of simulated source events or the average source neutron
energy) are written to <calculationname>.results files (cf. appendix C). The aggre-
gation of these values has to be done using other tools, carefully taking into account
the type of result. While for example the number of source neutrons just needs to be
summed, the average source neutron energy of each run needs to be weighted by the
respective source neutron number before combining to a total result.
In addition to splitting single runs into smaller pieces, for every calculation multiple runs
were carried out to improve the statistics of the results of random sampling processes.
The data of these different runs have to be combined as well using other tools. For all
the calculations presented in this section, a set of Python scripts was written, that both
generated initial macro files for calculations split into parts and also merged the results
together to coherent value sets. The set of scripts was developed with the goal to allow
for easy reproducibility of the results presented and recalculations with future versions
of ONMS.
31 The cluster uses common Intel 64bit processor architecture, different cores of the Intel generations
Westmere, Ivybridge and Haswell. The cluster has a total of 3484 cores.
Typical simulation times vary depending on the problem. The current version of ONMS allows for
the simulation of about 300000 source events per hour computer time.
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6.1 Experimental Data - Description of Measurements
Over the full time of the development of ONMS, a set of experimental results were
used to validate different steps of the process. The results are based on a measurement
campaign carried out from April 23 to May 4 2012 by Malte Göttsche at the PERLA lab-
oratory, Joint Research Centre, Ispra. They have been published in [Göt15], additional
information was gathered by personal communication with the author. He used the
results to validate simulations produced with another application capable of simulating
neutron multiplicity measurements, MCNPX-PoliMi.
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Figure 6.1.: Rendering of a Geant4 model of the Plutonium Scrap Multiplicity Counter.
The image has been created directly from the Geant4 GDML file used for
the calculations. Every gray tube is a space in the polyethylene where a 3He
tube is installed. Only selected 3He tubes have been divided in subsections.
The top part of the detector is not filled and only shown by its outline.
For the measurements, the so-called “Plutonium Scrap Multiplicity Counter” (PSMC)
has been used, figure 6.1 shows a graphical representation of the version that was
modeled using ONMS. It uses a cylindrical geometry and consists of 80 3He tubes in 4
rings in a polyethylene block with a square ground area. The polyethylene block has
a width of 66 cm and a height of 77.1 cm. For the model, polyethylene was defined
to have a density of ρ = 0.955gcm−3. To optimize efficiency, tube numbers vary for
each ring, the inner-most ring has 19, the next has 25 and the two outer rings have
18 3He tubes each. The 3He tubes have an active height of 71.1 cm and have an outer
diameter of 2.54 cm including the aluminum cladding, with a radius of 1.23 cm for the
volume containing 3He. The 3He is modeled with a density of 0.502mgcm−3.The cavity
of the detector has a diameter of 20 cm, and a height of 40 cm. When characterized
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in calibration measurements, the detector shows a very flat axial and radial efficiency
profile. The detector was modeled according to an MCNP input file developed by Malte
Göttsche [Göt15], which has been received in private communication.
For validation purposes, 3 metal samples (named PM1, PM2, PM3 in the following)
and 5 oxide samples (PuO2-10, PuO2-20, PuO2-21, PuO2-22, PuO2-23) have been
simulated. Isotopics, plutonium mass and total mass of the different samples are given
in table 6.1. The metal samples are enclosed in small aluminum cylinders, which in
turn are enclosed in stainless steel containers of cylindrical shape with a thicker top.
For the aluminum, the standard Geant4 aluminum density and composition (G4_Al)
was used, the composition of the stainless steel (AISI 304) was taken from personal
communication with Malte Göttsche. The oxide samples were all enclosed in a simple
aluminum cylinder, and typically in the form of powders. The full GDML code of the
sample PM1 is shown in appendix B. All simulated GDML files of this validation exercise
are part of the code repository of ONMS.
Table 6.1.: Characteristics of the samples measured by M. Göttsche, according to table
B.1 and B.2 in [Göt15, pp. 95-96].
Sample Mass (g) Density† Isotopic vector (wt %)
Total* Pu (gcm−3) 238Pu 239Pu 240Pu 241Pu 242Pu 241Am ‡
PM1 13.7363 12.5 20.06 0.004 95.42 4.529 0.032 0.015 0.245
PM2 20.5016 18.8 19.78 0.004 95.493 4.455 0.033 0.015 0.235
PM3 20.1064 18.9 22.43 0.025 91.358 8.468 0.102 0.047 0.895
PuO2-10 2.25278 1.987 4.243 0.058 86.082 13.27 0.321 0.27 1.483
PuO2-20 5.64953 4.983 5.32 0.058 86.082 13.27 0.321 0.27 1.483
PuO2-21 11.3002 9.967 5.676 0.058 86.082 13.27 0.321 0.27 1.483
PuO2-22 22.5834 19.919 5.671 0.058 86.082 13.27 0.321 0.27 1.483
PuO2-23 23.3142 20.566 5.166 0.084 70.906 26.856 0.691 1.463 4.878
* Total mass has been calculated including either the mass of oxygen atoms for oxide samples
or the mass of nickel and copper for the three metal samples.
† Density calculated based on total mass and size of the sample.
‡ Americium content is given in wt % of total plutonium content.
The samples were all placed in the cavity so that the center of the plutonium volume
was at the center of the cavity.
6.2 Validation Results and Discussion
For all the measured values described in section 6.1, ONMS simulations were carried
out. Figure 6.2 shows the factorial moments for all samples. The red bars depict data
as simulated with ONMS, the green bars show measurement results, and the blue bars
show simulations carried out with MCNPX-PoliMi. The latter two values were taken
from [Göt15]. For all samples, the ONMS simulations were carried out for a simulated
measurement time of 1000 s, 10 different runs were calculated for each sample. The
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number of simulated particles per sample per run varied from 2.6× 105 to 6× 106,
because of the difference in mass and proportions of isotopes undergoing spontaneous
fission. Simulations took between 80 and 1680 minutes to calculate per run. For each
of the ten different simulation runs, the pulsetrain analysis was carried out and Singles,
Doubles and Triples were calculated. The value shown in figure 6.2 is the mean of these
10 values, the error bars show the standard deviation of results from this mean. All
calculations were carried out using a predelay of 4.5 µs, a long delay of 4096 µs and
a gate length of 64 µs, similar to the experimental settings used in [Göt15]. Overall,
ONMS reaches good accordance with the measured values and the simulated values. A
general trend of slight overestimation of Doubles and Triples is visible, especially for the
metallic fuels. In figure 6.3, the pulsetrains of the same ONMS simulations have been
analyzed using an assumed dead time of 0.5 µs. No simulations with MCNPX-PoliMi are
shown, as they have not been carried out using the same dead time. The dead time
of the PSMC detector is specified with a shorter value of 0.12 µs in [Men+93, p. 11].
Applying dead time improves all results slightly.
For all samples, the plutonium mass has been calculated, the results are shown in figure
6.4. Again, ONMS shows good results, differences to the measured masses are not larger
than seven percent. Besides using the Singles, Doubles and Triples from the previous
figure, these results include more assumptions. The equation for the 240Pu effective
mass requires knowledge of the gate fractions of the detector. For the calculations
shown here, a fixed die-away time of 50 µs has been assumed, from which gate fractions
where calculated based on equation 4.17, yielding a Doubles gate fraction of 0.659 and
a Triples gate fraction of 0.435. The total plutonium mass was calculated from the
effective plutonium mass based on the given sample isotopic composition.
It is important to note that even small possible systematic uncertainties often dominate
the statistical uncertainties for neutron multiplicity simulations. The detector model
used here is based on [Göt15], where it has been produced based on coarse design
sketches of the detector. While it was tried to ensure that the models were represen-
tations of the physical detector and samples as accurate as possible, not all systematic
errors can be excluded, partly because of limited data availability.
In his work, [Göt15] carries out comprehensive sensitivity calculations for the PSMC
detector and the given samples using simulations with MCNPX-PoliMi. For the detector
model, he found uncertainties for Triples of up to 7.5 percent for very small changes
of ±4mm of the horizontal position of the He-3 tubes in the detector. Smaller, but still
significant changes could arise from changes of the vertical position of the tubes and the
gas pressure. Changes of 1 cm would influence the final result for Triples of up to 1.5
percent, an error of the same magnitude would be generated by differences in pressure
of the tubes of 1 percent. Similar uncertainties are also listed in [PW12]. Although it
was carefully checked, geometry definitions could allow for the possibility of smaller
systematic errors. Independently, it can be stated that ONMS shows good results for
this validation step.
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Figure 6.2.: ONMS simulation results for factorial moments compared to experimental
data and simulations (“Ext. Simulation”) as listed in [Göt15].
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Figure 6.4.: Sample plutonium masses, as simulated with ONMS, measured in [Göt15]
and characterized by the ISPRA laboratory. No experimental value is avail-
able for PuO2-23.
6.3 Description of the ESARDA Benchmark
The second part of the validation of this chapter is based on a large benchmark exercise
which was organized by the Non-Destructive Assay Working Group of the European
Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA). Validation based on this
exercise is more comprehensive than the calculations and experiments described in the
previous two sections.
The description of the benchmarks and results were published in the ESARDA Bulletin,
[PS06], [Pee+09]. Unless otherwise noted, all the descriptions and details presented in
this chapter were taken from these two sources, as well as from personal communication
with Paolo Peerani, one of the authors of the benchmark. The exercise consisted of a
total of four phases, and was carried out from 2003 until 2009. The first two phases
were based on “theoretical” samples, no actual measurements were carried out, and
11 different groups participated. During phase I, four different simulation codes were
employed to carry out full simulations of the samples, starting with Monte Carlo particle
transport of neutrons, followed by pulsetrain analysis. For the phase II, a set of neutron
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detection pulsetrains for all samples was generated using MCNPX by the authors of the
benchmark. These pulsetrains were distributed among the participants and had to be
analyzed. For that phase, results from ten different software tools were provided.
The other two phases describe measurements that were carried out for the benchmark,
and the results of simulations of these. For phase III, participants again had to carry out
full simulations of the samples, including Monte Carlo transport. Five different research
groups provided results for this step, coming from six different code systems. Measure-
ments of the samples were carried out in February 2007. Phase IV again consisted of
analyzing pulsetrains. For this phase, the pulsetrains were actually generated during
the measurement campaign. Besides feeding the neutron detection events to a shift
register analyzer, they were also stored using a data acquisition card and a computer.
The files generated by this process were shared with all the benchmark participants for
pulsetrain analysis.
All phases of the benchmark used or assumed the use of a detector model called “Active
Well Coincidence Counter” (AWCC, cf. also figure 4.5). Although it is possible to use
this detector in an active mode, it was used in a configuration for passive detection for
all phases. It is a relatively small neutron coincidence counter, and was modeled for the
use with ONMS according to the MCNP model of appendix A in [Mil12].
The detector contains 42 3He tubes, arranged in two rings of 21 tubes, respectively.
The tubes have an active height of 50.8 cm, the radius of the 3He volume is 1.23 cm.
They are embedded in a cylindrical block of high density polyethylene, modeled with
a density ρ = 0.955gcm−3 and an outer diameter of 47.31 cm. In the center of the
cylinder is a cavity with a diameter of 22.48 cm. It has a height of 35 cm, placed
below and above the cavity are polyethylene plugs. The cavity is lined with a small
aluminum cladding (thickness 0.15 cm) and a thin layer of cadmium (0.04 cm). Both
use a material composition and density as defined in the Material Database included
with Geant432.
6.3.1 Samples of Phase I and II
A total of 13 different calculations have been described for phases I and II, partly they
were based on the same sample, differing only in the assumed samples activity. All
samples were given specific identifiers, which are used later for the presentation of
results. A short summary of the samples and identifiers is shown in table 6.2. The first
sample is an AmLi neutron source. The sample is assumed to be a point-like source,
placed in the center of the detector. It has been simulated using three different neutron
intensities, which should correspond to count rates in the detector of 10, 100 and 1000
kHz (identifiers epI+II-c1-10, epI+II-c1-100, epI+II-c1-1000). Such count rates can
be achieved using a source activity of 26800 for the lowest count rate, 268000 and
2680000 for the other two, respectively. The activities assume a detector efficiency of
32 http://geant4.web.cern.ch/geant4/workAreaUserDocKA/Backup/Docbook_UsersGuides_beta/
ForApplicationDeveloper/html/apas08.html
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37.3% for the neutron spectrum released by the AmLi source33. The activities were used
as given for the ONMS calculations. AmLi neutron sources generate neutrons by (α, n)
reactions, hence no correlated neutrons are to be expected. For the energy spectrum of
the neutrons, the “Geiger/van der Zwan” spectrum is recommended. A version of this
spectrum as listed in Table 2 of [TL12] was used.
The second sample is a point-like 252Cf source, again in the center of the detector and
with three different activities. Also for this source count rate goals have been specified
instead of source activities, with rates of 10, 100 and 1000 kHz to be achieved (sample
identifiers epI+II-c2-10, epI+II-c2-100, epI+II-c2-1000). Using a ν of 3.757 and a
detector efficiency for 252Cf spontaneous fission neutrons of 30.95 %, the spontaneous
fission rates required to achieve the given count rates are 8600, 86000 and 860000
spontaneous fissions per second. The energy spectrum of the neutrons released by
spontaneous fission should be a Watt spectrum with a = 1.175 and b = 1.04 according
to the benchmark specification.
The third and fourth samples are plutonium samples. Both are to be simulated as cubic
cylinders (H = D) placed in the center of the cavity. No container needs to be simulated.
H and D are calculated depending on the different source volumes, which in turn can
be derived from density and mass. The third sample is supposed to be plutonium metal
with an isotopic composition of 90 wt% 239Pu and 10 wt% 240Pu, and a density of
20gcm−3. Two different simulations are to be carried out for this sample, one with a
total mass of 10g (epI+II-c3s) and one with a total mass of 1000g (epI+II-c3b). The
fourth sample is a sample of plutonium oxide powder. The isotopic composition of the
plutonium in this case is 2 wt% 238Pu, 60 wt% 239Pu, 25 wt% 240Pu, 8 wt% 241Pu and 5
wt% 242Pu, the powder density is supposed to be 2gcm−3. The first simulation should
be done with a total mass of 10g (epI+II-c4s), the second with a larger total mass of
5000g (epI+II-c4b).
The fifth sample is a mix of the plutonium oxide sample and an AmLi neutron source.
This sample was not simulated using ONMS, it is currently not possible to define two par-
allel sources. However, it was possible to carry out a pulsetrain analysis on a pulsetrain
file that has been produced for that source.
6.3.2 Phase III and IV
Six different samples have been simulated and measured in phases III and IV of the
benchmark, in these cases existing real samples formed the bases of calculations. The
first two samples are 252Cf samples, both in small stainless steel capsules. The first has
a source strength of 3781 n/s at the time of the measurement, the second a source
strength of 497200 n/s. In ONMS, the activity of a source has to be specified in sponta-
neous fission reactions per second, hence the above values have been converted using
33 The specification of sources according to their count rates in the detector has been given in [PS06].
This adds additional uncertainties to the benchmark, because it makes assumptions on the detection
efficiency that might not necessarily be exactly reflected in simulated models.
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ν = 3.757, giving activities of 1006.4 and 132339.6 spontaneous fissions per second.
The samples have the identifiers epIII+IV-c1 and epIII+IV-c2. The stainless steel cap-
sules have a height of 1 cm, a radius of 0.4 cm, with a wall thickness of 0.13 cm. In the
simulation with ONMS, the sources were placed in the center of the cavity.
The third sample (epIII+IV-c3) is a small plutonium metal disk with a radius of 1.65 cm
and a thickness of 0.6mm. The metal of this sample is a PuGa alloy with 1.5% Ga.
The sample was placed at the center of the detector cavity. The isotopic composition
given in [Pee+09] is the composition at the time of the sample characterization (July
1996). The measurement of the sample took place together with all other samples in
February 2007. Over time, the sample underwent radioactive decay and its isotopic
composition changed. To carry out adequate simulations, it was necessary to calculate
this isotopic change. Given the mentioned dates, a decay time of 10 years and 7 months
(3.3372× 108 s) was assumed. The initial and the resulting isotopic compositions are
shown in table 6.3 34.
Sample four and five (epIII+IV-c4, epIII+IV-c5) are plutonium oxide samples. The sam-
ples have been characterized in November 1987, hence a decay for 6.0737× 108 s (19
years, 3 month) was necessary to calculate. Initial and decayed isotopic compositions,
as well as sample masses, are shown in table 6.3. The plutonium oxide is stored in spe-
cific containers, which consist of an inner cylinder and an outer rotationally symmetric
body. A generic drawing of such a container is shown in figure 6.5, respective parame-
ters are listed in table 6.4. In case of sample epIII+IV-c4, the container was positioned
10 cm from the bottom of the cavity, for epIII+IV-c5 it was positioned immediately on
the bottom. It was assumed that the plutonium oxide powder would fill a cylindrical
volume at the bottom of the inner container. The size of this volume for each sample
was calculated based on mass and density of the sample.
The last sample for phase III and IV of the benchmark is a sample containing mixed-
oxide (MOX) material. The sample was characterized in April 1988, a decay for a time
of 5.9395× 108 s , or 18 years and 10 months was assumed. Isotopic composition of
the plutonium as characterized and as used for simulations is listed in table 6.3. The
uranium in the mix has the isotopic composition of natural uranium (234U: 5.7× 10−3
wt%, 235U: 0.7204 wt%, 238U: 99.2739 wt%)35. In [Pee+09], uranium and plutonium
masses are given, from which a fraction of plutonium in the MOX of 20 wt% can be
calculated. For the calculation of the volume of the sample, a density of 0.8 gcm−3 and
the given plutonium mass was used36. The sample is enclosed in a container similar
to the previous samples. Figure 6.5 shows a generic model, and table 6.4 the relevant
parameters. It was modeled that the plutonium would fill the inner container from
34 For the composition of the sample after decay, only plutonium isotopes and 241Am were taken into
account. Spontaneous fission products are clearly negligible, also other actinides only occur with
small fractions (less than 0.1 wt%) and have minor contributions to the source.
35 This composition was taken from the values in PyNE for the material “Uranium, Natural (NU)”.
36 [Pee+09] also lists a total sample mass, however the difference between the sum of plutonium and
uranium is too high to be only coming from the oxygen atoms - hence the plutonium mass was
selected as a reference value.
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r1
r2
r3
h3h2h1
ta
1
ta
3
ta
2
t1
t2
epIII+IV-c4 epIII+IV-c5 epIII+IV-c6
r1 17.4 29.15 41.3
t1 1.6 2.6 3.05
r2 26 38.5 52
t2 1 1.5 2
r3 43 55 67.5
h1 156 220 270
ta1 5 5 5
h2 168 242 293
h3 189 266 332
ta2 6 8 10
ta3 11 11 13
Figure 6.5.: Generic drawing of the PERLA
containers used for samples
epIII+IV-c4, epIII+IV-c5 and
epIII+IV-c6. The respective val-
ues are shown in the table on
the right.
Table 6.4.: Parameters for the contain-
ers of samples epIII+IV-c4,
epIII+IV-c5 and epIII+IV-c6.
The values correspond to the
figure on the left. All values
are given in mm.
the bottom to the given volume. The total container was placed at the bottom of the
detector cavity.
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6.4 ESARDA Benchmark - Validation results
Although the described ESARDA benchmark was split in four phases, the discussion of
results here is organized in two parts, combining similar phases. The first part describes
the results obtained by the phases II and IV, arguably the easier parts of the benchmark
as they only required the analysis of provided pulsetrains. ONMS is capable of doing
such an analysis by skipping the Monte Carlo transport part and loading pulsetrains
from files. The second part of this chapter describes results for phases I and III, which
were full Monte Carlo simulations of given samples.
6.4.1 Pulsetrain Analysis - Phase II and IV
Phase II of the ESARDA benchmark consisted of analyzing the artificially created pulse-
trains, which were provided to all participants (13 files). The files contained between
approx. 5 million and 19 million neutron events each. From these files, Singles, Dou-
bles and Triples were calculated by ten benchmark participants. Similar analyses were
repeated using the functionality of ONMS. To compare further capabilities, benchmark
participants also calculated the results based on four different dead time assumptions,
leading to five different sets of calculations:
• no dead time
• dead time of 0.5 µs, non-updating
• dead time of 0.5 µs, updating
• dead time of 2 µs, non-updating
• dead time of 2 µs, updating
Of the ten benchmark participants, not all participants were able to give results for all
five assumptions. ONMS is able to do pulsetrain analyses for all five assumptions, hence
all 65 analyses were carried out. All used a predelay of 4.5 µs, a long delay of 4096 µs
and a gate length of 64 µs. The values for predelay and gate width have been specified
in the benchmark descriptions [PS06]. The value for the long delay is a commonly
used value, different values were used by different participants, varying from 1000 µs
to 4096 µs.
As no measurements were taken in phase I and II of the ESARDA benchmark, the bench-
mark authors provided theoretical calculations of the results based on the point model.
The alpha ratio α is calculated based on the sample specifications. The pulsetrains were
produced using a Monte Carlo detector model using MCNPX, from the same calculations
efficiency and sample multiplication were extracted.
For the Singles rate estimated from the pulsetrain, very good agreement among all
benchmark participants and ONMS has been achieved. This is expected, as the Singles
ideally should represent the number of events in the analyzed file. Small discrepancies
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occur due to different treatments of the end of the pulsetrain. Some of the last events
have to be neglected in the analysis, as it is not possible to analyze for events in the long
delay window. Depending on the size of the long delay, different numbers are removed
from the total count rate.
The main results for double and triple rates for the case without dead time are shown
in figure 6.6. To improve the representation, all results have been normalized based
on the point-model calculations, which is represented by an orange line at x = 1. The
x-axis for every sample has been scaled to include the ONMS result and most of the
benchmark participants. Sometimes, the point-model value is visible far off the values
resulting from pulsetrain analysis, due to reasons as described above. In red, the results
as calculated with ONMS are shown. The error bars for ONMS depict the standard
deviation of individual results of ten equal splits of the single pulsetrain file.
The benchmark results are shown in blue, different dots in a single plot represent dif-
ferent benchmark participants. The uncertainties shown are those that were reported in
[PS06]37 In the tables included in [PS06], the origin of the ten different sets of results
is only listed as a participant number. For the plots in figure 6.6, benchmark partici-
pant “two” of the paper is left out - this result often was up to twice the value of the
average.
Also missing from the figure are the results for epI+II-c1-10, epI+II-c1-100 and epI+II-
c1-1000. These samples were all AmLi samples, which only emit uncorrelated neutrons,
hence one would expect Doubles and Triples to be zero. No benchmark participant that
provided results was able to reproduce this value, also ONMS is not able to reproduce
the point model values of zero. Instead they all show very different values, both pos-
itive and negative. For ONMS, this happens due to the methods used to generate the
foreground and background multiplicity distributions based on shifting gate windows.
To achieve zeros for Doubles and Triples, both distributions would need to be exactly
equal. However it is clear that due to the random nature of radioactive decay, some
64 µs windows might include slightly more events than others, leading to differences in
the distributions, which in turn lead to non-zero Doubles and Triples.
For all other samples shown in figure 6.6, the pulsetrain analyses of ONMS show very
good agreement with other codes. The resulting values for Doubles and Triples are for
all cases inside the respective set of the results by different benchmark participants. It
is clearly visible from the plots that in general better results are achieved for samples
with lower count rates. The large samples ’epI+II-c3b’ and ’epI+II-c4b’ as well as the
samples with high count rates ’epI+II-c2-1000’ and ’epI+II-c5-1000’ show the largest
spread among benchmark participants38. Nevertheless, for these samples ONMS shows
good results. Given the large variety of samples, it should be clear that the pulsetrain
analysis method of ONMS clearly works well.
37 Depending on the calculation method and interpretation of the benchmark, it is possible that partic-
ipants either gave the standard deviation of subsets, or the standard error of the mean. This might
explain some of the differences in the size of the uncertainties.
38 For these samples, the x-axis range is also the largest in absolute values.
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Figure 6.6.: Pulsetrain analysis for ESARDA benchmark phase II, no dead time. Results
are normalized with regard to the point model results given in [PS06] (or-
ange line, if visible in shown range).
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Figure 6.7.: Pulsetrain analysis including different assumptions for dead time for the
samples epI+II-c4s and epI+II-c4b. Dead times are given in µs. Results are
normalized with regard to the point model results given in [PS06]. ONMS
calculations are shown in red, Benchmark participants in blue.
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Results using different dead time assumptions are shown in figure 6.7. Here, only
those results for the small and large version of the fourth sample (epI+II-c4s, epI+II-
c4b) are shown. Full plots of all samples for all four different dead time assumptions
are shown in appendix D. Again, the pulsetrain analysis routine of ONMS gives good
results for all different types of dead times. Clearly visible in the picture are also the
differences in dead time effects between smaller and larger samples. For the epI+II-c4s
sample, a relatively small plutonium mass with a low rate of neutron emission, results
are still relatively close to the point model (x = 1). The much larger epI+II-c4b sample,
however, shows very large distances to the point model results. The count rate of this
sample is so large that many counts are removed from the pulsetrain due to dead time
effects, especially for updating (accumulating) dead times. These effects reduce the
Singles rate and subsequently Doubles and Triples rates.
The pulsetrains provided for the ESARDA benchmark phase IV are results from actual
measurements, making them more realistic test objects. For each of the six different
samples, ten files have been provided, each the result of a measurement of approxi-
mately 100 s. The files contain between 81000 and 15× 106 samples.
The results for double and triple rates of phase IV are shown in figure 6.8, again Singles
are not shown as very good agreement of values is achieved between all benchmark
participants and ONMS. The points displayed in the figure are the averaged values of
the analysis of the ten individual files. Error bars for ONMS results in this case are the
standard deviations of the ten calculations from the mean. As each sample was mea-
sured ten times in this phase, the statistical uncertainty of the ONMS results has been
estimated calculating the standard deviation of the individual values, as recommended
in the benchmark specifications in [Pee+09]. According to the report, this method was
also applied by the majority of the benchmark participants39.
Similar to phase II, ONMS shows very good agreement with the results of the benchmark
participants, being inside of the set of results for most calculated values. The double
rates typically vary by less than 0.5%, except for the samples epIII+IV-c4 and epIII+IV-
c6, where they vary about 1%. Triples rate variation is about a factor of ten higher. The
benchmark states that “the difference between the results is small for most practical
purposes” [Pee+09, p. 7]. As the ONMS results completely fall in the field of benchmark
participants, one can assume that the statement would apply for them, too.
As no mass estimates for either of the two phases were given by the benchmark par-
ticipants and discussed, no calculations of mass have been carried out with ONMS. As
discussed earlier, this would require additional assumptions, e.g. detector gate frac-
tions.
In conclusion it can be stated that the ONMS pulsetrain analysis part works very well
compared to other existing tools. As part of the article describing the benchmark, it was
also discussed to introduce a standardized algorithm to carry out such analysis. This
could be beneficial, especially for applications in nuclear arms control, as it would allow
39 Some participants carried out additional splitting of the pulsetrains.
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Figure 6.8.: Pulsetrain analysis for ESARDA benchmark phase IV. Results are normalized
with regard to the point model values given in [Pee+09] (orange line, if
visible in shown range). ONMS calculations are shown in red, Benchmark
participants in blue.
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data consistency and easier comparison of results. Here the open source characteristic
of ONMS might be useful, as it allows for very easy implementation of new methods,
and also provides a transparent way to analyze the currently used method.
6.4.2 Monte Carlo Simulations - Phase I and III
For phases I and III, full Monte Carlo simulations have been carried out for the neutron
emissions by the samples and their tracking through the detector. This was followed
by a pulsetrain analysis of the detected events. Much less participants in the ESARDA
benchmark carried out these exercises. It should be noted that ONMS is the only appli-
cation based on a Monte Carlo transport capability different from MCNP. All participants
of the two described phases of the benchmark use MCNP as the Monte Carlo transport
model of their application, adding only additional source routines, data sets and analysis
functions.
The statistical uncertainties calculated with ONMS (and other codes if given) for most
of the samples of these phases are relatively large. This is the case even though for all
samples the number of particles simulated were corresponding to typical real measure-
ment times40. Therefore, it should not be concluded that the uncertainties are results of
too small numbers of simulated particles (statistical uncertainty), but more likely char-
acteristic for the methodology to create the measured multiplicities and derive Singles,
Doubles and Triples rates from the neutron pulsetrain.
The results for phase I are shown in figure 6.9. In this case all three important values,
Singles rate, Doubles rate, and Triples rate are shown in the graph. Variations in the
single rate are possible because samples’ source terms had to be individually simulated
by ONMS (and every benchmark participant). Not shown in the figure are again the
AmLi samples (epI+II-c1-10, epI+II-c1-100, epI+II-c1-1000). The Singles rates as sim-
ulated with ONMS for these three samples only show very small deviations from the
point model and the other benchmark participants. For Doubles and Triples, variation
is very large between all calculations, due to the reasons discussed in the previous sub-
section. Also not shown are results for the samples containing a combined PuO2 and
AmLi source (epI+II-c5-10, epI+II-c5-100, epI+II-c5-1000), as ONMS does not have a
function to combine the two types of sources required for that sample in a simulation.
All results do not include any dead time correction. The ONMS results were calculated
by simulating ten runs for each sample. The simulated measurement time for each
run was either assumed to be long enough to generate more than 20 million neutron
events for the larger samples or 1000 s. The values shown for ONMS are the average
values obtained by pulsetrain analysis of the ten runs, the uncertainties are based on
the standard deviation of these values. No uncertainties were given in [PS06] for the
benchmark participants, hence no uncertainties are included in the plot.
40 Often, Monte Carlo Simulations simulate only small fractions of the particles actually physical
present, e.g. in a reactor.
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Figure 6.9.: Results of ONMS simulations for ESARDA Benchmark phase I in comparison
with benchmark participants’ results. The error bars for the ONMS values
are show the standard deviation of ten independent calculations for each
sample. Results are normalized with regard to the point model values given
in [PS06] (orange line).
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Clearly visible is the fact that the discrepancies are much higher among benchmark
participants compared to the previously shown results of pulsetrain analysis. Closest
agreement among benchmark participants and ONMS is reached for the three differ-
ent 252Cf samples (epI+II-c2-10, epI+II-c2-100, epI+II-c2-1000). This is reasonable, as
these samples do not have any neutrons resulting from (α, n) reactions or multiplica-
tion. Nevertheless, differences for Triples can go up to 30% in the epI+II-c2-1000 case.
The rising spread in results and increasing uncertainty among these samples directly
relates to the count rate. For the lowest count rate, less than one neutron is detected
in a foreground gate of 64 µs length, which allows for good detection of correlated and
uncorrelated neutrons. In contrast, with the strongest source nearly 65 neutrons are de-
tected in the same gate length, making differentiation between individual spontaneous
fission events significantly harder.
Throughout, the plutonium samples show larger differences among the benchmark par-
ticipants themselves as well as ONMS. Good agreement between between benchmark
participants, ONMS and point model can be found for the Singles rate. For the small ox-
ide sample (epI+II-c4s), deviations of all simulations from the point model are largest.
This is most likely due to a small underestimation of the sample multiplication used
for the calculation. With regard to the double count rate, ONMS result show good
agreement for all plutonium samples, they are close to the average of the benchmark
participants, with the exception of the large metallic sample (epI+II-c3b). This sample
is also the sample with by far the highest multiplication. The ONMS results are about
10% higher than the highest value of a benchmark participant.
The Triples rates for the plutonium samples show a large spread among the simulated
results, for one sample a benchmark participant is even off by approx. 200%. For
the two oxide samples and the small metal sample (epI+II-c4s, epI+II-c4b), ONMS
simulations yield a Triples rate that is slightly higher than the average, which is a rea-
sonable result. For the small metal sample, the value is inside the range of benchmark
participants, but about 10% higher than all except for one.
For the big metal sample, the ONMS overestimates Triples 20 % higher than biggest
value for metal sample. Such a value means that the multiplicity distributions derived
from the pulsetrain are slightly shifted towards higher moments. Other studies found
that this is a common problem also for other simulation codes [MS10] [Mil+11]. The
authors of these studies suggested that it could probably be resolved by a modified ν
value for 239Pu. At the current stage, no such modification has been implemented in
ONMS.
Figure 6.10 shows the results for simulations of the ESARDA benchmark phase III. Sim-
ilarly to phase I, the figure shows Singles, Doubles and Triples. Values for ONMS are
again based on the average of 10 independent runs, and the simulated measurement
time for each run was either assumed to be either long enough to generate more than
20 million neutron events per run for the larger samples or 1000 s. The figure also
shows experimental values, which are typically lower than the point model values, and
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Figure 6.10.: Results of ONMS simulations for ESARDA Benchmark phase III in compar-
ison with benchmark participants’ results. The error bars for the ONMS
values are show the standard deviation of ten independent calculations
for each sample. Results are normalized with regard to the point model
values given in [Pee+09] (orange line).
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also most of the simulations. This is due to inherent physical dead time effects of the
measurement systems, which were not accounted for in the simulations.
Very good results with regard to all three rates are achieved by ONMS for the two 252Cf
samples (epIII+IV-c1, epIII+IV-c2), as well as from most of the benchmark participants.
For the four plutonium sample, the single rates are slightly overestimated, as well as
the Doubles. The absolute overestimation is smaller than the general spread of the
results by different benchmark participants. As the Doubles are directly proportional to
Singles, the overestimation in the latter also increases the values of the first. For the
Triples, results are inside the range of benchmark participants for sample epIII+IV-c3,
and very close for epIII+IV-c6. For epIII+IV-c4 and epIII+IV-c5, results for Triples are
overestimated more.
An important factor that might contribute to the differences between point model,
benchmark participants and the ONMS results is the uncertainty of the four sample’s
isotopic composition. [Pee+09] only specified isotopic composition at the time of sam-
ple characterization, not at the time when the actual measurements took place. The age
of the samples used for the ONMS calculations was received in personal communication
with the author. It is not clear, however, what ages were assumed by the benchmark par-
ticipants. Other possible contributing factors are similar to those discussed previously -
detector design, sample geometry, and also differences in used nuclear data.
Overall, the results are good, although some of the validation simulations show values
slightly off the point model. Hence, ONMS should be considered a viable tool to carry
out neutron multiplicity simulations.
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7 Conclusion and Outlook
Currently and in the future, effective nuclear arms control agreements require technical
verification mechanisms. If new agreements will be negotiated, as for example a ban of
nuclear weapons, such needs for verification technology will increase as well. Scientists
and engineers play important roles carrying out developments to meet these necessities.
Constantly, new ideas are proposed and studied, and their implementation is discussed
and tested.
As a technical contribution to the field of nuclear arms control, an open source code
to carry out simulations of neutron multiplicity measurements was developed in this
thesis. Such measurements can be employed to estimate plutonium masses of samples,
for example in the context of nuclear safeguards or for nuclear disarmament verifica-
tion. The code, “Open Neutron Multiplicity Simulation” (ONMS) is able to carry out all
required tasks for simulations of such measurements. These tasks include
• Monte Carlo particle transport of neutrons through complex detector and sample
geometries, including the treatment of thermal neutron scattering in moderators
as polyethylene;
• adequate source definitions, including neutrons from spontaneous fission reactions
and (α, n) reactions;
• subsequent analysis of the neutron pulsetrains that are produced in the simulation
by neutron detection in specific detector elements.
Several codes exist that can carry out all tasks, developed over years by groups of re-
searchers in research centers around the world. Some more applications are available
that can carry the last task only. Nearly all existing comprehensive codes for the simu-
lation of neutron multiplicity measurements rely on MCNP41, an export-controlled and
proprietary application, for the Monte Carlo transport of neutrons. ONMS uses a dif-
ferent approach that has not been used before - it is based on the Geant4 framework, a
freely available set of routines for Monte Carlo particle transport.
Many functions for the three described tasks were implemented from scratch for ONMS,
Geant4 mainly supplied the basic Monte Carlo transport routines. In the ONMS source
routines, special functions for the treatment of (α, n) reactions were included, which
do not exist in other codes. They allow for an automatic calculation of (α, n) source
strength and neutron energy spectrum based on material specifications given by users.
The routine for the analysis of the detected neutron pulsetrain was implemented based
on commonly used shift register approaches. This routine was implemented to be usable
41 Before they were merged, this includes MCNP and MCNPX alike.
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with the application developed in the Geant4 framework, but could also be used as a
library for other programs. During the development, it was also made sure that all the
required nuclear data sets are available without restrictions.
The functionality of ONMS was validated in three ways. First, simulated results were
compared to experimental data generated by Malte Göttsche, based on his measure-
ments of eight different plutonium samples in metallic and oxide form. Second, the
pulsetrain analysis module was validated using two sets of pulsetrains that had been
generated for a large benchmark exercise by the Non-Destructive Assay Working Group
of ESARDA. The results of the analysis could be compared to results produced by other
code systems and theoretical values. Lastly, full Monte Carlo simulations have been
carried out based on the described benchmark, again comparing results to other codes
and theoretical values. While showing slightly larger discrepancies for large samples,
overall the validation showed that the code works well and could be a versatile tool to
carry out simulations of neutron multiplicity measurements.
Based on these results of this thesis, future research opportunities and needs can be
identified with regard to the development of ONMS. It might be useful to further ana-
lyze the differences shown in the results of the discussed validation efforts. That could
involve a renewed effort to check accuracy of detector and sample geometries and ma-
terials, and also make use of different nuclear cross section evaluations. While a small
set of different nuclear data sets has been already tested for some samples, no full study
of the influence of various parameters has been carried out. In the longer run, it is also
possible to continue pursuing the approach for (α, n) treatment that actually tracked
the transport of α particles through the geometry. This approach has not been followed
up in this thesis due to high computational needs. An increase in computing power
might make that approach feasible. While simulations can be carried out without such
an approach, it would be a valuable addition for the simulation of complex sample
geometries.
In the current version of ONMS, the pulsetrain analysis and subsequent calculation of
plutonium mass follows the most common approach used, which is based on several as-
sumptions as listed in chapter 4. Over time, several additions to this approach have been
proposed, for example the use of sample specific correction factors that improve the re-
sults for high multiplication [Göt15], or the use of different methods to generate the
gates for the extraction of the measured multiplicity distributions [CHH12; Hen+12].
It would be feasible to improve ONMS by implementing some of these approaches,
depending on intended further use cases.
While running many calculations using the Geant4 module NeutronHP / ParticleHP,
it became also clear that their would also be room for performance improvements.
Currently, Geant4 carries out Doppler broadening of neutron interaction cross sections
on-the-fly, i.e. whenever such a reaction could take place. Other Monte Carlo codes
allow for the use of specially prepared cross sections for specific temperatures, which
include already broadened peaks. It would be possible to implement a similar routine
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for Geant4, and prepare temperature-specific cross sections. This would involve chang-
ing parts of the Geant4 code - to add such a functionality permanently to Geant4 would
require consent by the Geant4 Collaboration.
Beyond the development of ONMS as a technical tool, it has a significance for an impor-
tant broader context, which was also identified and studied in this thesis. Verification
technologies have an inherent problem which goes beyond common research that fo-
cuses on technical aspects or direct effects of a technologies implementation. The issue
can be subdivided in at least three parts: First, technology not only need to produce
valid results, but all actors involved, states and others need trust the results. It is cru-
cial to establish confidence in the complex technical systems required for verification.
Second, there is a need for transparency of the means and assumptions that a technol-
ogy is based on, to allow everyone to understand and follow the conclusions drawn.
And lastly, it is important that the tools are available to at least every actor involved,
but also to the society at large, to ensure broad participation and democratic mecha-
nisms in the technical arms control process. All these points are relevant because the
results of verification technologies are often the basis for decision making by and among
states, nevertheless they are currently not addressed in research related to nuclear arms
control.
The problems have been discussed in detail in the beginning of the thesis, focusing on
the role of software. After identifying and describing the problem, a new solution has
been proposed. Software as part of verification technologies should adhere to three
open source criteria, defined as follows:
1. No restrictions for access to the program.
2. Distribution of the program must include the full source code.
3. Modifications of the program are allowed to anybody.
These criteria have been derived from definitions of open source software and free soft-
ware, as they are common in software development in general. Open source software
and the connected open source movement have become increasingly popular in the last
two decades. By offering a different way to create and maintain software, the open
source approach has contributed to significant changes in the world of software engi-
neering. To implement the criteria for nuclear arms control, either new software would
have to be developed or the distribution methods of existing software would need to
be changed significantly. With the development of ONMS, it can be shown that it is
possible to write such an application as an open source tool and publish it on a common
source distribution platform 42. While both, the technical work and the study of the role
of open source software could have been done in separate works, it was very beneficial
as a combined project - an approach that could also be repeated in the future.
Applying open source criteria to software in nuclear arms control has a number of ben-
efits. Software that fulfills the three criteria could enable more trusted and transparent
42 http://github.com/nuclearfreesoftware/onms
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verification exercises. Source code availability allows experts and a broader audience to
put tools under extensive scrutiny, looking for attempts of malicious and also uninten-
tional cheating and misbehavior. Easily accessible source code also makes underlying
assumptions transparent, at least to the extent of a third parties’ code reading abilities.
Allowing everyone to access software would allow for broad participation in the usage
for arms control purposes, but also for the development of the tools. This could lead to
better software, and to increased capacity building.
Looking at the process of other open source projects, some experiences would have to be
taken towards the field of nuclear arms control. While it is possible for many to partic-
ipate in a project, it is not guaranteed to happen. Important applications implemented
as open source software still need the structural backing of a state or an international
organization. Similarly important are clear decision making structures - the process to
allow developers to implement changes to critical software should include several steps
of adequate quality assessment. Often, free availability of software is perceived as a
risk due to dual-use aspects, for example using the software for weapons development
instead to help disarm weapons. This should be addressed by trying to develop software
with reduced dual-use characteristics. At the same it should be carefully checked that
access limitations do not harm possible verification uses for more than needed. Overall,
the benefits most likely outweigh the risks.
From early on, ideas of similar notion have been discussed with regard to nuclear arms
control. As early as in 1946 in the Acheson Lilienthal Plan proposed a global community
of knowledge as a necessary precondition for successful international cooperation for
the control of nuclear weapons. Clearly, the open source approach can help with the
creation of such a community, and would also help to make nuclear arms control more
democratic.
With regard to future steps, a concrete possibility based on the open source nature
of ONMS could be a new research opportunity for detector development. Instead of
relying on conventional approaches, one could also host an open challenge, where
groups would submit designs for such detectors, focusing their optimization for ex-
ample on very high efficiency or the reduction of 3He needs. That should not indicate
that current detectors are badly designed, but by allowing participants from different
backgrounds to participate, probably new innovative ideas could be generated. Such a
challenge benefits from the open source characteristics, but also requires a good docu-
mentation and specification of the task. If carried out on a broad scale, it would also
be a good way to spread knowledge and increase the number of experts on neutron
multiplicity counting and simulation.
In relation to the open source criteria, the most important next step would be the im-
plementation of the criteria for further software tools. In several presentations given
as part of this project, such an outreach was attempted and often well received. At
the same time, the discussions on this work showed the need for a set of instructions,
on how to convert software to open source software, explaining the exact meaning of
the term and the necessary steps to make software open source. A generic “handbook”
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containing these information might be worth considering, and could help the transition
process.
The introduction of more open source tools should be accompanied by a broader discus-
sion of open source aspects in the arms control community. It is important to know what
reasons there are that limit different actors from using open source software and from
making software available, and what would be required to overcome this reasons.
A different pathway forward are outreaching attempts to different communities. It is
one of the benefits of the open source approach that it does not limit participation
to arms control specialists. For example, it might be useful to address the group of
so-called hackers. The word hacker is often misunderstood for people that have bad
intentions. Here, it is not used in that way, but to describe talented and innovative
software developers. If involved, they could help creating more trusted systems, and
also support the task of spotting potential malfunctions in important code parts.
Besides software, the approach could be extended to hardware, to all technologies in-
volved in verification. Open source criteria for hardware are more difficult to review
successfully. It is possible to specify design criteria, electric circuits and physical proper-
ties, but to check if an actual part of an equipment adheres to all these criteria is harder
to achieve. While software can be exactly copied to allow others to study it, hardware
always consists of unique physical objects.
Beyond making the tools openly available, an even broader aspect should be taken into
consideration: It would not help to make software and hardware openly available if
there is a lack of open physics knowledge, which might exist due to classification and
sensitivity issues that states apply. Over time, solutions should be found to ensure that
all relevant physics necessary for verification technologies is accessible. Without such a
step, the differences in knowledge could again create mistrust and transparency, even
with fully open software and hardware.
Probably, such secrecy will not be necessary anymore in a world without nuclear
weapons. On the way towards such a world, open source software in general and
the tool developed as part of this work hopefully can contribute to foster sharing and
participation, trust and transparency.
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A JENDL/AN-2005 Cross Sections
The data set JENDL/AN-2005 is an evaluation of cross sections for inelastic interactions
of α-particles, with a particular focus on (α, n) reactions. It has been put together by
members of the Charged Particle Nuclear Data Working Group, which was established
under the Japanese Nuclear Data Committee at the Japan Atomic Energy Research Insti-
tute and is described in detail in [MMS06]. It is an updated version of JENDL/AN-2003
([MS02; MY02] evaluation. The evaluation includes several low-Z isotopes, listed in
table A.1. Comprehensive description of measurement data (and references) are given
in the report [MMS06]. Typically, the authors used available data from a number of
measurements, and the mEXIFON code to produce the cross sections.
Table A.1.: Isotopes included in JENDL/AN-2005, including a list of reactions available
for each isotope. In the reaction column, “np” stands for total neutron
production cross section, which combines the respective neutron producing
cross sections of the isotope.
Isotope ZAID Filename MT Reactions
6Li 3006 Li006.dat 4, 22, 28, 50-53/91, 201 (a,n), (a,a’n), (a,pn), (a,n0-3/c), np
7Li 3007 Li007.dat 4, 22, 50-54/91, 201 (a,n), (a,a’n), (a,n0-4/c), np
9Be 4009 Be009.dat 4, 22, 50-52/91, 201 (a,n), (a,a’n), (a,n0-2/c), np
10B 5010 B010.dat 4, 22, 28, 50-54/91, 201 (a,n), (a,a’n), (a,pn), (a,n0-4/c), np
11B 5011 B011.dat 4, 16, 28, 50-54/91, 201 (a,n), (a,2n), (a,pn), (a,n0-4/c), np
12C 6012 C012.dat 4, 50, 201 (a,n), (a,n0) - both equal, np
13C 6013 C013.dat 4, 22, 28, 50-54/91, 201 (a,n), (a,a’n), (a,pn), (a,n0-4/c), np
14N 7014 N014.dat 4, 22, 28, 50-54/91, 201 (a,n), (a,a’n), (a,pn), (a,n0-4/c), np
15N 7015 N015.dat 4, 22, 50-54/91, 201 (a,n), (a,a’n), (a,n0-4/c), np
17O 8017 O017.dat 4, 22, 50-53/91, 201 (a,n), (a,a’n), (a,n0-3/c), np
18O 8018 O018.dat 4, 16, 22, 50-54/91, 201 (a,n), (a, 2n), (a,a’n), (a,n0-4/c), np
19F 9019 F019.dat 4, 22, 28, 50-77/9, 201 (a,n), (a,a’n), (a,pn), (a,n0-27/c), np
23Na 11023 Na023.dat 4, 28, 50-78/9, 201 (a,n), (a,pn), (a,n0-28/c), np
27Al 13027 Al027.dat 201 np
28Si 14028 Si028.dat 201 np
29Si 14029 Si029.dat 201 np
30Si 14030 Si030.dat 201 np
According to the report, for every cross section thick-target neutron yields were cal-
culated based on [Zie77] stopping power data. After that, the authors claim to have
adjusted the cross sections to closely match yield data from [BC79] and [WS82], how-
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ever no information on uncertainties is given in the report. The cross sections data files
are available online for download43.
A set of small scripts has been written to process these cross sections, and turn them into
a format that is similar to the G4NDL file format for low energy neutron cross sections
in Geant4. The scripts are all part of the Github Repository for ONMS, located under
the subfolder tools/JENDL-conversion
The script download.sh downloads and extracts the cross sections into a new folder
JENDL-AN-2005. As the files have Windows newline (CRLF), an additional folder is cre-
ated and files are converted to UNIX style newlines. The original files have minor ENDF
errors with regard to the used notation. As this does lead to readout errors depending
on the used readout routine, the errors have been fixed using patch files. The first MAT,
1,451/ blank, blank, MF1, MT1, NC1, MOD1]CONT entry, which holds the number of
lines for every MF/MT entry lists one line less than necessary for the MF=1, MT=451
entry. This error is occuring in B010.dat, B011.dat, C012.dat, C013.dat, F019.dat,
Li006.dat, Li007.dat, N014.dat, N015.dat, Na023.dat, O017.dat, O018.dat.
In addition, all evaluation files have the following headline:
JENDL/AN-2005 0 0
but should have
JENDL/AN-2005 0 0 0 0
Two patch files, 451-lines.patch and headline.patch were created that contain all
necessary changes to correct the missing lines. The patches can be executed using the
script patch.sh. Conversion to G4NDL format is significantly more complex. While
the ENDF file format is well documented [HT09], only parts of the G4NDL structure
are documented in [Gea15b]. A short script convert.py was written to do the conver-
sion. It relies on the three Python modules, that were specifically developed for this
task. newmf.py uses routines from PyNE to create a complete data structure in Python
that holds the data of the ENDF files. geantdata.py can produce G4NDL formatted
files based on this data structure. endfgeant4converter.py combines the other two
modules and takes care of the management of input and outputfiles.
Important for the routine for (α, n) reactions in NMSMaterialDecaySource are not only
the production cross sections, but also the partial cross sections (MT=50-91). These
cross sections describe reactions that leave the residual nucleus in an excited state and
are used for the calculation of the neutron energy spectrum. The files produced by the
conversion script are stored in the folder called output. To be able to use them with
ONMS, the environmental variable NMSALPHALEDATA has to be set to include that path.
The scripts also read MF=6 data from the ENDF files. The MF=6 section contains
energy-angle distributions. These distributions are also converted to G4NDL files. They
43 http://wwwndc.jaea.go.jp/ftpnd/ftp/JENDL/jendlan2005.tar.gz
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are not used for typical ONMS reactions, but have been used in the development pro-
cess to test the implementation of new (α, n) cross sections for α-particle transport in
Geant4.
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B Example GDML file
The following listing shows a GDML file for the model of the sample “PM1”, as described
in section 6.1.
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no" ?>
2 <gdml xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema -instance" xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="../schema/gdml.xsd
">
3
4 <define>
5 <position name="NMSGDML-SamplePosition" unit="cm" x="0" y="0" z="-6.45" />
6 </define>
7
8 <materials>
9 <isotope N="58" Z="28" name="Ni58">
10 <atom unit="g/mole" value="57.935342" />
11 </isotope>
12 <isotope N="60" Z="28" name="Ni60">
13 <atom unit="g/mole" value="59.930786" />
14 </isotope>
15 <isotope N="61" Z="28" name="Ni61">
16 <atom unit="g/mole" value="60.931056" />
17 </isotope>
18 <isotope N="62" Z="28" name="Ni62">
19 <atom unit="g/mole" value="61.928345" />
20 </isotope>
21 <isotope N="64" Z="28" name="Ni64">
22 <atom unit="g/mole" value="63.927967" />
23 </isotope>
24 <isotope N="63" Z="29" name="Cu63">
25 <atom unit="g/mole" value="62.929598" />
26 </isotope>
27 <isotope N="65" Z="29" name="Cu65">
28 <atom unit="g/mole" value="64.927790" />
29 </isotope>
30 <isotope N="238" Z="94" name="Pu238">
31 <atom unit="g/mole" value="238.049560" />
32 </isotope>
33 <isotope N="239" Z="94" name="Pu239">
34 <atom unit="g/mole" value="239.052164" />
35 </isotope>
36 <isotope N="240" Z="94" name="Pu240">
37 <atom unit="g/mole" value="240.053814" />
38 </isotope>
39 <isotope N="241" Z="94" name="Pu241">
40 <atom unit="g/mole" value="241.056852" />
41 </isotope>
42 <isotope N="242" Z="94" name="Pu242">
43 <atom unit="g/mole" value="242.058743" />
44 </isotope>
45 <isotope N="241" Z="95" name="Am241">
46 <atom unit="g/mole" value="241.056829" />
47 </isotope>
48 <element name="El-Ni_of_NMSSourceMaterial">
49 <fraction n="0.680770" ref="Ni58" />
50 <fraction n="0.262230" ref="Ni60" />
51 <fraction n="0.011399" ref="Ni61" />
52 <fraction n="0.036346" ref="Ni62" />
53 <fraction n="0.009255" ref="Ni64" />
54 </element>
55 <element name="El-Cu_of_NMSSourceMaterial">
56 <fraction n="0.691500" ref="Cu63" />
57 <fraction n="0.308500" ref="Cu65" />
58 </element>
59 <element name="El-Pu_of_NMSSourceMaterial">
60 <fraction n="0.000040" ref="Pu238" />
61 <fraction n="0.954385" ref="Pu239" />
123
62 <fraction n="0.045110" ref="Pu240" />
63 <fraction n="0.000317" ref="Pu241" />
64 <fraction n="0.000148" ref="Pu242" />
65 </element>
66 <element name="El-Am_of_NMSSourceMaterial">
67 <fraction n="1.000000" ref="Am241" />
68 </element>
69 <material name="NMSSourceMaterial" state="solid">
70 <D unit="g/cm3" value="20.059704" />
71 <fraction n="0.055000" ref="El-Ni_of_NMSSourceMaterial" />
72 <fraction n="0.035000" ref="El-Cu_of_NMSSourceMaterial" />
73 <fraction n="0.907770" ref="El-Pu_of_NMSSourceMaterial" />
74 <fraction n="0.002229" ref="El-Am_of_NMSSourceMaterial" />
75 </material>
76
77 <material Z="13" name="G4_Al" state="solid">
78 <MEE unit="eV" value="166"/>
79 <D unit="g/cm3" value="2.699"/>
80 <atom unit="g/mole" value="26.9815"/>
81 </material>
82 <isotope N="54" Z="26" name="Fe54">
83 <atom unit="g/mole" value="53.9396"/>
84 </isotope>
85 <isotope N="56" Z="26" name="Fe56">
86 <atom unit="g/mole" value="55.9349"/>
87 </isotope>
88 <isotope N="57" Z="26" name="Fe57">
89 <atom unit="g/mole" value="56.9354"/>
90 </isotope>
91 <isotope N="58" Z="26" name="Fe58">
92 <atom unit="g/mole" value="57.9333"/>
93 </isotope>
94 <element name="Fe">
95 <fraction n="0.05845" ref="Fe54"/>
96 <fraction n="0.91754" ref="Fe56"/>
97 <fraction n="0.02119" ref="Fe57"/>
98 <fraction n="0.00282" ref="Fe58"/>
99 </element>
100 <isotope N="50" Z="24" name="Cr50">
101 <atom unit="g/mole" value="49.946"/>
102 </isotope>
103 <isotope N="52" Z="24" name="Cr52">
104 <atom unit="g/mole" value="51.9405"/>
105 </isotope>
106 <isotope N="53" Z="24" name="Cr53">
107 <atom unit="g/mole" value="52.9407"/>
108 </isotope>
109 <isotope N="54" Z="24" name="Cr54">
110 <atom unit="g/mole" value="53.9389"/>
111 </isotope>
112 <element name="Cr">
113 <fraction n="0.04345" ref="Cr50"/>
114 <fraction n="0.83789" ref="Cr52"/>
115 <fraction n="0.09501" ref="Cr53"/>
116 <fraction n="0.02365" ref="Cr54"/>
117 </element>
118 <isotope N="58" Z="28" name="Ni58">
119 <atom unit="g/mole" value="57.9353"/>
120 </isotope>
121 <isotope N="60" Z="28" name="Ni60">
122 <atom unit="g/mole" value="59.9308"/>
123 </isotope>
124 <isotope N="61" Z="28" name="Ni61">
125 <atom unit="g/mole" value="60.9311"/>
126 </isotope>
127 <isotope N="62" Z="28" name="Ni62">
128 <atom unit="g/mole" value="61.9283"/>
129 </isotope>
130 <isotope N="64" Z="28" name="Ni64">
131 <atom unit="g/mole" value="63.928"/>
132 </isotope>
133 <element name="Ni">
134 <fraction n="0.680769" ref="Ni58"/>
135 <fraction n="0.262231" ref="Ni60"/>
136 <fraction n="0.011399" ref="Ni61"/>
137 <fraction n="0.036345" ref="Ni62"/>
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138 <fraction n="0.009256" ref="Ni64"/>
139 </element>
140 <material name="Aisi304Steel" state="solid">
141 <T unit="K" value="293.15"/>
142 <MEE unit="eV" value="282.839371081725"/>
143 <D unit="g/cm3" value="7.92"/>
144 <fraction n="0.705" ref="Fe"/>
145 <fraction n="0.19" ref="Cr"/>
146 <fraction n="0.105" ref="Ni"/>
147 </material>
148
149 <isotope N="12" Z="6" name="C12">
150 <atom unit="g/mole" value="12"/>
151 </isotope>
152 <isotope N="13" Z="6" name="C13">
153 <atom unit="g/mole" value="13.0034"/>
154 </isotope>
155 <element name="C">
156 <fraction n="0.9893" ref="C12"/>
157 <fraction n="0.0107" ref="C13"/>
158 </element>
159 <isotope N="14" Z="7" name="N14">
160 <atom unit="g/mole" value="14.0031"/>
161 </isotope>
162 <isotope N="15" Z="7" name="N15">
163 <atom unit="g/mole" value="15.0001"/>
164 </isotope>
165 <element name="N">
166 <fraction n="0.99632" ref="N14"/>
167 <fraction n="0.00368" ref="N15"/>
168 </element>
169 <isotope N="16" Z="8" name="O16">
170 <atom unit="g/mole" value="15.9949"/>
171 </isotope>
172 <isotope N="17" Z="8" name="O17">
173 <atom unit="g/mole" value="16.9991"/>
174 </isotope>
175 <isotope N="18" Z="8" name="O18">
176 <atom unit="g/mole" value="17.9992"/>
177 </isotope>
178 <element name="O">
179 <fraction n="0.99757" ref="O16"/>
180 <fraction n="0.00038" ref="O17"/>
181 <fraction n="0.00205" ref="O18"/>
182 </element>
183 <isotope N="36" Z="18" name="Ar36">
184 <atom unit="g/mole" value="35.9675"/>
185 </isotope>
186 <isotope N="38" Z="18" name="Ar38">
187 <atom unit="g/mole" value="37.9627"/>
188 </isotope>
189 <isotope N="40" Z="18" name="Ar40">
190 <atom unit="g/mole" value="39.9624"/>
191 </isotope>
192 <element name="Ar">
193 <fraction n="0.003365" ref="Ar36"/>
194 <fraction n="0.000632" ref="Ar38"/>
195 <fraction n="0.996003" ref="Ar40"/>
196 </element>
197 <material name="G4_AIR" state="gas">
198 <MEE unit="eV" value="85.7"/>
199 <D unit="g/cm3" value="0.00120479"/>
200 <fraction n="0.000124000124000124" ref="C"/>
201 <fraction n="0.755267755267755" ref="N"/>
202 <fraction n="0.231781231781232" ref="O"/>
203 <fraction n="0.0128270128270128" ref="Ar"/>
204 </material>
205 </materials>
206
207 <solids>
208 <tube aunit="deg" deltaphi="360" lunit="mm" name="SolidPu" rmax="3.75" rmin="0" startphi="0" z="15.5"/>
209 <tube aunit="deg" deltaphi="360" lunit="mm" name="totalAlCase" rmax="7" rmin="0" startphi="0" z="46"/>
210 <tube aunit="deg" deltaphi="360" lunit="mm" name="innerAlCase" rmax="4" rmin="0" startphi="0" z="31"/>
211 <subtraction name="AlCaseSolid">
212 <first ref="totalAlCase"/>
213 <second ref="innerAlCase"/>
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214 <position name="AlCaseSolid_pos" unit="mm" x="0" y="0" z="-2.5"/>
215 </subtraction>
216 <tube aunit="deg" deltaphi="360" lunit="mm" name="PerlaCavity" rmax="11.5" rmin="0" startphi="0" z="69.5"
/>
217 <tube aunit="deg" deltaphi="360" lunit="mm" name="totalPerla" rmax="18" rmin="0" startphi="0" z="90"/>
218 <tube aunit="deg" deltaphi="360" lunit="mm" name="outerPerlaNon" rmax="18.1" rmin="12.5" startphi="0" z="
65"/>
219 <subtraction name="PerlaSolid">
220 <first ref="totalPerla"/>
221 <second ref="outerPerlaNon"/>
222 <position name="PerlaSolid_pos" unit="mm" x="0" y="0" z="-12.6"/>
223 </subtraction>
224 </solids>
225
226 <structure>
227 <volume name="PM1">
228 <materialref ref="NMSSourceMaterial"/>
229 <solidref ref="SolidPu"/>
230 </volume>
231 <volume name="AlCase">
232 <materialref ref="G4_Al"/>
233 <solidref ref="AlCaseSolid"/>
234 </volume>
235 <volume name="PerlaCavity">
236 <materialref ref="Aisi304Steel"/>
237 <solidref ref="PerlaCavity"/>
238 <physvol name="NMSSourceVolume">
239 <volumeref ref="PM1"/>
240 <position name="PM1_pos" unit="mm" x="0" y="0" z="-22.0"/>
241 </physvol>
242 <physvol name="AlCase">
243 <volumeref ref="AlCase"/>
244 <position name="AlCase_pos" unit="mm" x="0" y="0" z="-11.75"/>
245 </physvol>
246 </volume>
247 <volume name="NMSLVName -SampleMother">
248 <materialref ref="G4_AIR"/>
249 <solidref ref="PerlaSolid"/>
250 <physvol name="PerlaCavity">
251 <volumeref ref="PerlaCavity"/>
252 <position name="PerlaCavity_pos" unit="mm" x="0" y="0" z="-7.25"/>
253 </physvol>
254 </volume>
255 </structure>
256
257 <setup name="Default" version="1.0">
258 <world ref="NMSLVName -SampleMother"/>
259 </setup>
260
261 </gdml>
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C Usage of Open Neutron Multiplicity
Simulation
C.1 Command Line Options
A small number of command line options has been defined for ONMS, which can be used
when ONMS is started. Most settings specified using command line options cannot be
changed at runtime.
Table C.1.: Command line options for ONMS.
-h / help Show help
-D <detector> GDML File with Detector specification
(Default: gdml/detector/PSMC.gdml)
-S <sample> GDML File with Sample specification
(Default: gdml/sample/PM1.gdml)
-n Do not use PhysicsList with thermal neutron
scattering (it is used as default)
-m <macrofilename> Load <macrofilename> (Default: vis.mac)
-b <macrofilename> Run <macrofilename> in batch mode
-l <logfile> Write all output to log file <logfile>
-p <name> Name for all output files (log, result etc.).
-r <no1> <no2> Create file random_seeds.txt with <no2> lines,
each line containing <no1> random seeds
C.2 Messenger Options
Geant4 allows application developers to make use of specific messenger classes to define
user interface commands. These commands can be called at runtime and allow users
to change settings, but also to control the program flow. All commands listed in table
C.2 have been specifically programmed for ONMS. They can be used to work with the
program interactively, e.g. to load and analyze pulsetrain data files using different
settings.
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Table C.2.: Messenger Commands
Command Description
Control event runs
/ONMS/run/runtime Set measurement time to be simulated
/ONMS/run/printmodulo Every time the event number modulo the
given value is zero, status information is
printed
/ONMS/run/beamOnRuntime Start calculation, the number of events is
calculated based on source activity
Parameters for analysis and result output
/ONMS/analysis/detectorvolume Set volume name of the volume where neu-
tron absorption is added to pulsetrain
/ONMS/analysis/lostvolume Set volume name of the volume where neu-
tron absorption is counted as lost neutron
/ONMS/analysis/showresults Show results of current run or loaded
pulsetrain data
/ONMS/analysis/
writesourceneutronenergies
Write list of source neutron energies to file
/ONMS/analysis/eventoffset Set an event-id offset for pulsetrain (e.g.
for multiple parallel runs)
/ONMS/analysis/writeresults Write results to files (detector statistics,
multiplicity results and settings)
/ONMS/analysis/writeresultsafterrun Automatically export results after each run
/ONMS/analysis/writeincludepulsetrain Turn pulsetrain file export on/off for nor-
mal result write
/ONMS/analysis/readpulsetrain Load a pulsetrain from a pulsetrain file.
“.pulsetrain” is automatically added to file-
name
/ONMS/analysis/readshakespulsetrain Load a pulsetrain from a file that contains
a list of events with eventtimes in shakes
/ONMS/analysis/multiplicitylength Set maximal multiplicity for R+A / A dis-
tributions
/ONMS/analysis/registerlength Set length of shift register (in positions!)
/ONMS/analysis/registerperiod Set register period of shift register
/ONMS/analysis/setpredelay Predelay for pulsetrain analysis
/ONMS/analysis/setlongdelay Long delay for pulsetrain analysis
/ONMS/analysis/setgate Gate length for pulsetrain analysis
/ONMS/analysis/setderandomizeperiod Set period for derandomize-quantization
step
/ONMS/analysis/derandomizedo Turn on/off derandomize quantization step
/ONMS/analysis/registerquantizationdo Turn on/off register quantization step
Table continued on next page
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Table C.2 – continued from previous page
Command Description
/ONMS/analysis/efficiency Set detector efficiency for mass calcula-
tions
/ONMS/analysis/dieawaymethod Set method to calculate dieaway (0 = fixed
dieaway time)
/ONMS/analysis/dieaway Set neutron dieaway time for detector
/ONMS/analysis/infinitegate Set length for ’infinite’ gate to be used for
gate fraction calculations
/ONMS/analysis/gatefractionmethod Choose method for calculation of gate frac-
tions
/ONMS/analysis/gatefractions Set fixed gate fractions
/ONMS/analysis/predeadtime Dead time for algorithm carried out pre
quantization
/ONMS/analysis/predeadtimeupdating Set dead time to be/not to be updating for
algorithm carried out PRE quantization
/ONMS/analysis/postdeadtime Dead time for algorithm carried out post
quantization
/ONMS/analysis/postdeadtimeupdating Set dead time to be/not to be updating for
algorithm carried out POST quantization
/ONMS/analysis/pulsetrainanalysismode Set pulsetrain analysis method (for-
ward/backward)
General source settings
/ONMS/source/verbose Set verbose level for MaterialDecaySource
/ONMS/source/material Select material for ONMSMaterialDe-
caySource
/ONMS/source/sourcefromvolume Specify a physical volume name that
should be used as source
/ONMS/source/cf252sfoptions Set options for multiplicity and energy dis-
tribution of Cf252 spontaneous fission.
/ONMS/source/activevolume Set active volume of source (density as in
material specification)
/ONMS/source/activity Set activity of source
/ONMS/source/activityfixed Set to true to override automatic activity
calculation.
/ONMS/source/sfn Enable/disable spontaneous fission (neu-
tron emission) as a decay mode for source
/ONMS/source/sfg Enable/disable spontaneous fission
(gamma emission) as a decay mode for
source
/ONMS/source/alpha Enable/disable α-decay for source
/ONMS/source/neutronAlphaN Enable/disable neutrons from (α,n) reac-
tions for source
Table continued on next page
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Table C.2 – continued from previous page
Command Description
/ONMS/source/dumpstatus Output current source status
Special settings for (α, n) reaction source
/ONMS/source/alphan/directionSampling Set method for sampling the position
/ONMS/source/alphan/energySampling Set method for sampling the energy
/ONMS/source/alphan/positionSampling Set method for sampling the position
/ONMS/source/alphan/energy Set energy of neutrons emitted by (α, n)
reactions
/ONMS/source/alphan/filename Set file for input (α, n) reaction data
/ONMS/source/alphan/energyFilename Set file with neutron energy spectrum for
alpha,n reaction
/ONMS/source/alphan/writeEnergyFile Output (α, n) reaction spectrum to file
/ONMS/source/alphan/
energySpectrumIncludeMT91
Turn on/off inclusion of MT91 cross sec-
tion (and Q-value) for spectrum calcula-
tion
/ONMS/source/alphan/
activityCalculation
Set method for calculation of activity for
/ONMS/source/alphan/activity Set activity of (α, n) neutron source
Source geometry settings
/ONMS/source/geometry/type Set ONMSMaterialDecaySource distribu-
tion type
/ONMS/source/geometry/shape Set ONMSMaterialDecaySource shape for
Surface or Volume source
/ONMS/source/geometry/volume Confine source to volume (NULL to unset)
/ONMS/source/geometry/radius Set radius.
/ONMS/source/geometry/inner_radius Set inner radius when required.
/ONMS/source/geometry/halfx Set inner radius when required.
/ONMS/source/geometry/halfy Set inner radius when required.
/ONMS/source/geometry/halfz Set z half length.
/ONMS/source/geometry/centre Set centre coordinates of ONMSMateri-
alDecaySource
Random seeds
/ONMS/randomSeedList Creates a list of pairs of random seeds
It is also possible to combine commands in a macro file, which can be used to automatically run
calculations. An example macro file is shown in the next section.
C.3 Example Macro file
The following macro file was used to calculate sample “PuO2-20”. It was used as a split run,
where many runs with a measurement length of 5 s where simulated using different random
seeds. It uses neutron from spontaneous fission and (α, n) reactions as source particles. In
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the end, results including statistics of the run (started / absorbed neutrons) as well as source
settings and the produced pulsetrain are written to different files.
Listing C.1: Macro file for calculation of PuO2-20 sample.
1 # Source Volume & Material
2 /NMS/source/material NMSSourceMaterial
3 /NMS/source/sourcefromvolume NMSSourceVolume
4
5 # Detector Settings
6 /NMS/analysis/detectorvolume HE1-He
7 /NMS/analysis/lostvolume PolyethyleneArea
8
9
10
11 # Source Type and settings
12 /NMS/source/sfg false
13 /NMS/source/sfn true
14 /NMS/source/alpha false
15 /NMS/source/neutronAlphaN true
16 # /NMS/source/activity - not given
17
18 # AlphaN Settings
19 /NMS/source/alphan/directionSampling 0
20 /NMS/source/alphan/energySampling 2
21 /NMS/source/alphan/positionSampling 0
22 # /NMS/source/alphan/energy - not given
23 # /NMS/source/alphan/filename - not given
24 /NMS/source/alphan/activityCalculation 2
25 # /NMS/source/alphan/activity - not given
26
27 # Runtime settings
28 /random/setSeeds 28607207 36633217
29 /NMS/run/runtime 5
30 /NMS/run/printmodulo 1000
31 /NMS/analysis/eventoffset 0
32
33 # Run
34 /NMS/run/beamOnRuntime 1
35
36 # Create some output
37 /NMS/source/dumpstatus
38 /NMS/analysis/writesourceneutronenergies puo2-20
39 /NMS/source/alphan/writeEnergyFile puo2-20
40 /NMS/analysis/showresults
41 /NMS/analysis/writeincludepulsetrain true
42 /NMS/analysis/writeresults puo2-20
C.4 Formats of result files produced by ONMS
After a pulsetrain analysis has been carried out, a results file similar to file in list-
ing C.2 is produced. In the beginning, it includes information on the source par-
ticles generated (primaryalpha, primarygamma, primaryneutron, neutronpertime,
primaryneutronenergy). The next set of information is related to the processes in the
detector (secondaryneutron, totalneutron, secondaryneutronenergy, neutron-
absorbeddetector, neutronabsorbedlostvolume). Often of interest are the values
efficiencysource, giving the number of neutrons detected divided by the number
of neutrons started in a source; efficciencytotal giving the number of neutrons
detected divided by the number produced in any neutron producing reaction; and
neutronlifetime, which gives the average lifetime of a neutron before leakage or
absorption. All these values only depend on source definition and Monte Carlo trans-
port.
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All other values depend on the settings that were made for the pulsetrain analysis. The
moments of derived from the pulsetrain are given as totals (singlestotals, etc.), per
time (singlespertime). Also, values are calculated based on splitting the pulsetrain
into ten smaller timesteps (avgsinglespertime). From this treatment, it is also pos-
sible to calculate statistical uncertainties (the standard deviation of the distribution,
uncsinglespertime). The remaining values are the multipliciation, spontaneous fis-
sion rate and α ratio as well as plutonium effective mass. The total plutonium mass is
calculated based on the isotopic composition of the specified source material.
Listing C.2: Result file of a calculation of PuO2-20 sample.
1 runtime ,5,s
2 lastevent ,4.99483,s
3 primaryalpha ,0,1
4 primarygamma ,0,1
5 primaryneutron ,5989,1
6 secondaryneutron ,345,1
7 totalneutron ,6334,1
8 sfnubar ,0,n/SF
9 neutronpertime ,1197.8,1/s
10 primaryneutronenergy ,2.03991,MeV
11 secondaryneutronenergy ,1.52004,MeV
12 neutronabsorbeddetector ,3315,1
13 detectorvolname ,HE1-He,-
14 neutronabsorbedlostvolume ,1741,1
15 lostvolumename ,PolyethyleneArea ,-
16 efficiencysource ,0.553515,1
17 efficiencytotal ,0.523366,1
18 neutronlifetime ,52.1742,ms
19 singlestotal ,3315,1
20 doublestotal ,625,1
21 triplestotal ,104.17,1
22 singlespertime ,663,1/s
23 doublespertime ,125,1/s
24 triplespertime ,20.8341,1/s
25 avgsinglespertime ,663,1/s
26 avgdoublespertime ,125,1/s
27 avgtriplespertime ,20.8716,1/s
28 uncsinglespertime ,52.7276,1/s
29 uncdoublespertime ,27.47,1/s
30 unctriplespertime ,11.4518,1/s
31 multiplication ,1.00082346352,1
32 alpha ,0.682605114316,1
33 fissionrate ,334.761405542,1/s
34 pu240effmass ,0.698876,g
35 pumass ,5.03887,g
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D Additional results for dead time
calculations
The following figures show additional results for ESARDA Benchmark, phase II, in-
cluding different dead time corrections. All results are normalized with regard to the
point model results given in [PS06] (orange line). ONMS calculations are shown in
red, Benchmark participants in blue. Results of ONMS calculation in comparison with
benchmark participant values.
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Figure D.1.: Pulsetrain analysis results, ESARDA benchmark phase II, assuming a dead
time of 0.5 µs, non-updating.
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Figure D.2.: Pulsetrain analysis results, ESARDA benchmark phase II, assuming a dead
time of 0.5 µs, updating.
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Figure D.3.: Pulsetrain analysis results, ESARDA benchmark phase II, assuming a dead
time of 2 µs, non-updating.
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Figure D.4.: Pulsetrain analysis results, ESARDA benchmark phase II, assuming a dead
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